



YNUJ

THE YALE-NUS UNDERGRADUATE JOURNAL

VOLUME III



Yale-NUS Undergraduate Journal (YNUJ)

Volume III

First edition published 2018

Yale-NUS Society for Academic Research (YNSAR)

Yale-NUS College

16 College Avenue West, Singapore 138527

ISSN: 26304899

Printed in Singapore by Drummond Printing Pte Ltd
65 Sims Avenue #02-06, Yi Xiu Factory Building
Singapore 387418



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PRESIDENT'S LETTER

I am very proud to present Volume III of the Yale-NUS Undergraduate Journal (YNUJ) in my final year as President of the Yale-NUS Society for Academic Research (YNSAR). This is the culmination of a year's hard work from everyone in the organization, and I am truly grateful to my Executive Committee for their invaluable assistance in seeing the project through to completion. Thank you, particularly, to May for assisting with publishing, and Cedric for delivering the latest entry in a line of beautifully formatted publications.

My sincerest gratitude, as well, to our incredible student editors. Alston, Amanda, Anthea, Capucine, Cedric, Clara, Devendra, Jincong, Joanne, Nigel, and Yejin, thank you all for your service and continued dedication to the club. Volume III would not have been possible without you, and I hope you will look back on our achievement with great pride. Special thanks and congratulations, of course, are in order for our Editor-in-Chief, Dianne, who has worked tirelessly to prepare this Volume for publication. Dianne, it's been a privilege working with you, and I simply cannot thank you enough for your leadership and friendship throughout the process. I am glad that we are signing off together on this joyous note after a rollercoaster year! Enjoy your retirement; you've earned it.

Thank you, also, to our faculty editors for graciously offering their time and expertise to Volume III; Assistant Professors Nozomi Naoi, Yu-Min Joo, and Zachary Howlett, Associate Professors Eduardo Araral and Luke

O'Sullivan, and Professors Gavin Flood and John Driffill have helped us ensure that the YNUJ maintains a high standard of rigor and novelty, in line with our growing ambitions at the frontiers of undergraduate research. I am especially happy to note the club's increased interaction with external faculty, which is a testament to both YNSAR's and the YNUJ's continued growth. And finally, a heartfelt thank you to our faculty advisor, Professor Terry Nardin, for remaining the one true constant for the club and a sempiternal source of guidance and support.

Dear esteemed reader, it has been a joy and an absolute honor sharing brilliant undergraduate research with you. We have an exciting selection of pieces this year, premiering an economics paper, amongst others, and the Journal is now ready for its next big leap forward. I've served YNSAR in various capacities for the entirety of my undergraduate career, and the club's continued success indubitably means the world to me. I am thus delighted to be leaving YNSAR and the YNUJ in the very capable hands of the next Executive Committee, and am thrilled by their ambitious and creative plans for the future. For the final time now, thank you very much for your support, and please join me in following the organization's development with great anticipation and enthusiasm in the years to come.

**Yours,
Darrel Chang
PRESIDENT**



EDITOR-IN-CHIEF'S LETTER

Volume III of the Yale-NUS Undergraduate Journal presents a rich tapestry of stories and incisive analyses around the world. We start in Spain, where Francesca Maviglia illuminates a lacuna in Spanish anarchist scholarship, arguing that it is microcosmic of reigning Eurocentric historiography. Moving to Jordan, Peter Ooi presents an original approach to the literature on Palestinian refugees by deconstructing preconceived binaries on the self-construction of identity. Spotlighting the former British India region, Ng Qi Siang juxtaposes two renowned novels to underscore tensions over a marginalised caste. Over at Bangladesh, Kam Qiang Wei argues that elderly welfare is cast as a political pawn to the detriment of the vulnerable population it is meant to serve. Following, Natasha Lee's in-depth ethnography of lion dance in Singapore illuminates the practice's constructions of authenticity to grapple with a checkered history. Finally, in global analyses, Dhivesh Dadlani presents a compelling quantitative case for the correlations between mandatory conscription and national pride, while Al Lim reframes the logic of global heritage sites to better preserve cultural heritage.

I would like to thank Vol III's contributors, our student and faculty editors, executive committee members and faculty advisor Professor Terry Nardin for bringing this issue to fruition. My sincerest thanks, also, to our Society's President Darrel Chang for his dedication to nurturing the growth of our organisation. I will be stepping down from my position as Editor-in-Chief following this issue and warmly welcome my successor, Alcan Sng. Alcan brings with him a wealth of editorial experience and a passion for publishing. I am confident he will carry on the vision that our Society was founded upon: to spotlight original, illuminating perspectives, written accessibly for an interdisciplinary audience.

To our esteemed readers, thank you for your support. I hope you will enjoy the contents of this Volume as much as I have.

**Yours,
Dianne A.
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF**

CONTRIBUTORS

EDITORS

Yejin Park '19

Capucine Barcellona, '20

Anthea Julia Chua, '20

Jincong Chu, '20

Alston Ng, '21

Amanda Leong, '21

Cedric Choo, '21

Clara Low, '21

Devendra Neupane, '21

Joanne Ho, '21

Nigel Loh, '21

FACULTY ADVISOR

Terry Nardin

Professor of Political Science

Yale-NUS College

FACULTY EDITORS

Nozomi Naoi

Asst. Professor of Humanities (Art History)

Yale-NUS College

Yu-Min Joo

Asst. Professor

Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy

Zachary M. Howlett

Asst. Professor of Social Sciences

(Anthropology)

Yale-NUS College

John Driffill

Professor of Economics/Visiting Professor

Birkbeck College/Yale-NUS College

Gavin Flood

Professor of Hindu Studies and Comparative

Religion/Yap Kim Hao Visiting Professor of

Comparative Religious Studies

University of Oxford/Yale-NUS College

Eduardo Araral

Vice Dean for Research/Associate Professor

Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy

YNSAR EXCO

Darrel Chang

President

Dianne Araral/Darrel Chang

Co-Editors-in-Chief

Tristan Koh

Video Team Manager

Alston Ng

Vice-President

Cedric Choo

Marketing Director

Wang Xing Hao

Vice-President

May Wang

Treasurer

Invisible Friendships:

Anti-Colonial Anarchism in Spain and the Blind Spots of Historiography

Francesca Maviglia, Yale-NUS College '19

It is necessary, in these critical moments when chauvinists, businessmen, and all those who cause wars or eagerly wait for them to profit at the expense of the people, declare themselves first-class patriots, that us, the anarchists, the stateless, the disruptive, those who above divisions of borders and races see in each worker a brother, oppose to the miserable cry of “pro fatherland”, the sublime principle of “pro humanity”.

Editorial of nº 226 of the Spanish anarchist magazine *Tierra y Libertad* (“Land and Freedom”), 12th of August 1914¹

Introduction

In *The Age of Globalization*, Benedict Anderson traces the influence of European anarchism on the novels of the Filipino nationalist José Rizal. According to Anderson, at the end of the 19th century there was an active internationalist network that connected the Philippines, Cuba and Europe and contributed to the rise of anti-colonial movements in the former two.² This paper set out to the task of retracing these networks in the opposite direction: rather than looking at the way European anarchists influenced anti-colonial struggles, investigating the ripples provoked by independentist turmoil in the colonial world in European anarchist movements between the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries.

I decided to focus on the context of Spain primarily due to two factors. Firstly, the Spanish anarchist movement was arguably the most significant in Europe. Secondly, while Spain had lost most of its colonies in the early 1800s during the Spanish American wars of independence, three of its territories were still struggling to break free in the latter decades of the century: Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. Spain thus presents a very interesting case study, as the surge of anarchist and socialist movements coincided with the Spanish Crown’s desperate efforts to

¹ Quoted in Joan Zambrana, “El Anarquismo Organizado En Los Orígenes de La CNT (Tierra y Libertad 1910-1919)” (CEDALL, 2009), 752. My translation.

² Benedict R. O’G Anderson, *The Age of Globalization: Anarchism and the Anticolonial Imagination* (London ; New York, NY: Verso, 2013).

hold on to its last imperial possessions. In contrast, France and Britain did not lose most of their colonies until the late 20th century; smaller European powers like Germany and Italy only started acquiring colonial territories at the end of the 19th century through the so-called ‘Scramble for Africa’.

An initial literature review, however, revealed a lack of scholarship on the Spanish anarchist movement’s position on the colonial question. While some information was available on ‘imperial sceptics’ in Britain and France (which I will touch upon later in the paper), I found virtually nothing analysing the influence of anti-colonial turmoil on anarchist organizing in Spain. Was this a sign that anarchists, while deeply committed to internationalism within Europe, were blind to the plight of those colonized by their own government? Or was it, on the other hand, a blind spot of historiography?

This paper will provide evidence suggesting the presence of anti-colonial sentiments within the Spanish anarchist movement and will consider why the topic is under-researched. I argue that a Eurocentrist paradigm still permeates the way we understand history and historiographical research, particularly regarding the direction of intellectual ideas between Europe and the colonial world. I propose some necessary shifts in understandings of global relations between social movements to reconstruct this overlooked history. The paper thus operates on two levels: on one hand, it presents some historical findings on the relation between anti-colonialism and Spanish anarchism; on the other, it reflects how prevalent historiographical approaches contribute to making this relation invisible.

Anti-Colonialist Influences in Spanish Anarchism at the Turn of the Century

Two phenomena occurring at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century – respectively, the involvement of Spanish anarchists in Latin America (particularly in the 1895-1898 Cuban war of independence), and the protests against Spanish colonialism in Morocco – support the thesis that Spanish anarchists were attuned to independentist movements in the colonies. While this information is insufficient to conclusively map the character of anarchist anti-colonial discourse in Spain, it suggests that a deeper investigation of primary sources would demonstrate the existence of an attitude of solidarity.

Anarchism was flourishing in the Americas during the late 19th century: while Cuba “turned into an important centre of coordination of anarchist activities with a constant flux of militants coming and going” from various countries in the region,³ significant anarchist

³ José Julián Llaguno Thomas, “Las Voces Olvidadas Del Antiimperialismo: El Anarquismo Frente Al Avance de Estados Unidos En América Central y El Caribe,” in *El Imaginario Antiimperialista En América Latina*, ed. Andrés Kozel et al. (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Ediciones del CCC Centro Cultural de la Cooperación Floreal Gorini, : CLACSO, 2015), 125–40. My translation.

movements were also present in Puerto Rico, Panama, Costa Rica, Mexico, Argentina, Peru, Chile, Brazil, as well as certain parts of the US.⁴ It should thus come as no surprise that when the third Spanish-Cuban war broke out in 1895, anarchists were actively involved both in the conflict as members of the separatist forces and in the international mobilization in support of the independence.⁵

In particular, Cuban anarchists were active in distributing propaganda amongst the Spanish troops to encourage them to desert their army. Not only there is evidence of desertions, but some Spanish soldiers even joined the *Ejército Libertador de Cuba* (ELC, “Liberation Army of Cuba”): according to the census of the ELC, three of the six total departments of the army alone counted 473 Spanish members.⁶ Anarchist efforts in Cuba were matched by a parallel international boycott of the Spanish and American governments, supported by prominent anarchist militants such as Emma Goldman, Lucy Parsons and Voltairine De Cleyre.⁷ Anarchists in Spain also campaigned against the Cuban war: researcher Joan Casanovas claims that “all Spanish anarchists disapproved of the war and called on workers to disobey military authority and refuse to fight in Cuba”.⁸ It is clear that anarchist solidarity with the Cuban independence struggle was an international phenomenon, and that Spain was one of the bases for such campaigns of support.

Similar mobilization efforts occurred about a decade later when Spain increased its militarist activities in Morocco. The Northern region of the Rif was formally under Spanish protectorate but in practice hardly controlled up to this point, given the resistance of Berber tribes to the Arab Sultan and European domination alike.⁹ Tensions between Spanish troops and local Riffian tribes prompted the government to recruit Catalan reservists to Morocco: the targeting of only one region was perceived as a punishment of Catalunya’s separatist aspirations.¹⁰ Workers’ discontent at the idea of risking death to protect capitalist mining activities in the Rif

⁴ Llaguno Thomas. See also: Clara E. Lida and Pablo Yankelevich, eds., *Cultura y Política Del Anarquismo En España e Iberoamérica*, Primera edición, Colección “Ambas Orillas” (México, D.F: El Colegio de México, 2012); and George Woodcock, *Anarchism: A History of Libertarian Ideas and Movements*, Broadview Encore Editions (Peterborough, Ont. ; Orchard Park, NY: Broadview, 2004).

⁵ Llaguno Thomas, “Las Voces Olvidadas Del Antiimperialismo: El Anarquismo Frente Al Avance de Estados Unidos En América Central y El Caribe.”

⁶ Domingo Acebrón and María Dolores, “Los Canarios En Ejército Libertador de Cuba, 1895-1898,” *Tebeto - Anuario Del Archivo Histórico Insular de Fuerteventura* 2, no. 5 (1992): 35–52.

⁷ Llaguno Thomas, “Las Voces Olvidadas Del Antiimperialismo: El Anarquismo Frente Al Avance de Estados Unidos En América Central y El Caribe.”

⁸ Jose Casanovas, cited in Lucien van der Walt, “Towards a History of Anarchist Anti-Imperialism,” *The Anarchist Library*, 2005, <https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/lucien-van-der-walt-towards-a-history-of-anarchist-anti-imperialism>.

⁹ Hisham Aidi, “Is Morocco Headed Toward Insurrection?,” *The Nation*, July 13, 2017, <https://www.thenation.com/article/is-morocco-headed-toward-insurrection/>.

¹⁰ Woodcock, *Anarchism*, 372.

fuelled the protests, which had been initially called for by the anarcho-syndicalist union *Solidaridad Obrera* (Workers’ Solidarity).¹¹ Those protests culminated in the 1909 Barcelona uprising that eventually led to the brutal repression known as the Tragic Week and the subsequent incarceration and torture of anarchists in the Montjuich prison.

The criticism of Spanish colonialism in Morocco, and more generally of European imperialism in Africa, was a recurrent theme in the weekly anarchist magazine *Tierra y Libertad* (“Land and Freedom”, henceforth TyL), which became within a few decades the biggest political publication of the time by number of printed copies.¹² Joan Zambrana categorized the content of the issues of TyL published between 1910 and 1919, providing the opening editorials of each number as well as a list of titles of articles accompanied by a short summary of their content. This documentation project provides an overview of the most common topics appearing in the writings of Catalan anarchists.¹³ I surveyed the list of articles published between 1910 and July 1914 to look for criticisms of imperialism in Africa, and in Morocco in particular.¹⁴ What follows is my translation of titles and summaries of the articles I selected as most relevant:

Criticism of Imperialism in Africa

Year	Number	Title	Summary of content
1910	4	In vino veritas	Criticism of the imperialist bourgeoisie
	18	Report of Algiers	Short account of the situation in Algeria
1911	80	Gloomy Africa	On imperialist fighting in Africa
	86	Civilization in Tripoli	On the war of Italy in Libya
1912	92	The Italian banditry	On Italian imperialism in Africa
	130	The border	Criticism of borders and divisions amongst humans
1913	153	The “Biribi”	On the war in North Africa
	160	Civilizing?	Criticizing the occupation of North Africa
	172	Spain in Africa	Criticism of the Spanish intervention in Africa
	172	War and European civilization	Criticism of the “civilizing” war in Africa

¹¹ Murray Bookchin, *The Spanish Anarchists: The Heroic Years 1868-1936*, 1. Harper Colophon ed (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), 146-148.

¹² Miguel Iñiguez, *Esbozo de Una Enciclopedia Histórica Del Anarquismo Español*, 1a. ed (Madrid: Fundación de Estudios Libertarios Anselmo Lorenzo, 2001), 592.

¹³ Zambrana, “El Anarquismo Organizado En Los Orígenes de La CNT (Tierra y Libertad 1910-1919).”

¹⁴ I decided to stop after July 1914 because the start of the First World War shifted the magazine’s focus predominantly towards anti-war discourse.

Criticism of Imperialism in Morocco

Year	Number	Title	Summary of content
1910	6	We civilize Morocco?	Criticism of the possibility of warfare
	32	Solidarity of the Moors	Notice of solidarity from Moroccan workers
1911	60	National honour	On a possible invasion of Morocco
	65	A manifesto	Manifesto against the repression in Morocco
	78	Democracy... and weapons at hand	On the repression in Morocco
	86	Is the war over?	On the intervention in the Rif
1913	196	From Ceuta to Tétouan	Report on the abuses in North Africa
	209	The crimes of civilization	On the “civilizing plague” in Morocco

As seen from the titles and summaries provided, TyL was unquestionably opposed to imperialism and interventionism, considered tools of the bourgeoisie for capitalist exploitation. In particular, TyL featured recurrent critiques of the colonial rhetoric of the “civilizing mission”. In fact, one of the opening editorials poses the questions:

Civilization? Who, then, represents it now? The German State with a militarism so powerful and formidable, that it has killed at birth any germ of rebellion? The Russian State, whose only methods of persuasion are the knout, the gallows and Siberia? The French State with Biribi, the bloody conquests of Tonkin, Madagascar and Morocco and the forced recruitment of Blacks? France, who has kept comrades in its prisons for years, for the sole reason of having said or written against the war? England that exploits, divides and starves and oppresses the people of its immense colonial empire?¹⁵

Although these sources are dated over a decade after the wars of independence in Cuba, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico, they suggest a relation between these anti-colonial movements and anti-colonialist discourse in Spanish anarchism. As Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow argue in *Contentious Politics*, social movements employ “repertoires of contention”, or sets of tools

¹⁵ Editorial of n° 253 of the Spanish anarchist magazine *Tierra y Libertad* (“Land and Freedom”), March 31 1915, cited in Zambrana, “El Anarquismo Organizado En Los Orígenes de La CNT (Tierra y Libertad 1910-1919).”, 271. My translation.

and actions that are context-specific and built over time. Anti-imperialist discourse and practice were undoubtedly part of the repertoire of Spanish anarchism by the 1910, and collaborations with international solidarity campaigns during the Cuban war suggest that such ideas had likely been circulating within anarchist circles for quite some time.

Overcoming Euro-Centrism & the Politics of Friendships

The commentaries of Spanish interventionism in Morocco and European exploitation of Africa clearly show a strong rejection of imperialism and colonialism. Anarchist mobilization for Cuban independence suggests that such rejection was not articulated in isolation, but in conjunction with independentist movements in the colonial world. This limited information is hardly sufficient to draw the conclusion that the turmoil in Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines directly shaped the direction of Spanish anarchism, and more robust evidence of a direct intellectual exchange should be gathered from primary sources such as newspapers, pamphlets, letters and personal correspondence.

This preliminary evidence, however, provides substantial motive to investigate the question further, and begs the question of why this topic is so under-researched. I suspect the lack of attention could be attributed to a surviving Euro-centric paradigm, according to which intellectual ideas and political theories are first articulated in the Western world and then exported to the (post-)colonial world. In fact, the rise of anti-colonial nationalism fits into this mold: as Anderson demonstrates in *Imagined Communities*, nationalist intellectuals like José Rizal or José Martí typically belonged to a European-educated elite that had absorbed Enlightenment ideas about nation-states and political rights and re-proposed them in the colonies, ‘imagining’ a national community in lieu of pre-colonial regional, religious, or ethnic loyalties.¹⁶ As articulated by Caroline Hau in her analysis of politics in Rizal’s *Noli me tangere*, nationalist anti-colonialism is characterised by an intrinsic contradiction between ideals of emancipation from the colonizers, and the vision for this emancipation as only realizable within a political framework imported from European thought.¹⁷

Anarchist thought, while initially developed in Europe, challenges ‘European-ness’ as an essential category by drawing from non-Western forms of social organization to envision alternatives to the State as the paradigmatic political structure. Thanks to their rejection of the nation-state as the basis for community and their consequent emphasis on internationalism, anarchist movements were inherently porous and predisposed to transnational influences and

¹⁶ Benedict R. O’G Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983).

¹⁷ Caroline S. Hau, “The Fiction of a Knowable Community,” in *Necessary Fictions: Philippine Literature and the Nation, 1946-1980* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2000), 48–93.

collaborations – including from the colonies to the ‘motherland’. Both colonialist and post-colonialist thought, however, have understood modernity as a phenomenon originating in Europe and exported to the rest of the world (the difference being that the former considered this process positive, while the latter exposed its trauma and perversity). The idea of a movement located in Europe rejecting quintessentially ‘European’ political paradigms, while taking inspiration from non-European people, directly challenges the presumed direction of intellectual exchange from Europe to the peripheries.

The blind spot of historiography on the affinity between anarchism and (some) anti-colonial movements is reflected in the distinction between the terms anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism. The former is commonly associated with socialist, syndicalist and anarchist movements in Europe, while the latter is assumed to pertain to independentist struggles against European powers in the colonial world. In reality, both positions are essentially the same: they both denounce the horrors of European domination over non-European people, denounce the economic exploitation of colonial territories, challenge the idea of an essential superiority of European culture, and affirm the right to self-determination of all people worldwide. No one would be surprised to hear the term anti-imperialism associated with socialism or anarchism, but it is rarer to observe an equivalent use of anti-colonialism to characterize European radical thought. In reality, anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism fundamentally advance the same arguments: that they are systematically used in different contexts reflect the inability of imagining that (some) European and (some) non-European people might fight for the same interests and goals.¹⁸

As Leela Gandhi argues in *Affective Communities* (interestingly mirroring Anderson’s title *Imagined Communities*), post-colonialism has “remained tentative in the appreciation of individuals and groups who have renounced the privileges of imperialism and elected affinity with victims of their own expansionist cultures”.¹⁹ The project of making these individuals visible necessarily requires a renunciation of the idea of a homogenous West, occupying a uniform position and exhibiting uniform interests. On the contrary, a broad definition of imperialism as a principle organizing the world according to hierarchies of race, culture, class, gender, civilization, etc.,²⁰ reveals the existence within Europe itself of subjects at the bottom of

¹⁸ You might have noticed that in this paper I deliberately used the term anti-colonialism to characterize the thoughts and practice of anarchist movements, even when such a term was not present in the sources I examined, precisely with the intent of questioning and breaking down this distinction.

¹⁹ Leela Gandhi, *Affective Communities: Anticolonial Thought, Fin-De-Siècle Radicalism, and the Politics of Friendship*, Politics, History, and Culture (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 1.

²⁰ Gandhi, 7.

such hierarchies: “sexual misfits, slaughterhouse animals, factory slaves, colonized subjects, unruly women” all belong to the same “imperial periphery”.²¹

Gandhi argues that the shared belonging to these peripheries allowed for the development of what she terms “politics of friendship” between European and non-European people, marking the development of a “metropolitan anti-colonialism”.²² Politics of friendship are characterized by an “anti-communitarian communitarianism”: while they seek to embrace and magnify sociality, empathy, and community, they reject the Hegelian imperative to prioritize commitment to the “proximate”, “our own” kind from the same unit (whether the family, the tribe, the nation, etc.), that permeates traditional communitarianism.²³ This kind of friendship is not based on any recognizable form of kinship except for a shared inhabitation of the “periphery”. Today’s No Border activist who gets arrested for blocking a deportation flight is operating on the same politics of friendship as the Spanish anarchist tortured in the Montjuich prison for protesting militarism in Morocco a century ago.²⁴

Conclusion

Despite apparent connections between the Spanish anarchist movement and anti-colonial turmoil in Cuba, the Philippines and Puerto Rico, and anti-imperialist discourse as Spanish interventionism grew in Morocco in the early 20th century, a lack of scholarship on the subject represents a blind spot on the history of affective relations between European and non-European ‘peripheries’. In fact, historiographies of anarchism in Spain focus predominantly on the movement’s internal organization and its relation to socialism, while historiographies of anti-colonialism focus on the events of the wars of independence, with few links traced between these two worlds.²⁵

In conclusion, I argue that the collaboration with anti-colonialist movements and the rejection of imperialism by anarchist movements in Europe challenges paradigms of modernity as a phenomenon exported from Europe to the colonies. Prevailing assumptions of a one-direction flow of political ideas render invisible the influence of anti-colonial turmoil on European radical movements, despite evidence suggesting its significant weight. Given the

²¹ Gandhi, 7.

²² Gandhi, 9.

²³ Gandhi, 25.

²⁴ Diane Taylor, “Arrests as Stansted Anti-Deportation Protesters Lock Themselves to Plane,” *The Guardian*, March 29, 2017, sec. World news, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/29/arrests-as-stansted-anti-deportation-protesters-lock-themselves-to-plane>.

²⁵ In contrast, the approach I advocate for has been explored in relation to Britain: notably, by Bernard Porter’s *Critics of Empire*, Gregory Claeys’ *Imperial Sceptics*, Nicholas Owen’s *The British Left and India*, and Leela Gandhi’s aforementioned *Affective Communities*.

conjunctural contemporaneity of the collapse of the Spanish Empire and the rise of the anarchist movement, Spain is a particularly interesting case study that should be given further attention.

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Ex-Gazans in Jordan:

From Legal ‘Outsiders’ to Political ‘Outsiders’

Peter Ooi, Yale-NUS College ‘18

To Sukayna,

This essay is dedicated to you and your family. I owe so much of this research to your generous help. Thank you for showing me warmth, hospitality and friendship beyond measure; thank you, most of all, for sharing your story with me.

I regret that we did not meet again before you passed on. I do not know anyone with a stronger spirit and a kinder soul, and I pray that your family find solace in remembering you. May your daughters inherit your kindness and strength of will. Rest in peace.

سكينة، انا دائما رح اتذكرك
الله يرحمك ويجعل مثواك الجنة

An earlier unedited version of this essay won the 2017 Middle East Essay Prize, an annual essay competition organized by the NUS Middle East Institute.

The ex-Gazans in Jordan are a minority group of Palestinian refugees that rarely feature in academic literature. Despite facing systemic conditions of statelessness that are particular to them, their distinctive experiences are often rendered invisible in research which focuses on the Palestinian community in Jordan as a whole. This article examines how ex-Gazans construct their identities as Palestinians in view of their social and legal circumstances. Using interviews conducted with residents of Hussein camp and Jerash camp in Jordan, this article argues that the ex-Gazans' experience of discrimination in Jordan is layered with pervasive reminders of an 'outsider' status that other Palestinians are not subject to. Their constructions of Palestinian identity consequently align with this 'outsider' status such that they avoid making political demands of their host state, Jordan. These findings problematize scholarly explanations given for Palestinian refugees' apparent political apathy in Jordan, which neglect the distinction between Palestinians with Jordanian citizenship and stateless Palestinians.

Introduction

Since the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, displacement has become a defining feature of being Palestinian. Entire generations of Palestinians have grown up as displaced persons across the Middle East, Europe and the Americas. Some Palestinian families have suffered displacement more than once, including those who have fled the ongoing civil war in Syria.¹ The sheer diversity in Palestinian experiences of displacement means that there is hardly a singular understanding of what it means to be Palestinian, and questions of Palestinian identity and selfhood become exceedingly complex. Hanafi (2011, 455) acknowledged this complexity in arguing that understanding a prospective Palestinian return to the homeland first requires “a sociological understanding of the political, social and cultural attributes of the Palestinian people” that accounts for the socioeconomic and cultural integration of Palestinians in their host countries. In this essay, I aim to contribute to such a sociological understanding of Palestinian

¹ Bolongaro, Kait. *Palestinian Syrians: Twice Refugees*, Al Jazeera, 23 March 2016, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/03/palestinian-syrians-refugees-160321055107834.html>. Accessed 8 October 2018.

identity by examining questions of integration and identity among a community of Palestinians residing in Jordan commonly referred to as the ex-Gazans.

Jordan remains the only state to have granted full citizenship to Palestinian refugees en masse. Most of the country's 2.2 million Palestinians are therefore able to express themselves as legitimate members of the political community. However, the same cannot be said of the approximately 158,000 ex-Gazans in Jordan who do not enjoy the suite of privileges that citizenship entails.² These ex-Gazans are typically the families of Palestinian refugees who fled to Jordan from Gaza during the Six-Day War in 1967. Drawing on my own fieldwork, I argue that the status of ex-Gazans as legal 'outsiders' transforms them into political 'outsiders' who avoid making political claims on their host state, even on issues concerning Israel. This stands in stark contrast to the attitudes of Palestinians with Jordanian citizenship, for whom a sense of Palestinian identity translates into political demands on the Jordanian state. Through my discussion of the ex-Gazans, I will also dispute the notion that Palestinian refugees in Jordan generally enact a retreat into an 'ordinary' realm, a proposition put forward by political anthropologist Luigi Achilli (2014).

Methodology

I conducted semi-structured interviews in April 2017 with Palestinian residents of Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan. Of the ten recognized Palestinian refugee camps which house approximately 370,000 Palestinian refugees in Jordan, I chose Hussein camp and Jerash camp as my field sites due to their stark demographic differences.³ Built in 1952 to accommodate refugees from the first Arab-Israeli war, Hussein camp accommodates 32,000 registered Palestinian refugees, 90% of whom hold Jordanian citizenship.⁴ On the other hand, Jerash camp comprises mostly ex-Gazans, having been set up in 1968 to shelter refugees from the Six-Day War. Consequently, only about 6% of Jerash camp's 29,000 residents hold Jordanian citizenship (Tiltnes and Zhang 2013).⁵ The different geographic locations of the two camps was also a salient consideration for my choice. As Hussein camp is now spatially integrated into downtown Amman, residents of Hussein camp are deeply embedded in the social environment of a cosmopolitan city where intermarriages between Palestinians and Jordanians are common and

² Estimated population sizes of Palestinians and ex-Gazans in Jordan are cited from *Protection in Jordan*, UNRWA, <https://www.unrwa.org/activity/protection-jordan>. Accessed 8 October 2018.

³ Estimated total Palestinian refugee population residing in the ten Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan is cited from *Where We Work*, UNRWA, <https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/jordan>. Accessed 8 October 2018.

⁴ Estimated population size of Hussein camp is cited from *Jabal El-Hussein Camp*, UNRWA, <https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/jordan/jabal-el-hussein-camp>. Accessed 8 October 2018.

⁵ Estimated population size of Jerash camp is cited from *Jerash Camp*, UNRWA, <https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/jordan/jerash-camp>. Accessed 8 October 2018.

intercommunal divisions matter less to the burgeoning middle class (Tobin 2012). However, Jerash camp is located well beyond the Amman municipality, in a village cluster where Palestinian-Jordanian social divisions are firmly entrenched. As will become apparent later, the interview responses of my research participants largely reflect the different social environments they inhabit in Hussein and Jerash camp.

I conducted a total of four interviews in Jerash camp and five in Hussein camp. Given my limited proficiency in spoken Arabic, these interviews were conducted with the help of a translator who was herself a Palestinian with Jordanian citizenship. All of my interviewees in Jerash camp were ex-Gazans without Jordanian citizenship, except one ex-Gazan respondent who had obtained citizenship through marriage. Of my interviews in Hussein camp, four respondents were citizen Palestinians and one was ex-Gazan without Jordanian citizenship. Additionally, my participant sample comprised an even balance of males and females. As the objective of this essay is illuminate the political identities of the ex-Gazans, I focus largely on the responses of my ex-Gazan participants here. Where relevant, however, I contrast their responses with those of my other interviewees to illustrate the peculiarities of being ex-Gazan in Jordan.

Palestinians and the Jordanian State

The historical roots of Palestinian-Jordanian tension

To gain a comprehensive understanding of ex-Gazan identity, their statelessness must first be situated within the wider context of the Palestinian-Jordanian tensions in the country. Historically, the extension of Jordanian citizenship to Palestinian refugees was a means of territorial expansion. King Abdullah I of Jordan had long harbored ambitions to rule over Greater Syria, and the 1948 Arab-Israeli war presented him the opportunity to fulfill his expansionist agenda in Palestine (Massad 2001). Following Jordan's military annexation of central Palestine in December 1948, King Abdullah signed an addendum to the 1928 Law of Nationality that extended Jordanian citizenship to the Palestinian residents of Jordan's newly extended borders. Article 2 of the 1949 addendum states that

“All those who are habitual residents, at the time of the application of this law, of Transjordan or the Western Territory administered by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and who hold Palestinian nationality, are considered as having already acquired Jordanian nationality and to enjoy all the rights and obligations that Jordanians have.” (Massad 2001, 39)

Citizenship was thereby granted to the Palestinian refugees of the 1948 war who had settled in Jordan, providing the formal political basis for the unification of central Palestine and

Jordan (Brand 1995). A year later, the Jordanian government renamed central Palestine the “West Bank of the Hashemite Jordanian Kingdom” (the “West Bank” in short) to reflect this absorption of territory (Massad 2001, 229). In 1954, the Jordanian Law of Nationality was again amended to include Palestinians and their descendants who were “habitually residents in February 1954 in Jordan” (Achilli 2014, 237). From the state’s perspective, ‘Jordan’ in 1954 included the West Bank. The Palestinians who later fled the West Bank to Jordan during the 1967 Six-Day War were therefore Jordanian citizens by default. By contrast, Gaza was administered by the Egyptian government prior to 1967 (Feldman 2012). Palestinian refugees who arrived in Jordan in 1967 from Gaza thus were not entitled to Jordanian citizenship.

King Abdullah’s expansionist ambitions would end in failure. Jordanian policy vis-à-vis the Palestinians underwent a drastic reversal after the 1970 civil war in Jordan known as Black September. The events of Black September pitted the guerrilla forces of the Palestinian Resistance Movement (PRM), the *fedayeen*, against the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan in a violent struggle for the right to represent the Palestinian people. The Hashemites emerged victorious and subsequently evicted the PRM organizations from their strongholds in Jordan (Fruchter-Ronen 2008). Black September was a battle between the PRM leadership and the Hashemite monarchy rather than between Palestinians and Jordanians. A sizable number of the soldiers who fought for the Hashemites against the PRM were of Palestinian origin, and a significant proportion of the approximately 5000 soldiers who defected to the PRM were Jordanians of Jordanian descent (Massad 2001). An inter-communal divide between Palestinians and Jordanians became prominent only after the war, when the Jordanian state sought to mold a nationalist Jordanian identity which excluded Palestinian elements.

Key to the creation of this exclusionist national identity was the appointment of Wasfi Al-Tall as prime minister on 28 October 1971. Under Al-Tall’s administration, hundreds of Palestinian officials deemed pro-*fedayeen* were dismissed from the civil service and security forces of Jordan. In conjunction with the appointment of high-ranking public officials whose anti-Palestine dispositions were widely known, the purge succeeded in drastically diminishing Palestinian influence within state institutions. The resulting ‘Jordanization’ of the bureaucracy was accompanied by Al-Tall’s campaign to cripple Palestinian influence outside state apparatus, namely in professional associations and unions (Fruchter-Ronen 2008). The state effort to minimize Palestinian influence in all major spheres of life would in the 1970s extend to higher education, with the introduction of unofficial quotas for Palestinian faculty in Jordanian universities. The proportion of faculty who were Palestinian quickly shrunk from the majority to a minority (Massad 2001).

Even cultural expressions of Palestinian identity were curtailed by the state, with decidedly Jordanian cultural symbols promoted in their stead. Nimr Sarhan, an expert in Palestinian folklore, established the Committee for the Annual Palestinian Folklore Day in 1981. He was later incarcerated by the Jordanian government, his folklore exhibits were cancelled by the police, and he was subsequently prevented from returning to his work on Palestinian culture. By contrast, the state-launched Jerash Festival of Culture always features Jordanian Bedouin ‘*Dabkah*’ performances and songs (Massad 2001). The state-endorsed marginalization of Palestinians in Jordan has rendered them what Massad calls an ‘othered’ community, whose collective identity is not only relegated to second-class but is, more significantly, defined by its exclusion from the national Jordanian identity.

Contemporary tensions between Palestinians and Jordanians

The state animosity towards Palestinians has paved the way for significant Palestinian-Jordanian tension within the general population today, much of which revolves around a stark economic divide. Ever since Al-Tall’s administration, the Jordanians have controlled the public sector whereas the Palestinians have come to dominate the private sector. This paved the way for widespread fear among Jordanians that Palestinians could use their economic power in the private sector to destabilize the Jordanian economy. Adherents to this view typically point to the aftermath of Jordan’s disengagement with the West Bank in 1988, when Palestinians caused the Jordanian dinar to crash by withdrawing their money from Jordanian banks all at once (Reiter 2004). In response, the Palestinians decry their political disempowerment in the country, often citing parliamentary under-representation as evidence of the vice-grip that Jordanians maintain on political influence (Ryan 2011).

Palestinian grievances against the Jordanian community are compounded by their lack of access to state resources. In Jordan, the ease with which a citizen might access state resources relies considerably on an individual’s *wasta*. Literally meaning ‘the middle,’ *wasta* refers to the use of family or tribal connections to obtain jobs, credit, favors, and housing among other things (Achilli 2014). That the overwhelming majority of state employees are Jordanian means that everyday Jordanians are likely able to use *wasta* to cut red tape in bureaucratic processes. On the other hand, Palestinians are denied this privilege because of their diminished numbers in the public sector (Brand 1995).

To capture the sense in which Palestinian identity in Jordan is defined by exclusion from the national Jordanian identity, anthropologist Luigi Achilli (2014) borrows the concept of the friend-enemy distinction from German political theorist Carl Schmitt. Schmitt argued that ‘the political’ is inherently antagonistic, since identifying as a member of any political community

requires a concomitant understanding of the conditions which disqualify that membership. Because the ‘other’ is defined precisely as that which ‘we’ members of the political community are not, the ‘other’ is said to be “existentially something different and alien” (Schmitt 2008, 27). But the ‘other’ is not simply different – it is an enemy. In the Schmittian ‘political,’ the designation of ‘enemy’ follows concrete actions of the ‘other’ which are “judged to pose an immediate existential threat to the life of the community” (Rae 2016, 263). Identification with ‘friends’ of the same community, then, is predicated on a perception of existential threat posed by the ‘enemy.’

Schmitt’s friend-enemy distinction aptly describes the dynamic between the Palestinian and Jordanian communities in Jordan. Besides facing exclusion from the national Jordanian identity, the Palestinians are also often construed as an existential threat to the Jordanian community. To many Jordanians, the events of Black September and the 1988 dinar crash demonstrate that the Palestinians are capable of mounting damaging campaigns against them. Palestinians in Jordan are generally all subject to this process of ‘othering’ and are designated as the ‘enemy’ of the Jordanian community.

Within the Palestinian community, however, an important distinction should be made between those who possess Jordanian citizenship and those who do not. The ex-Gazans belong to the latter category. In the following sections, I seek to demonstrate that statelessness significantly colors the experiences of ex-Gazans as the ‘other’ and manifests in a political identity markedly different from those of their citizen counterparts. I conclude with a discussion of how my findings problematize Achilli’s use of the friend-enemy distinction to explain the political inactivity of the Palestinian refugees. His explanatory account makes no distinction between citizen and non-citizen Palestinians, which I argue qualifies the applicability of his theory.

Being an ex-Gazan ‘Other’

Not only stateless, but an ‘outsider’

The vast majority of ex-Gazans in Jordan remain legally stateless to this day, though a few have obtained Jordanian citizenship through marriage. They hold temporary Jordanian passports which require renewal every two years, but do not possess a national ID number. This ID number is the crucial administrative detail that allows Palestinians with citizenship to access all the same political and civil rights as Jordanians. Those without national numbers face severe handicaps in accessing economic opportunities and aid services. Formal employment requires a work permit from the Jordanian government, the successful application for which requires ex-Gazans to prove they have skills or qualifications not already available in the Jordanian workforce. They cannot

drive taxis or buses because a national number is needed to apply for public driving licenses. Employment opportunities abroad are greatly curtailed by the 2-year validity of their passports (Tiltne and Zhang 2013). Furthermore, ministerial permission is required for non-citizens to own immovable property or to rent property for more than three years, making the acquisition of property beyond the cramped confines of the camp effectively impossible. Reports have thus surfaced of ex-Gazans entering informal agreements with Jordanian citizens who purchase land on their behalf. Feldman (2012) provides the example of a Jordanian man who passed away while holding title to the property of approximately one hundred ex-Gazan residents of Jerash camp. She notes that the heirs of the deceased man were under no legal obligations to honor the claims of the ex-Gazans to their property, even if they did so out of compassion.

Furthermore, citizenship status impacts a Palestinian refugee's access to financial aid. Non-citizens face severely limited access to monetary aid from the Jordan National Aid Fund (NAF) and rely instead on the United Nations Relief and Work Agency (UNRWA), the humanitarian arm of the UN dedicated solely to Palestinian refugees. This is significant considering that the NAF on average disburses more than five times the financial support that the UNRWA provides to each poor refugee household. Within the camps, the median annual support received per refugee household from the NAF was 792 JD, while the corresponding figure for the UNRWA was 184 JD. Given the huge disparity between citizen and non-citizen access to socioeconomic resources, it is unsurprising that poverty rates are much higher in Jerash camp than in Hussein camp (Tiltne and Zhang 2013).

The socioeconomic disadvantages of statelessness have a substantive impact on the identities of ex-Gazans. Their lack of citizenship rights leads to frequent encounters of discrimination that never allow them to forget their legal status as 'outsiders' in Jordan. One of my ex-Gazan interviewees from Jerash camp, Amani, used to work as a teacher in a private school. Out of the 150 JD monthly salary fixed in her contract, she was given only 90 JD. Amani recounted that to justify the exploitative wage reduction, her employer would tell her she "should be thankful" she was even employed, given the extreme difficulty that ex-Gazans face in securing employment. Her story is one of the many in which ex-Gazans, due to their non-citizen status, have vastly different experiences of ordinary, daily activities compared to those of Jordanian citizens. Tissam, another ex-Gazan from Jerash camp, recounted an incident in which she sought medical treatment for her mother in a local hospital. Upon entering the hospital, they were immediately asked if they had the necessary insurance coverage for free treatment. Only Jordanian citizens are eligible for this insurance, however, and Tissam subsequently paid the full cost of the treatment. In her case, unlike Amani's, there was no malice on the part of the hospital staff. It was a simple, necessary administrative procedure that sufficed to remind Tissam and her

mother that in the eyes of the state, they were foreigners; that alone evoked considerable resentment in them. Both Amani and Tissam further noted that when ex-Gazans attend university, they pay the tuition fees of foreign students. In innumerable aspects of their lives, ex-Gazans are forced to confront their lack of citizenship privileges, making them acutely aware of their formal exclusion from the Jordanian nation. An additional layer of ‘foreign-ness’ thus attends the ex-Gazan experience of ‘other-ness’ that all Palestinians in Jordan are subject to.

This would explain the tendency among my interviewees who were citizen Palestinians to personally identify as Jordanian whereas my ex-Gazan respondents typically disavowed a Jordanian identity. Palestinians with Jordanian citizenship can conduct their daily affairs without pervasive reminders of foreign-ness. Though aware of the state discrimination directed at all Palestinians, they are able to speak as a legitimate member of the Jordanian nation. Khalid, a citizen Palestinian from Hussein camp, claimed that Jordan is “my country too” and “in my blood” while acknowledging in the same interview that he was not a “son of this country.” By contrast, the ex-Gazans overwhelmingly refused to assume the label of ‘Jordanian.’ Two ex-Gazans remarked to me that even if they were offered Jordanian citizenship with all its benefits, they would reject it. The imposition of ‘foreign-ness’ upon the ex-Gazans induces an internalization of their exclusion from the Jordanian polity, allowing the ex-Gazans to situate themselves squarely on the Palestinian side of the friend-enemy distinction.

An exception is to be found in the person of Amani. She was granted Jordanian citizenship when she married a Jordanian man, and her story illustrates the drastic effect citizenship can have on ex-Gazan identity. When I asked her to define Jordanian-ness, our exchange went as follows:

Me: What makes a Jordanian a Jordanian?

Amani: Everything is available to them. Being Jordanian-Jordanian represents the right situation of having access to all the services – health, education – all of it. They are citizens in every sense of the word, with access to all their rights and services.

Like the rest of the ex-Gazans interviewed, Amani takes citizenship to signify material benefits such as access to health services, education and employment. Unlike most ex-Gazans, she was able to gain access to these benefits. After marrying her Jordanian husband, her new legal status as citizen enabled her to secure stable employment in Amman with a 350JD monthly salary. Recalling that Amani had previously been subject to illegal wage reduction, her Jordanian citizenship had essentially rescued her from absurdly low wages and the indignity of exploitation. Amani appeared consequently to identify as Jordanian, as seen in the following exchange:

Me: Do you see yourself as Jordanian?

Amani: Yes. And I do not want to go back to be a Palestinian because I suffered from that.

Me: What do you mean by saying you do not want to be a Palestinian?

Amani: When it comes to official papers, documents, I am more satisfied to be a Jordanian because it makes my life easier. But of course, I love that I am Palestinian.

How is it that Amani both loves being Palestinian and yet does not want to be Palestinian? My interpretation is that Amani has taken the suffering induced by her statelessness as emblematic of Palestinian-ness. In addition to her mistreatment by her previous employer, Amani had also recounted incidences of being shunned in university by Jordanian students who realized she was Palestinian. Given the host of difficulties she associates with being recognized as Palestinian in public arenas like employment and education, it appears that Amani disdains being publicly Palestinian while preserving a wholly private sense of Palestinian-ness. Intriguingly, Amani's constructions of Jordanian and Palestinian public identities were still mutually exclusive. Being Jordanian did not mean that Amani now identified with both sides of the friend-enemy distinction; rather, she simply switched allegiances. Amani's identifying as Jordanian in public matters contrasts starkly with how the other ex-Gazans choose to identify. But like them, she seeks to situate herself on only one side of the friend-enemy distinction.

While it may be countered that Amani is merely instrumentalizing her Jordanian citizenship without a substantive change in identity, I maintain that the instrumental benefits of Jordanian citizenship cannot be straightforwardly divorced from one's identification as Jordanian. It was common among my ex-Gazan interviewees to define being Jordanian as having access to state resources in healthcare and education. Furthermore, as argued earlier, the ex-Gazans' lack of access to the privileges of citizenship has the effect of reinforcing their exclusion as an 'other' from the Jordanian nation. A Palestinian refugee's socio-political inclusion or exclusion from the Jordanian nation therefore hinges on their access to the benefits of citizenship. Insofar as enjoying these benefits can be said to be a defining characteristic of being Jordanian, Amani's claim to public Jordanian-ness should not be dismissed as mere instrumentalization. Furthermore, whereas all my other ex-Gazan interviewees, including Amani's own father, had said that given the chance they would return to Palestine immediately, Amani indicated that she would rather remain in Jordan to continue the life she has built here. This striking difference between her response and those of the other ex-Gazans suggests that her claim to Jordanian-ness was not simply cosmetic, but indicative of a deeper shift in identity. Little wonder then that when Amani was asked if she identified as Jordanian, her answer was an unflinchingly 'yes.'

Overall, my ex-Gazan interviewees' responses suggest that their legal condition of statelessness translates into a Palestinian identity that is excluded from Jordanian national identity and that rejects the simultaneous possession of a Jordanian identity. In the next section, I discuss how this particular construction of Palestinian identity shapes the political claims that the ex-Gazans make.

Making political demands of the Jordanian state

During my interviews, I asked my participants for their opinions on the 2016 Israel-Jordan gas deal, under which Jordan will import US\$10 billion worth of Israeli gas for 15 years.⁶ If there is one subject towards which Palestinians are expected to have a predictable stance, it is Israel. The Palestinian layperson is commonly assumed to support any endeavor to harm Israel and to rally against any collaboration with Israel. Indeed, the announcement of the gas deal in Jordanian media was met with weekly demonstrations in Amman, corroborating this assumption.⁷ Yet, the difference in responses between the citizen Palestinians and the ex-Gazans in my interviews yield an important nuance to this understanding of Palestinian attitudes towards Israel.

Those Palestinians with citizenship tended to fit the typical characterization of the Palestinian layperson. They were all willing to participate in a hypothetical boycott movement of Israeli gas, and further argued that Jordan as a state should not have entered the gas deal. Ahmad, a citizen resident of Hussein camp, told me he had protested against the gas deal because he heard that "they will put the Israeli flag on the gas bottle even though they are our enemies. The idea itself does not make sense to people." If his incredulity alone did not imply a claim on Jordan to withdraw from the gas deal, then his participation in the street demonstrations did. Palestinians with Jordanian citizenship thus have few qualms expressing political demands on the state of Jordan.

The ex-Gazans, however, tended to distance themselves from what they depicted as matters 'for the government.' To the question of the gas deal, Amani's father responded,

"I do not interfere. It has to do with the government. These are the agreements of the country. If the governments give it away for free, if they export it, if they did whatever they need to do, it's fine."

While his nonchalance was surprising, it was consistent with his status as a legal 'outsider.' If ex-Gazans are reminded daily that the Jordanian government is not their government and therefore not accountable to them, it makes little sense for them to place any

⁶ Abu-Nasr, Donna. "Unwanted: The \$10 Billion Gas Deal with Israel that Jordan Needs." *Bloomberg*, October 27, 2016, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-26/unwanted-the-10-billion-gas-deal-with-israel-that-jordan-needs>. Accessed 8 October 2018.

⁷ Ibid.

sort of demand on it. Nor is the nonchalance of Amani's father reducible to political apathy. All the ex-Gazans indicated that they would individually take part in a boycott of Israeli goods, suggesting that each person was still inclined toward political action, albeit action that is by nature confined to a private sphere. Amani's father's nonchalance should therefore be attributed to the governmental nature of the gas deal, and the distance ex-Gazans place between them and governmental affairs.

In some cases, this distancing allowed for a rational, measured pragmatism that was conspicuously absent from the responses of most citizen Palestinians. The most spirited ex-Gazan response against the gas deal came from Tissam, but even she conceded that "if it's necessary, then it's ok to take [the gas] from Israel." Amani extended this logic of pragmatism, even agreeing with the gas deal because "Jordan was paying Egypt for gas anyway. It will be better for Jordan to do it this way, they will even save money." In other cases, the distance between the ex-Gazan and Jordan resembled that which occurs between guest and host. For example, Amani's father made sure to qualify his involvement in the boycott of Israeli goods. He clarified that he would take part only if it was for the good of Jordan, because "it is the country that hosted the Palestinians, and I ate from the bread in Jordan." Whatever the individual disposition, the striking commonality was that the ex-Gazans always held governmental affairs at a remote distance from themselves.

For the ex-Gazans, the natural corollary to this distance from politics is an ethic of forbearance. Even when discussing the recent protests in Amman against rising prices, Amani's father remarked,

"We don't do this because this is their country, and they are the ones who protest and express their feelings about raising the prices. We as Palestinians, whatever happens, we resist. If they increase the prices, it is alright; whatever they do, it is alright, we can deal with it."

Amani's father's sentiments here illustrate how the cognizance of one's place as a legal 'outsider' transforms one into a political 'outsider.' Much like how the economic pains of statelessness became emblematic of Palestinian-ness for Amani, forbearance has become a hallmark of Palestinian-ness for Amani's father. In his self-understanding, to be Palestinian is not to publicly participate in politics, nor to campaign for an end to Israel; being Palestinian is precisely the act of keeping silent and resiliently adapting to change. Yusuf, a 25-year-old ex-Gazan, echoed a similar aversion to political participation in the following conversation:

Me: What do you think your duties as a Palestinian are?

Yusuf: In here [the camp]? Doing work, doing your duty to your parents, to your husbands and wives. Just doing your work. Nothing else.

Me: Not to try to push for a return to Palestine publicly?

Yusuf: No, it's hard to push. There are limitations.

Translator: What about the right of return?

Yusuf: No. The right of return is not a big deal. You cannot return.

The 'right of return' is the rallying cry of Palestinian nationalism, and yet for Yusuf, being Palestinian does not necessitate a commitment to it. Instead, being Palestinian means embracing a life far removed from affairs of the government, no matter how banal. Unlike those with Jordanian citizenship, a stateless Palestinian does not make political demands of the Jordanian state. His enactments of Palestinian-ness are stripped of all its political leanings and reduced to basic familial and economic duties.

The aversion to governmental affairs that Amani's father and Yusuf express here should not be reduced to the fear that political action will be met with violent reprisal by the Jordanian state. While this fear no doubt features strongly in the minds of ex-Gazans residing in Jordan, what is of note is that this fear, in concert with the fact of being political 'outsiders', has molded a Palestinian identity among ex-Gazans that relinquishes the claims that citizen Palestinians typically place on the Jordanian state. Amani's father and Yusuf both invoked Palestinian identity in their responses above, indicating that they perceived the enduring of hardship and their distancing themselves from governmental affairs as more central to Palestinian-ness than a commitment to traditionally 'Palestinian' causes, like the right of return. The same cannot be said of citizen Palestinians like Ahmad, who expressed explicit condemnation of the Jordanian state's action and who, despite facing similar risks of incarceration and police abuse, joined public protests in Amman against the Israeli gas deal in a clear expression of Palestinian-ness.

Implications for Existing Literature

At this juncture, it is appropriate to revisit Achilli's application of the friend-enemy distinction in the Jordanian context. While the friend-enemy distinction maps accurately onto Palestinian-Jordanian dynamics in Jordan, Achilli stretches this Schmittian idea too far in his explanation of the political reticence of Palestinian refugees living in camps.

The key idea in Achilli's explanatory framework is that there exists for Palestinian refugees a realm of the 'ordinary' beyond the reach of politics and the friend-enemy distinction which defines it. In Jordan's politics, the adversarial dynamics of the friend-enemy distinction are mapped onto Palestinian-Jordanian relations. The historical 'othering' process initiated by the state and internalized by at least the ethnically Jordanian citizenry renders Palestinian and Jordanian identities incompatible and mutually conflicting; engaging in politics thus requires choosing a side, either Palestinian or Jordanian. Achilli argues that Palestinian refugees,

however, possess a “desire to live as both Palestinian refugees and Jordanian citizens” simultaneously (2014, 241). Unwilling to pick a side, Palestinian refugees decide instead to descend into a non-political realm of the ‘ordinary’ (Achilli 2014). Drawing on his field research in Al-Wihdat camp, Achilli explains that the realm of the ‘ordinary’ is “substantially nonpolitical and largely encompassed within the prospect of full socioeconomic integration in Jordan” (Achilli 2014, 244). The ‘ordinary’ might include getting married, owning a house, progressing in one’s career, and setting aside time for recreation. Within this non-political socioeconomic realm, they can enact both Jordanian and Palestinian identities without betraying either. Retreating into these “ordinary” spheres of life is thus a refusal to “play the game of politics,” and represents “an attempt to limit, control and hold back the upsetting dynamics of the we/they distinction” (Achilli 2014, 244).

My findings from my interviews with my ex-Gazan respondents problematizes the applicability of Achilli’s dichotomy between the ‘political’ and the ‘ordinary’ to ex-Gazan refugees. On the surface, the ex-Gazans seem to be enacting precisely what Achilli termed a ‘retreat into the ordinary’; Yusuf advocates withdrawing into a nonpolitical life preoccupied with socioeconomic activity. However, the applicability of Achilli’s ‘ordinary’ ends at this superficial level. In Achilli’s theory, Palestinians withdraw into the ‘ordinary’ because they want to enact both Palestinian and Jordanian identities. The ‘ordinary’ is purportedly the space within which a Palestinian refugee can be both without contradiction. It follows that if a Palestinian desired only to enact either Palestinian or Jordanian identity, that Palestinian would have no need to retreat from the ‘political’ into the ‘ordinary.’ The ex-Gazans I interviewed show no desire to enact a Jordanian identity and yet distance themselves from politics, suggesting that Achilli’s account is not quite the right explanation for their political reticence. Furthermore, the friend-enemy distinction permeates even the mundane in the lives of the ex-Gazans. The experiences recounted by my ex-Gazan respondents made clear that they were confronted by the friend-enemy distinction even when conducting activities which should belong in the realm of the ‘ordinary,’ like visiting a hospital for medical treatment. Taking seriously the Schmittian concept that the ‘political’ is defined by the friend-enemy distinction, it follows that for ex-Gazans there is no ‘ordinary’ realm that exists distinct and separate from ‘the political.’

Conclusion

I do not claim to have demonstrated the falseness of Achilli’s theoretical schema. Rather, what I have shown is that Achilli’s explanation of the political reticence of Palestinian refugees in Jordan is predicated on the assumption of citizenship. Achilli fails to flag this assumption from the outset, but it lies implicit in his work; after all, 90% of the Palestinian residents of Al-Wihdat

camp, where Achilli conducted his study, hold Jordanian citizenship (Tiltnes and Zhang 2013). His application of the Schmittian friend-enemy distinction to the Jordanian-Palestinian tensions is both insightful and accurate. However, while his account of the ‘ordinary’ could very well hold among Palestinians with citizenship, it can scarcely extend to the stateless population of ex-Gazans. Achilli’s theoretical framework thus presents an example of a scholarly narrative concerned with the Palestinian refugee community in Jordan in general which, though insightful, obscures the experiences of the ex-Gazans as a minority group.

Examining the ex-Gazans as a subgroup of Palestinians in Jordan subject to distinctive systemic challenges, I have argued that the political reticence of the ex-Gazans is rooted in their legal status of statelessness. It is not the case, as Achilli may argue, that the ex-Gazans disengage from politics out of a desire to be embody both Palestinian and Jordanian identities. Rather, their formal exclusion from the Jordanian citizenry imbues their experience as an ‘other’ with an experience of ‘foreign-ness’, transforming the ex-Gazans from legal ‘outsiders’ to political ‘outsiders.’ As political ‘outsiders,’ the ex-Gazans perceive that they have no claim on the Jordanian state. Even as they confront the friend-enemy distinction in virtually every aspect of their lives, their choice is not to flee but to endure and forbear, without expressing any kind of political claim on the Jordanian state.

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Caste and the Indian Nationalist Novel: Contesting the Dalit Question in *Kanthapura* and *Untouchable*

Ng Qi Siang , Yale-NUS College '19

*This paper discusses the treatment of untouchables in *Kanthapura* and *Untouchable*, two of India's most renowned nationalist novels. Probing a comparison between these texts at once establishes a dialogue between rival conceptions of untouchable citizenship – those espoused by the Indian National Congress establishment (i.e. Gandhi) and others by more critical untouchable activists such as B.R. Ambedkar during India's struggle for independence. While the Gandhian view of untouchables espoused in Raja Rao's *Kanthapura* (1938) purports to improve the social condition of this subaltern community, it does so in a paternalistic manner that denies untouchables agency, self-determination and real improvements in their marginal social position. The only solution to Dalit social exclusion, argues Mulk Raj Anand in *Untouchable* (1935), is to recognize the systemic structural discrimination that untouchables confront within the caste system and consequently, to allow this subaltern community to work towards the abolition of caste through a distinct movement that better caters to their specific concerns. Through this comparison, this paper not only disrupts the notion of Indian nationalism as an unproblematic and homogenous force behind the leadership of Gandhi and the Congress, but also highlights contestation between different groups of English-educated nationalist leaders and intellectuals regarding the sensitive politics of caste.*

Introduction

‘My nationalism, fierce though it is, is not exclusive,’ proclaimed Mahatma Gandhi, whose spiritual leadership would come to define Congress’ struggle for *Swaraj* (*Indian Self-Rule*).¹ Under his guidance, Congress attempted to mobilize and emancipate marginalized groups such as the untouchables – people outside of the Hindu caste system deemed “ritually impure” – to participate in the anti-colonial struggle.² Yet, the paternalistic nature of Gandhian nationalism and the privileged positionality from which Congress activists viewed the condition of the untouchables arguably alienated many of these subalterns due to the high-caste gaze through which they understood these issues.³ This prompted untouchable leaders such as B.R. Ambedkar to break with Congress to form separate movements that better met *Dalit* aspirations.⁴ Despite good intentions, Gandhian nationalism was arguably poorly grounded in the reality of untouchable experiences and thus encountered difficulty catering to their specific needs and ambitions.⁵

Nowhere are the contradictions between the theory and reality of Gandhian nationalism more apparent than in Raja Rao’s *Kanthapura* (1938). A middle-class brahmin from Hyderabad, Rao was strongly influenced by Gandhian ideas and actively participated in the Quit India Movement (1942).⁶ While the novel reflects the apparently inclusive aims of Gandhian nationalism, it also highlights the problematic understanding that Congress had of untouchable issues. Studying *Kanthapura* gives scholars a space to explore and question such attitudes; reading it comparatively with more critical texts such as Mulk Raj Anand’s *Untouchable* (1935) sheds light on how Gandhian assumptions deviate from subaltern realities while contesting the disempowering discourses therein.

This paper argues that Rao expresses excessive optimism regarding nationalist unity between untouchables and caste Hindus under Gandhi, potentially silencing historical injustices and structural barriers that alienated subalterns from the mainstream *Swaraj* movement. The paper will first examine Rao’s idea of nationalism and his portrayal of subalterns before comparing it with *Untouchable* to expose his silences regarding the untouchable community,

¹ Gandhi and Anthony Parel, *Hind Swaraj and Other Writings*, Centenary ed, Cambridge Texts in Modern Politics (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 18.

² Teresa Hubel, *Whose India? The Independence Struggle in British and Indian Fiction and History* (London: Leicester Univ. Press, 1996), 151; Rumina Sethi, *Myths of the Nation: National Identity and Literary Representation* (Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press, 1999), 131–33.

³ Ramachandran Guha, “Introduction,” in *Untouchable*, by Mulk Raj Anand, New edition, Penguin Classics (London: Penguin Books, 2014), ix–xiv.

⁴ Hubel, *Whose India?* 153–58.

⁵ B. R. Ambedkar and Valerian Rodrigues, “Gandhism: The Doom of the Untouchables,” in *The Essential Writings of B.R. Ambedkar* (New Delhi; New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 150–58, 161–69.

⁶ R. Parthasarathy, “Introduction,” in *Kanthapura*, by Raja Rao, 2014, vii.

giving them a voice to resist problematic Gandhian representations of their community and paternalistic attitudes towards the liberation of the untouchables.

The Silencing of Untouchables in *Kanthapura*

Kanthapura recounts the story of how a group of South Indian villagers came to embrace Gandhian nationalist ideas and participate in the *Swaraj* movement against British colonial rule. The protagonist, Moorthy, comes into contact with Gandhian ideas while studying in the city and eventually returns to his home village to mobilize his fellow villagers to resist British rule. He initially faces ostracization from his fellow villagers for breaking caste boundaries to spread *Swaraj* among the untouchable pariah caste, consequently suffering excommunication from the Brahmin caste for his efforts. Despite the efforts of conservative forces such as Bhatta, the village priest and Waterfall Venkamma, a gossiping Brahmin woman, to discredit *Swaraj*, the young activist successfully instigates pariah coolies and Brahmin clerks on the Skeffington Coffee Estate to rise up against the British proprietors while winning over most of the village to the Gandhian cause. While eventually arrested by the British authorities for allegedly inciting violence among the locals, the village women take leadership of the local *Swaraj* movement in his absence and continue to resist British rule with support of villagers from the surrounding villages. After several confrontations with the brutal colonial police, the village land is auctioned off to wealthy Europeans. Displaced from their land, the villagers burn down their village and disperse to neighboring settlements. The novel's conclusion is ambivalent: while the villagers remain hopeful that Gandhi will deliver *Swaraj*, their hard-won gains are reversed by a truce between the Mahatma and the British. Disillusioned, Moorthy forswears Gandhism and switches his support to the Socialist Nehru instead.

Kanthapura, the South-Indian village from which Rao's novel takes its name, is highly fragmented on caste lines. The spatial layout of the village itself is segregated based on 'a traditional village community hierarchically within an orthodox organization of castes' into a 'Brahmin quarter... a Pariah quarter... a Potter's quarter, a Weaver's quarter and a Sudra quarter', resulting in the creation of homogenous and exclusive social spaces that limit interactions between people of different castes.⁷ While the female Brahmin narrator Achakka initially describes the village as containing 'four-and-twenty houses', she speaks 'only of the Brahmin quarter', for she did not know how many houses existed outside of her exclusive environment, especially since she dared not enter 'polluting' spaces such as the "Pariah quarter" but merely observed it from 'the street corner Beadle Timmayya's hut'.⁸ This geographical segregation

⁷ Sethi, *Myths of the Nation*, 90; Raja Rao, *Kanthapura* (Guragon: Penguin Books, 2014), 6.

⁸ Rao, *Kanthapura*, 6.

reflects the social segregation of the village community: villagers are influenced by the politics of pollution embedded within the caste system and are haunted by an abiding fear of losing caste. The ‘confusion of castes’ is compared with the ‘Kaliyuga floods’⁹ during the depraved apocalyptic age in Hindu mythology, suggesting the existential threat to the social order presented by the breaking of caste boundaries. This anxiety eventually prompts the Brahmins to excommunicate Moorthy – the local Congress leader – ‘his family and all the generations to come’¹⁰ for visiting the “Pariah quarter”.

So traumatic is losing caste, in fact, that Moorthy’s mother dies of despair on hearing of her excommunication. Her angst is conveyed through the metaphor of ‘winds of the *night* and the shadows of the *night* and the jackals of the *night*...’ with the repetition of the word ‘night’ and the imagery of shadows and jackals demonstrating the psychological trauma of her relegation from the sacred space of Brahmanical purity by juxtaposing it to the wild, dark and profane space of ‘ghosts... spirits and the evil ones’ supposedly inhabited by outcastes.¹¹ The sheer force of this trauma metaphorically (and literally) destroying her sense of self-identity associated with her Brahmin caste by ‘pierc[ing] her breast’ like a dagger’, highlighting the centrality of this institution to one’s existence and self-definition, especially since key social institutions (e.g. religion, marriage and funerals) are organized on caste lines.¹² To be deprived of caste is, therefore, likened to being cast out of human civilization into the dangerous wilderness of social exclusion, severing one’s links with one’s community and one’s personal identity, thus exposing the daily psychological violence faced by those deprived of caste.

The catalyst for change is the introduction of Gandhian ideas into the community, which rapidly heals caste divisions within the village. Gandhi is portrayed with religious overtones, creating a myth to bind Kanthapura’s identity with that of the Indian nation-state and to symbolize its growing national consciousness, a mystique heightened by the fact that Gandhi himself does not appear in the novel and can thus be shaped by his interlocutors into a charismatic figure around which the villagers could rally. In a Harikatha¹³ recounted by the storyteller Jayaramcha at the Ganesh-Jayanti festival, the Mahatma is portrayed as an avatar of Shiva. He is sent by Brahma at the behest of the Sage Valmiki to ‘fight the enemies of the country’, lending the divine authority of Hindu traditions to his ideas.¹⁴ Parallels are drawn with Krishna, who fought ‘against demons and...killed the serpent Kali’, portraying the anti-colonial movement as

⁹ Rao, 31.

¹⁰ Rao, 49.

¹¹ Rao, 49.

¹² Rao, 49–50.

¹³ A Tamil Hindu religious discourse that often recounts the life of a saint.

¹⁴ Rao, *Kanthapura*, 12–13.

a battle between a binary of good and evil, defining the Indian nation against the British ‘other’ while elevating Gandhian nationalism to the level of objective and divine-inspired ‘Truth’.¹⁵ Moorthy’s conversion to Gandhian nationalism is moreover portrayed as divine revelation, where ‘he had seen a vision, a vision of the Mahatma, mighty and God-beaming’, providing a form of divine sanction to his later activism by investing him with Gandhi’s ostensible supernatural authority.¹⁶ Gandhian ideas are furthermore ascribed ‘something of the silent communion of ancient books’, ascribing infallible, divine truth to his teachings by placing it on the level of the great Hindu epics – the *Ramayana* through the reference to Valmiki, its author, and the *Mahabharata* through the comparison to Krishna, its protagonist.¹⁷ Admittedly, such myths do promote nationalist unity among the villagers. Common village initiatives led by Moorthy (e.g. temple-construction, Congress Panchayat) – who, as an outcaste, represents all yet none of them – allows villagers to transcend narrow caste loyalties to participate in the national anti-colonial struggle as theoretically equal citizens, weakening caste consciousness and allowing Untouchables to contribute towards *Swaraj*.¹⁸

The unrealistic speed with which deeply entrenched institutions such as caste are swiftly eroded by Gandhian influence, however, implies that Rao may perhaps have fetishized Gandhism as a supernatural power that acts as a panacea for Untouchable difficulties: the villagers abruptly ‘forgot about [caste]’ despite the powerful influence it once held over their lives.¹⁹ Yet, the scene where Rachanna’s wife begs Moorthy to touch a tumbler of milk ‘as though it were offered to the gods’ so that her family may be sanctified of their impurity as pariahs, exposes the fact that the lingering specter of caste persists in spite of the *Swaraj* movement’s claim to empower untouchables.²⁰ In referring to herself in servile terms such as ‘poor hussy’, the text highlights the persistence of untouchable servility towards caste Hindus – a form of psychological colonization from which it is difficult to escape.²¹ Even Moorthy, the representative of the nationalist movement in Kanthapura, cannot help but feel repulsed by the impurity of the offering. While he does eventually drink the milk, he does so fearfully with ‘many a trembling prayer’ and is only able to take one sip before setting it aside.²²

¹⁵ Rao, 13; Anna Triandafyllidou, “National Identity and the ‘Other,’” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 21, no. 4 (January 1998): 593–94, accessed 24 April 2018, <https://doi.org/10.1080/014198798329784>; Gandhi and Parel, *Hind Swaraj and Other Writings*, chap. 17.

¹⁶ Rao, *Kanthapura*, 13.

¹⁷ Rao, 38.

¹⁸ Rao, 7–11, 79–88, 151–52.

¹⁹ Rao, 133.

²⁰ Rao, 83.

²¹ Rao, 83.

²² Rao, 85.

Even the memory of this seemingly trivial act was terrifying enough to make Moorthy's 'hair stand[s] on end', necessitating a dose of Ganges Water and a bath with new clothes to get over the trauma of drinking in a pariah home, suggesting that even the best-trained Gandhians find it difficult to fully exorcise the influence of caste over their lives.²³ Despite their desire to liberate the untouchables from oppression, it seems that many Congress members remain trapped within hierarchical discourses of caste, resulting in them continuing to perpetuate caste structures in their habits and behavior. The existence of these entrenched discourses contradicts the portrayal of the changes brought about by Gandhian nationalism as swift and efficacious, perhaps arising from the high-caste gaze of the narrator, who is perhaps less aware of lingering pariah oppression. Juxtaposing the high-caste idealization of the efficacy of Gandhian *Swaraj* and the continued marginalization of untouchable castes highlights how mainstream nationalism may have trivialized the challenges still faced by subalterns seeking emancipation from persistent structural discrimination.²⁴

Problematic silences also exist in the Congress's attitude towards untouchables within the text. Though caste boundaries were indeed relaxed to unite the village, caste is not completely eliminated as an institution. True to Gandhi's practice of 'let[ting] the castes [and] separate eating exist' by retaining the traditional idea of caste and not requiring satyagrahis to 'break caste taboos, go on strike, fast, or participate in any other form of protest against untouchability', no real change in status exists for the pariahs in the novel, who meekly take an oath 'not to break the law' in the courtyard of the sacred temple rather than inside it.²⁵ This exposes the still exclusionary nature of Gandhian nationalism and the lack of awareness untouchables possess of their subjugation.²⁶ The high-caste gaze of Achakka, a subjective narrator removed from the pariah community, is ambivalent towards their lived experience, marginalizing their experience of the struggle for *Swaraj* (Indian self-rule) and the role that they play within the independence movement. They are instead 'othered' and fetishized as passive objects in a state of quasi-religious awe of caste Hindus, fully accepting their destined inferiority with no independent aspirations, thus discounting the urgency of their liberation and inadequately capturing the reality of their lived experiences.²⁷ Despite a sensation of liberation from British colonialism and a greater degree of community acceptance, untouchables remain subjugated by the institution of caste under Gandhism.

²³ Rao, 85.

²⁴ Rao, 85.

²⁵ Rao, *Kanthapura*, 31,87.

²⁶ Sethi, *Myths of the Nation*, 93; Hubel, *Whose India?*, 153.

²⁷ Rao, *Kanthapura*, 83.

The religious cult of personality in the text surrounding Gandhi and his self-appointed prophet, Moorthy, who is venerated as Kanthapura's local Mahatma, also carries paternalistic and authoritarian undertones that prevent untouchables from challenging these problematic attitudes towards caste. The novel's portrayal of 'Gandhi without flaws' suggests that conformity to Gandhian tenets is the only legitimate path to nationalism.²⁸ Due to his greater proximity to the Mahatma through his membership of the Congress Party, this deification rubs off on Moorthy as well, allowing him to vicariously enjoy the adoration and hero-worship that the villagers display towards Gandhi. Indeed, as the novel progresses, Moorthy becomes aloof and dictatorial in directing the anti-colonial struggle. Having undergone the 'glorious' sacrifice of incarceration, he increasingly uses grandiose language such as 'ye' and 'hath' while addressing speeches to the entire community rather than interacting with specific individuals in vernacular speech, suggesting an increasingly ambivalent attitude towards his fellow villagers, who seemingly follow his commands without question.²⁹ Dissenters such as conservative caste Hindus Bhatta and Waterfall Venkamma – vindictive and reactionary as they may be – gradually fade away. The claims to possess an objective 'Truth' and the god-like cult of personality surrounding nationalist leaders appear to suggest an authoritarian streak within the nationalist movement to the preclusion of other imaginations of nationhood.

No room, therefore exists for the untouchable pariahs to influence the Gandhian program in the text – they exist only to be led by the caste Hindu *Swaraj* activists – reflecting how the Gandhian movement's exclusive claim to representing the untouchables causes him to unwittingly impose his agenda upon them in a paternalistic manner, ironically delegitimizing organic forms of untouchable resistance even as he advocates for their liberation and social inclusion.³⁰ Despite the good intentions of Congress activists, untouchables remain twice colonized, first by the Raj, and subsequently by caste Hindus, who mobilize their political support to advance a *Swaraj* where untouchables remain marginalized.³¹ Despite a fleeting sense of liberation, in *Kanthapura*, 'the subaltern cannot speak'.³²

The Centrality of Subaltern Lived Experience in *Untouchable*

Untouchable recounts a day in the life of Bhaka, an untouchable boy who cleans latrines in a British army barracks for a living. Through his eyes, Anand richly described the daily life of the

²⁸ Sethi, *Myths of the Nation*, 100.

²⁹ Rao, *Kanthapura*, 137.

³⁰ Hubel, *Whose India?*, 151–52.

³¹ Gyatri Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak," in *Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: A Reader*, ed. Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman, 2013, 66–111, 90–104, accessed 26 April 2018, <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=1052363>.

³² Spivak, 104.

untouchables and the numerous indignities they face on a daily basis. Despite his low-born status, Bhaka aspires to the higher standard of living enjoyed by the White man, regularly dressing up in British Army uniforms and attempting to learn English. Nevertheless, he is unable to escape the contempt of Hindu society on account of his low caste, exemplified by a dramatic slap he receives from a caste Hindu for touching him in the street by accident. Troubled by these indignities, Bhaka indignantly questions his maltreatment by Indian society and enters a state of despair at his inability to escape untouchable oppression. Stumbling upon a Congress Rally, Bhaka listens to Gandhi (who is an actual character in the novel) articulate his vision for the untouchables and several intellectuals discussing the Untouchable question. While puzzled and slightly doubtful at their words, Bhaka returns home to share Gandhi's words with his family in the hopes that these ideas would one day lead to their emancipation.

Like Rao, Mulk Raj Anand came from a middle-class high-caste background, born into a lower-middle class Kshatriya family in Peshawar. Despite playing with untouchable children as a child, his perspective on *Dalits* may nevertheless have been filtered through a privileged gaze.³³ In reading *Untouchable*, one questions the extent to which the feelings ascribed to Anand's untouchable protagonist, Bakha, truly represent subaltern sentiments rather than merely being a mouthpiece for his elite (and possibly flawed) understanding of the conditions of the untouchables.³⁴ Yet, in contrast to their peripheral role in *Kanthapura*, *Untouchable's* realist description of the life of Bakha at least places the lived experiences of untouchables at its core.³⁵ It acknowledges untouchable agency while highlighting more starkly their persecution by an oppressive social order.

Rather than representing untouchables as a supine and pliant constituency, Anand portrays young untouchables as having dreams and aspirations towards a better standard of living. Bakha, the young protagonist, symbolizes the idealism and optimism of youth in aspiring beyond his station. Enjoying life in the liminal space of British military barracks where caste has a weaker hold, Bakha learns a sense of self-respect from being treated 'as a human being' by British tommies, thus 'think[ing] of himself as superior to his fellow-outcastes' who were 'content with their lot' of stagnation and oppression – a sentiment shared by his friends Chota and Ram Charan, as they imitate British practices such as wearing British military uniform and

³³ Rosemary Marangoly George, *Indian English and the Fiction of National Literature* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 94; E.M. Forster, "Afterword," in *Untouchable*, by Mulk Raj Anand, New edition, Penguin Classics (London: Penguin Books, 2014), 143.

³⁴ George, *Indian English and the Fiction of National Literature*, 114.

³⁵ Nisha Rani Tank, "Social Realism: Reflection and Identity in Mulk Raj Anand's Works with Special Reference to *Untouchable* and *Coolie*," *International Journal of Advanced Research and Development* 3, no. 2 (March 1, 2018): 1.

smoking tobacco.³⁶ Despite the problematic nature of the psychological imperialism inflicted upon these youths in their desire to ‘copy [the British] in everything...to copy them as well as [they] could’, this attitude does imply a growing aspirational attitude among the young untouchables in the text. They believed that ‘look[ing] like a sahib... And walk[ing] like a sahib’ would invest them with a sahib’s privileges too, suggesting a desire for a higher social status and an improved quality of life.³⁷

Such behavior recalls how Ambedkar used to appear in public dressed in a Western suit in contrast to Gandhi’s khadi to express untouchable aspirations to the power and opportunity of the West’.³⁸ For untouchables, Western dress was not so much slavish cultural imperialism as a ‘storming of the upper-class citadel’ to escape oppressive indigenous hierarchies.³⁹ In fact, Bakha solicits access to the education required to climb the social ladder, buying a ‘first primer of English’ and paying a babu’s son to teach him English to get around the taboo against educating Dalits: he desires access to public life and the wider world through ‘read[ing] the papers’ and literature and writing letters.⁴⁰ Born a sweeper but unable to ‘consciously accept that fact’, Bhaka’s dream of becoming a sahib suggests that young untouchables, like caste Hindus, hope for a life of success and prosperity, humanizing them beyond the role of a servile ‘other’.⁴¹ Anand gives these subaltern characters the agency to strive towards these aspirations in contrast to their peripheral position in *Kanthapura*.

Nevertheless, untouchable aspirations are continually impeded by the oppressive discourses of caste, trapping young untouchables in an oppressive cycle of immanence. Despite Rao giving the impression that caste can be efficaciously eradicated through the introduction of Gandhian ideas, the reality of caste discourses is that they are rarely as ineffectual as the protests of conservative caste Hindus like Bhatta and Waterfall Venkamma in *Kanthapura*. Instead, these discourses operate as a collectively-enforced technology of power designed to keep untouchables within their subjugated state. The dramatic slap that Bakha receives for touching a caste Hindu exemplifies this. Surrounded by a large crowd of caste Hindu onlookers, Bakha symbolizes the central role of the untouchables as the base of the caste superstructure, serving as an impure ‘other’ relative to which caste Hindus can maintain their relative ‘hygiene’.⁴² This results in the presence of an intangible ‘moral barrier’ between him, the ‘dirty’ untouchable, and the clean

³⁶ Mulk Raj Anand, *Untouchable*, New edition, Penguin Classics (London: Penguin Books, 2014), 3–5.

³⁷ Anand, 5.

³⁸ George, *Indian English and the Fiction of National Literature*, 114.

³⁹ Guha, “Introduction,” xiv.

⁴⁰ Anand, *Untouchable*, 30–31.

⁴¹ Anand, 31.

⁴² Alex Law, *Key Concepts in Classical Social Theory* (United Kingdom: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2011), 19, accessed 27 April 2018, <https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446251485>; Anand, *Untouchable*, 38.

caste Hindus, a psychological product of the caste system's politics of purity.⁴³ So powerful is this discourse that Bakha is compelled to adhere to this barrier, resentfully complying with the demand that he announce his presence with 'Posh, posh, sweeper coming' even though 'one push from his hefty shoulders would have been enough to unbalance the skeleton-like bodies of the Hindu[s]' in defiance of this humiliating injunction.⁴⁴

Instinctively triggered by Bakha's transgression of touching one of their number, the caste Hindus insult and even physically assault him to maintain this barrier, a tangible manifestation of the psychological violence the caste system inflicts to keep untouchables in their place.⁴⁵ The knocking off of Bakha's turban is especially humiliating, as the turban symbolizes one's dignity and honor, exposing the power of the high-caste to deprive untouchables of the human dignity that Bakha is taught to demand.⁴⁶ Following this violent humiliation, Bakha must accept society's definition of his identity, as seen from the persistent yet resentful mental repetition of '*Untouchable!* That's the word! *Untouchable!* I am an *Untouchable!*⁴⁷' Denied empowerment and social inclusion, Bakha is trapped within the unwanted identity of a reviled untouchable by oppressive caste structures. Contrary to *Kanthapura's* idealized view of social change through Gandhism, this entrenched edifice does not simply fade away.

Gandhi's solution to the untouchable Question unraveled, therefore, is unrealistic at best and patronizing at worst when juxtaposed against the violence that caste inflicts upon the untouchables. The Mahatma articulates a patronizing vision for his '*harijans*', demanding that they be treated *kindly*, provided with 'good, sound grain...courteously offered' and that they '*purify* themselves' and ritually 'rid themselves of evil habits'.⁴⁸ In describing Havildar Charat Singh, an apparently kind caste Hindu soldier who personifies kindness to untouchables, and Colonel Hutchinson, a British churchman, who symbolizes religion, Anand argues that neither is sufficient to emancipate untouchables from the oppressive institutions of the caste system.

The Havildar shows kindness to Bakha by not only speaking nicely to him and even giving him a new hockey stick, but also allowing Bakha to bring him coal for his *hookah*, a 'polluting' act that untouchables were normally forbidden from performing. The Havildar even pours him tea, earning his love and admiration.⁴⁹ Yet, such 'kindness' is neither empowering nor

⁴³ Anand, *Untouchable*, 38–39.

⁴⁴ Anand, 38–43.

⁴⁵ Anand, 39.

⁴⁶ Anand, 40; George, *Indian English and the Fiction of National Literature*, 119.

⁴⁷ Anand, *Untouchable*, 42–43.

⁴⁸ Anand, 131.

⁴⁹ Anand, 91–95.

dignifying, since it is laden with a condescension that ‘symbolized six thousand years of racial and caste superiority’, suggesting that Bakha is being patronized by a privileged caste Hindu who craves the pleasure of being a do-gooder since he can ‘afford to be kind’ without loss to himself, more out of pity than genuine good will.⁵⁰ Indeed, Bakha notices that his kindness has ‘a slight suspicion of forgetfulness about it’: in fact, the Havildar regularly mispronounces Bakha’s name as ‘Bakhya’, ‘Bakhe’ and ‘Bakhia’, suggesting a lack of any real care for the youth except to indulge his smug self-perception of generosity – thus reducing Bakha to the status of a pet, a child or a servant.⁵¹

Moreover, this kindness incites Bakha’s servility and disarms his outrage at the oppression he suffers as an outcaste. He is ‘a slave overjoyed at the condescension of his master’ at the Havildar’s casual promise of a hockey stick, fooling him into a sense of pride and contentment despite the unequal power dynamics tainting the relationship.⁵² Bakha’s father is similarly left utterly convinced of the ‘kindness’ of a high-caste doctor, who personally visits their dwelling to deliver a dying infant Bakha’s fever medicine, forgetting that the child had almost died in the first place because said doctor had refused to see an untouchable patient all day.⁵³ These isolated acts of kindness symbolize piecemeal concessions and reforms reminiscent of Gandhi’s call for better treatment for untouchables, trapping them within a state of false consciousness by encouraging them to support *Swaraj* with the caste system intact in spite of there being no substantive improvement to their subjugated social position.

Religion, while giving temporary solace to the untouchables, does not provide concrete solutions to their oppression either. When Bakha confides his problems in Colonel Hutchinson, the latter is unable to provide any practical or relevant solutions, merely ‘babbling, babbling, all vague in a cloud’ about the goodness and redemptive power of Christ and singing didactic hymns that do not address the real needs of the untouchable community.⁵⁴ Indeed, Anand implies that religion is in fact self-indulgent, as the padre is too obsessed with self-edification to give relevant answers to Bakha’s repeated questions about the alien faith which he is unable to comprehend – a sentiment he also feels when listening to Gandhi’s articulate his idealism with ‘a quixotic smile on his thin lips.’⁵⁵

In fact, Gandhi’s glorifying of Untouchability and wishing to be reincarnated as an untouchable to clean Hindu society exhibits similar self-indulgence, convincing himself that he

⁵⁰ Anand, 10; Hubel, *Whose India?*, 170.

⁵¹ Anand, *Untouchable*, 10,91; Hubel, *Whose India?*, 171.

⁵² Anand, *Untouchable*, 10.

⁵³ Anand, 69.

⁵⁴ Anand, 109–16.

⁵⁵ Anand, 125–28.

is standing in solidarity with the untouchables and convincing the untouchables that their oppression is a privilege while effecting little tangible change, a criticism that the economist Ambedkar regularly levelled against the real-life Mahatma.⁵⁶ It is because of this that Moorthy eventually distances himself from Gandhism in favor of materialist Nehruvian Socialism at the conclusion of *Kanthapura*, realizing that Gandhism's spirituality hindered meaningful action.⁵⁷ Religion is thus portrayed as a mask for hidden agendas: just like the padre's kindness is but a smokescreen for his imperialist Christian evangelism, Gandhi's performance as a 'beautiful and saintly' holy man in the novel may similarly belie an ulterior motive, perhaps to co-opt subaltern support for his exclusionary *Swaraj* through empty platitudes, indicated by 'something Mephistophelian in the determined little chin immediately under his mouth'.⁵⁸ If the pillars of kindness and religion upon which Gandhism rests yield little benefit for untouchables, its claim to bring about the 'emancipation of the untouchables' is debatable.⁵⁹

If Gandhism cannot liberate the untouchables, what is to be done? Anand does not say. Indeed, as a kshatriya removed from the untouchable community, his silence may imply that it is not his place to define the untouchables' future course. While Bhaka repeatedly seeks new sources of authority from the Havildar, Gandhi and finally the poet Iqbal Sarshar, Anand rejects the 'valorization of revolutionary leadership' in *Kanthapura*.⁶⁰ He suggests that no superior authority truly offers a satisfying solution to the unique problems faced by untouchables: Bhaka is always left disappointed by his 'idols' or unable to understand their prescriptions in full, disqualifying them from directing untouchable activism. The implication is that the untouchables must themselves work out their own salvation through an organic form of resistance that best suits their interests. The over-intellectualized and petty debate at the novel's conclusion between the Anglophile Bashir and the poet Sarshar is perhaps Anand providing a metafictional self-critique of his own conflicted identity as an English-educated writer, too confused and removed from the untouchable experiences to decide their future course for them. He implies that untouchables have become a distinct subjectivity unto themselves, othering the higher castes by referring to them separately as 'the Hindus', meaning that *Dalits* ought, as Ambedkar encouraged them to, to reject 'any structures of authority' and instead embrace authority for themselves separate from mainstream nationalism to better advance their own concerns as a distinct social group within the wider nationalist movement.⁶¹ Anand's refusal to prescribe the way forward for

⁵⁶ Anand, 130; Ambedkar and Rodrigues, "Gandhism: The Doom of the Untouchables," 167–69.

⁵⁷ Rao, *Kanthapura*, 211.

⁵⁸ Anand, *Untouchable*, 125.

⁵⁹ Anand, 131.

⁶⁰ Hubel, *Whose India?* 175.

⁶¹ Hubel, 175.

untouchables paves the way for a more pluralistic and democratic solution to caste oppression, encouraging the untouchables to seize their own destiny in ‘figur[ing] out the elements of possible new worlds’.⁶²

Conclusion

An important difference between *Kanthapura* and *Untouchable* is whether nationalism can co-exist with caste. On the one hand, the former implies that there is nothing mutually exclusive about caste and nationalism, even suggesting that the latter ought to be subordinated to the former in the interests of nationalist unity. On the other hand, the latter highlights that the depth of oppression faced by Untouchables renders Indian independence futile as they remain alienated from the freedom and prosperity it promises, perhaps necessitating a separate movement to achieve subaltern liberation. The privileged gaze of the Brahmin narrator in *Kanthapura* may lead to an idealistic underestimation of the difficulty of resolving the untouchable Question, while the centering of the subaltern in *Untouchable* exposes the evils of the caste system, leading to contrasting understandings of its role in an independent India.

These contrasting attitudes arguably influence the narrative style used by both authors. Approaching the untouchable Question from the position of a ‘clean’ Brahmin, Rao adopts a ‘dirty’ or ‘messy’ narrative style by attempting an ‘ordinary style of storytelling’ easily accessible to readers. He writes in a manner that he believes to embody the literary style of South India, respecting neither punctuation nor conjunction to “tell one interminable tale in a stream of consciousness with...a meandering narrative structure’ to accurately represent ‘the tempo of Indian life’.⁶³ This enables Rao to mask the hierarchical exaltation of the Brahmin caste and create a unifying national narrative that speaks to the entire Indian nation irrespective of caste, ironically marginalizing the unique struggles of the untouchables in the process.

In contrast, *Untouchable* has been described as being ‘indescribably clean’.⁶⁴ It uses a realist style to go ‘straight to the heart of its subject’ to amplify the subaltern voice above structural silences. Anand illustrates Bhaka’s life down to the most minute detail: even a task as mundane as cleaning latrines is described down to level of the movement of muscle as ‘a marvel of movement [and] dancing’, allowing readers to easily imagine the world inhabited by this invisible community.⁶⁵ Anand also describes Bhaka’s thoughts and emotions, highlighting the ‘smoldering rage...like spurts from a half-smothered fire’ he feels towards his oppression by

⁶² George, *Indian English and the Fiction of National Literature*, 123.

⁶³ Rao, *Kanthapura*, xxxi–xxxii.

⁶⁴ Forster, “Afterword,” 141.

⁶⁵ Anand, *Untouchable*, 9–11.

caste Hindus, enabling readers to empathize with the daily psychological violence untouchables face as a result of their subaltern position.⁶⁶ Anand thus purifies the ‘dirty’ untouchable by humanizing their experiences and placing them at the center of public discourse, though this style occasionally results in an ambivalent narrative voice due to his use of the ‘language and voice of the privileged classes’ to expose subaltern suffering.⁶⁷ To appeal to a wider audience, the clean must be made dirty and the dirty made clean.

Since both novels examine caste through the subjectivity of high-caste Hindu authors, it might be worth comparing them to *Dalit*⁶⁸ literature to examine continuities and differences between untouchable self-perception and upper-caste representation. Unlike the third-person novels of Rao and Anand, untouchable writers write in an autobiographical mode to ‘express their experiences of the oppression’, prizing self-perception vis-à-vis elitist ‘sympathy literature’ exemplified by the ‘bourgeois’ novel.⁶⁹ Comparing such texts could help us re-examine the belief that only *Dalits* can produce ‘*Dalit* literature’ while testing the limits of empathy that caste Hindu authors can have for untouchable oppression.⁷⁰

Acknowledgements

This paper would not have been possible without the valuable input of Professor Javed Majeed, Professor of English and Comparative Literature at King’s College London, and Dr. Tom Langley, Teaching Fellow of Comparative Literature at King’s College London, both of whom served as module conveners for the Socialism and Literature in India in the Twentieth Century module for which this paper was written. All errors are, however, my own.

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⁶⁶ Forster, “Afterword,” 141; Tank, “Social Realism,” 303.

⁶⁷ Oindrila Ghosh, “Caught In-between Two Worlds: Ambivalence in Mulk Raj Anand,” in *Culture and Identity: Re-Reading Raja Rao and Mulk Raj Anand*, ed. Aninda Basu Roy, Arindam Das, and Sarbojit Biswas, 2014, chap. 9.

⁶⁸ Refers to Militant untouchables, though the use of the term remains highly contested.

⁶⁹ Graham Good, “Lukács’ Theory of the Novel,” ed. György Lukács and Anna Bostock, *NOVEL: A Forum on Fiction* 6, no. 2 (1973): 181, accessed 30 April 2018, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1345432>.

⁷⁰ George, *Indian English and the Fiction of National Literature*, 123–24.

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Political Vicissitudes of Elderly Welfare:

Clientelism and Expansion of Bangladesh's Old Age Allowance Program

Kam Qiang Wei, NUS Political Science

This article evaluates the efforts made by the Government of Bangladesh to mitigate the protracted issue of elderly welfare, specifically regarding the inadequate pension coverage for a sizeable proportion of elderly. In particular, this article focuses on the Old Age Allowance Programme (OAAP) and how this initiative is used to provide minimal support for the elderly destitute. In doing so, this article argues that the introduction of the OAAP is motivated by political and electoral considerations by tracing political vicissitudes, demographic changes and past social policies that were enacted to assist the elderly. Furthermore, this article emphasizes that ongoing political battles between dominant political parties, centred around clientelist relations, have resulted in substantial targeting errors for the elderly destitute. In particular, the elite capture of social welfare institutions at the national level, coupled with the lack of accountability of local officials, have excluded many of the elderly destitute from social pension benefits. The article concludes that the long-standing social policy problem of inadequate pension coverage for the elderly remains unresolved due to zero-sum political contestations and rivalries in Bangladesh's electoral democracy.

Demographic and Economic Trends

Bangladesh is one of the 20 developing countries with the largest number of elderly population.¹ By 2025, 1 in 10 Bangladeshis will be considered “elderly.”² Demographic ageing in Bangladesh is attributed to the successes of social policy interventions that reduced fertility rates and extended life expectancy.³ Like many countries in developing Asia, Bangladesh is expected to age at relatively low incomes.⁴ Moreover, there is a sharp decline in the labour force participation (LFP) of elderly men and women after 55 years of age that correlates strongly with the increase in disability around that age.⁵ Hence, old age disability reduces LFP.⁶ Additionally, the link between elderly poverty and informal sector employment is salient. Many of the elderly previously worked in agriculture and other informal sectors, for which they are paid poorly, although the informal sector contributes the most to Bangladesh’s GDP and comprises more than 50 percent of total employment.⁷ Consequently, a majority of seniors are forced to depend on their meagre voluntary savings to finance their retirement expenditure, given their low wages previously accumulated via informal employment.⁸ This results in elderly destitution and increased dependence on social protection to provide a measure of income security in old age.⁹ Retirement income security will hence become economically and politically significant for the number of elderly that is anticipated to increase sharply. Consequently, financing retirement expenditure constitutes a significant policy challenge.¹⁰

Against this backdrop, I firstly highlight that inadequate social pension coverage for the elderly Bangladeshis emerges amidst the exclusionary pension system. Secondly, I discuss how the government established the Old-Age Allowance Programme (OAAP) to reform the pension system. Thirdly, I argue that the increasing importance of elderly constituencies drove and sustained the OAAP. Finally, I posit that targeting errors caused by elite capture of beneficiary

¹ Russell Kabir et al., “Population ageing in Bangladesh and its implications on healthcare,” *European Scientific Journal*, 9, no.33 (2013): 35, <http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/12857/1/2001.pdf>

² M Alimullah Miyan, “Retirement and Pension System in Bangladesh” (paper presentation, the 8th Asian Congress of the International Society for Labour and Social Security Law, Taipei, Taiwan, November, 2005), 12, www.airroc.org.tw/ISLSSL2005/program/doc/III-2.doc

³ Kabir et al., “Population ageing in Bangladesh,” 37.

⁴ Miyan, “Retirement and Pension System in Bangladesh,” 14.

⁵ Bazlul Haque Khondker et al., *Old age social protection options for Bangladesh*, (Dhaka: Bureau of Economic Research, 2013), 18, <http://www.pension-watch.net/silo/files/old-age-sp-options-for-bangladesh.pdf>

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Miyan, “Retirement and Pension System in Bangladesh,” 19.

⁸ Ibid., 18.

⁹ Armando Barrientos, “Is There a Role for Social Pensions in Asia?” *Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies*, 2, no. 1 (2014): 8, doi: 10.1002/app5.63

¹⁰ Azad Singh Bali, “The Political Economy of Pension Reforms in India,” *Public Administration and Development*, 34(2014): 294, DOI: 10.1002/pad.1681

selection processes, party dominance over political institutions and political clientelism between elites and potential beneficiaries render the OAAP incapable of solving the problem with social pension coverage for the elderly poor. Using the OAAP as a case study, I attempt to examine how political factors such as intense party competition and clientelism hinder the effective implementation of the social policies aimed at alleviating elderly poverty. From this, I note that social policies designed for helping the elderly destitute serves an additional purpose — to enhance the power of national and local elites in their struggle for votes.

Patron-Clientelism and Social Policy

Patron-clientelism refers to arrangements and relationships that are premised largely on instrumental calculus whereby an individual of higher socio-economic, cultural or *political* status (patron) uses his or her own influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or both to those of lower status (client).¹¹ The client reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal services and votes to the patron, thereby sustaining the political power of the former.¹² Existing literature has relegated patron-clientelism to the realm of politics – the party struggles that animate politicians to seek out their support base by providing economic allocations either by redirecting state resources to important electoral constituents or providing personal pay-offs to clients.¹³ Hence, groups that are marginalized have to make political claims to access resources. As Chatterjee (2004) writes, “particular population groups that are economically and socio-culturally marginalized engage with governmental agencies and transgress the strict lines of legality in struggling to live and work...in dealing with them, the authorities cannot treat them on the same footing as other civic associations that follow more legitimate and legal social pursuits.”¹⁴ In Bangladesh, clientelist networks permeate society. Political decision-makers face pressures from the clientelist networks, thereby driving them to engage in para-legal arrangements — the hallmark of clientelist politics for various purposes that revolve around their career interests.¹⁵ By dispensing resources through para-legal arrangements to clients, using them as vote banks and support bases, politicians are able to neutralize opposing forces and establish social control.¹⁶ However, existing perspectives on patron-clientelism see such instrumental arrangements as essentially extra-legal (para-legal) and illegitimate.¹⁷

¹¹ Abu Elias Sarker, “Patron-Client Politics and Its Implications for Good Governance in Bangladesh,” *International Journal of Public Administration*, 31, No.12 (2008): 1418-1419, DOI: 10.1080/01900690802194966

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid., 1420.

¹⁴ Partha Chatterjee, *The Politics of the Governed: Reflections on Popular Politics in Most of the World* (Columbia University Press, 2004), 40.

¹⁵ Sarker, “Patron-Client Politics,” 1420.

¹⁶ Ibid., 1420, 1430.

¹⁷ Chatterjee, *The Politics of the Governed*, 60.

Notwithstanding, patron-clientelism also prevails in the realm of legal and legitimate public policies. By extension, legitimate and legal policy arrangements also serve as avenues for politicians to engage in clientelism. Social pensions policies are constitutionally recognized, debated in Parliament and serve an official purpose of taking care of the destitute. Yet, in Bangladesh's context, incumbent political elites have deftly appropriated legitimate institutions in order to "dispense patronage" to their constituents, thereby cementing their positions in government.¹⁸ This article builds upon existing theories of clientelism and highlights that clientelist relationships not only pervade in society but also take place within the government ministries, agencies and bureaucracies. As a result, many stakeholders – citizens and politicians alike —are entangled in a complex state-society nexus that embodies clientelist politics that threaten to undermine the objectives of social policies to mitigate destitution of particular segments of society in the first place. Using the case of the OAAP, I will discuss how the clientelist links between state and society repose not merely in the realm of politics, reflected in party competition but also how political elites harness and exploit legitimate and legal channels – the realm of social policy, to conduct their clientelist and vote-seeking behaviours within an electorally competitive polity like Bangladesh.

Problem Statement

Hitherto, many elderly Bangladeshis suffer from poverty because old age reduces their capacity to earn wages. Herein, I define poverty as the deprivation of income, purchasing power and resources to afford necessities for survival.¹⁹ Bangladesh's poverty index presently considers non-food consumption.²⁰ The Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) used two poverty lines for its poverty estimates. One is the lower poverty line, equivalent to only the food poverty line. Household with total expenditures equivalent to the food poverty line are considered extreme poor.²¹ The second refers to the upper poverty line, equivalent to food plus non-food poverty line. The corresponding households are considered moderately poor.²² In Bangladesh, aid programmes are intended to improve the financial situation of the elderly who are below the lower poverty line. Yet, public initiatives to alleviate elderly destitution is limited, evidenced by

¹⁸ Ibid., 41, 77.

¹⁹ Md. Golam Mostofa Hasan, "Legal Framework of Poverty Reduction in Bangladesh: An Analysis From The International Human Rights Law," *The Northern University Journal of Law*, 4 (2013): 85, DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.3329/nujl.v4i0.25943>

²⁰ Ibid., 87.

²¹ Md. Shafiul and Azam Katsushi S. Imai, "Vulnerability and poverty in Bangladesh," No. 141, 2009, Chronic Poverty Research Centre, University of Manchester, <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/127320/WP141%20Azam-Imai.pdf>

²² Ibid.

the lack of a universal social security system.²³ Based on this premise, the social policy problem is the incapability of policy-makers to ensure adequate financial support for the elderly poor through existing pension schemes. Since pension programmes aim to smooth consumption, mitigate old-age poverty, and manage longevity, coverage gap in pension programmes leave many elderly individuals unprotected from the risk of impoverishment.²⁴

Traditional Pension System

The government administers a contributory-based scheme whereby every formal sector employee contributes a certain percentage of their basic salary to the Provident Fund.²⁵ Formal sectors include government, semi-government organizations and established private sector organizations.²⁶ Employee contributions range from 5 to 10 percent with equal employer contributions. The combined amount is kept in a separate account, whereby an interest is earned on a compound rate basis.²⁷ While in service, employees can use some of their accumulated funds as loans, which are repayable from their monthly salary.²⁸ Additionally, the government administers a public servants' pension scheme.²⁹ After a minimal 10 years of civil service employment, or on reaching 57 years, one obtains a monthly allowance based on the last salary drawn and the years of service rendered.³⁰ This pension scheme is a mandatory, publicly managed, tax financed defined benefit scheme and is administered on a pay-as-you-go principle.³¹ Civil servants aged 57 years obtain superannuation pension when they mandatorily retire.³² Government employees also obtain compensation pension when their posts are rendered redundant, or become entitled to invalid pension if they are declared medically unfit to perform their official duties.³³ Furthermore, family pension is given to the pensioner's family upon his or her death. A public servant can nominate members of his or her family as successors for the whole or part of his or her family pension while remaining in service.³⁴ Those schemes enable

²³ Raisul Awal Mahmood at al., "Bangladesh" in *Social Security for the Elderly: Experiences from South Asia*, ed. S. Irudaya Rajan (London: Routledge, 2008), 171.

²⁴ Landis MacKellar, *Pension Systems for the Informal Sector in Asia* (Washington DC: The World Bank, 2009), 6, <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOCIALPROTECTION/Resources/SP-Discussion-papers/Pensions-DP/0903.pdf>

²⁵ Mahmood at al., "Bangladesh," 174.

²⁶ MacKellar, *Pension Systems for the Informal Sector*, 10.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Mahmood at al., "Bangladesh," 174.

²⁹ MacKellar, *Pension Systems for the Informal Sector in Asia*, 31.

³⁰ Miyan, "Retirement and Pension System in Bangladesh," 15.

³¹ Sharifa Begum and Dharmapriya Wesumperuma, "Overview of the Old Age Allowance Programme in Bangladesh" in *Social Protection for Older Persons: Social Pensions in Asia*, ed. Sri Wening Handayani and Babken Babajanian (Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2012), 191, <https://think-asia.org/bitstream/handle/11540/100/social-protection-older-persons.pdf?sequence=1>

³² Miyan, "Retirement and Pension System in Bangladesh," 17.

³³ Ibid., 16.

³⁴ Ibid., 18.

public-sector employees to have retirement savings and income safeguards for themselves and their family in the case of disability or death.³⁵

In 2018, the finance minister Muhith announced that the government will adopt a public pension plan similar to that of developed countries during his budget speech. Under this plan, employees working in private corporate firms and other established types of businesses will be included.³⁶ The national pension fund will have multiple sources. The primary source will be a portion of the income tax derived from the public servants. Money from the budget allocated specifically for the pension fund serves as a second source. The third source will be the employers' and employees' contributions to the fund.³⁷ Doubtless, this initiative signifies the government's will to expand pension coverage for those hitherto excluded from it, given that under the previous scheme, people who are not employed in the government or parastatal organizations are excluded from pension benefits.³⁸ However, a closer analysis reveals the cosmetic nature of reform attempts to include more elderly into the pension scheme since the scheme targets only 8 percent out of the 95 percent of the private sector employees who are formally employed.³⁹ Consequently, informal sector workers, including migrant labourers, self-employed persons, unpaid homemakers and those who work in agricultural sectors are excluded from the public pension system because they are neither government employees nor formally employed.⁴⁰ Yet, most workers are engaged in the informal sector given limited job opportunities within the formal and government sectors.⁴¹ According to the 2010 Labour Force Survey, the informal sector constitutes 87 percent of Bangladesh's labour force.⁴² Evidently, a vicious cycle of poverty ensues for people who work in informal sectors. Consequently, elderly people who retire from the informal sector continue to depend on either their own savings or family support to finance old-age expenditures. Only a minority of privileged seniors benefited from the civil service pensions.⁴³ Furthermore, older women are more vulnerable to impoverishment than men because of their initial low LFP in both formal and informal sectors, since social norms often restrict women from engaging in paid

³⁵ Mahmood et al., "Bangladesh," 175.

³⁶ Shafiqul Islam, "What to expect from the government's public pension scheme," *Dhaka Tribune*, May 6, 2018, <https://www.dhakatribune.com/business/economy/2018/05/06/expect-governments-public-pension-scheme>

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Miyan, "Retirement and Pension System in Bangladesh," 18.

³⁹ Islam, "What to expect from the government's public pension scheme."

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ravi Vellor, "Bangladesh: Poverty and lack of opportunities make it fertile for extremist ideology," *The Straits Times*, January 20, 2016, <http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/south-asia/bangladesh-poverty-and-lack-of-opportunities-make-it-fertile-for-extremist-ideology>

⁴² "Informal Economy in Bangladesh," International Labour Organization, accessed April 17, 2018, <http://www.ilo.org/dhaka/Areasofwork/informal-economy/lang--en/index.htm>

⁴³ Khondker et al., *Old age social protection options*, 33.

labour. Hence, older women have less earning potential as they are less likely to have ever worked for income.⁴⁴ Older women are also expected to be responsible for unpaid household work to lessen the family burden.⁴⁵ Those factors undermine their accessibility to income security and increase their reliance on social protection. Nonetheless, the exclusionary pension schemes put older women at severe risks of impoverishment. The upshot is that the traditional pension systems had failed to work for those employed in the informal sectors, amongst those who received little to no pension benefits, elderly women tend to be impacted more severely due to their initial low LFP.

Arrangements for Elderly Poor and Informal Workers

The formal sector schemes at best cover a small fraction of the elderly, who were previously formally employed in government organizations and established firms. Hence, an important avenue for broadening social protection coverage is through social pensions, which constitute an important component of the national development plans to reduce elderly poverty.⁴⁶ Initial attempts to reform the public pension system was reflected through the government's introduction of the OAAP for the elderly poor in 1998.⁴⁷ The OAAP's architecture is discussed because it is the only official programme for Bangladesh's burgeoning elderly population, evinced by the number of seniors exceeding 10 million since 2010.⁴⁸ Social pensions are regular non-contributory cash transfers and benefits to older people provided by the government, aimed at redistribution and addressing poverty.⁴⁹ Social pension benefits are financed from the budget and tax revenues.⁵⁰ According to Robert Palacios and Charles Knox-Vydmanov, the term "social" implies that their objective mainly relates to income redistribution and tackling poverty. Thus, such schemes distinguish them from other non-contributory pensions, such as special veterans' pensions and civil service pensions.⁵¹ The OAAP originally targeted a small minority of older people but have since been gradually expanding coverage for a greater proportion of the elderly population.⁵² Under the OAAP, entitlements are not based on earnings, wage history or payroll contributions but are granted solely on citizens meeting age and need requirements,

⁴⁴ Ibid., 22.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 21.

⁴⁶ Bali, "The Political Economy of Pension Reforms," 297.

⁴⁷ Miyan, "Retirement and Pension System in Bangladesh," 24.

⁴⁸ Begum and Wesumperuma, "Overview of the Old Age Allowance Programme," 191.

⁴⁹ Robert Palacios and Charles Knox-Vydmanov, "The Growing Role of Social Pensions: History, Taxonomy and Key Performance Indicators," *Public Administration and Development*, 34 (2014): 252. DOI: 10.1002/pad.1682

⁵⁰ Bali, "The Political Economy of Pension Reforms," 297.

⁵¹ Palacios and Knox-Vydmanov, "The Growing Role of Social Pensions," 251.

⁵² Ibid., 257.

which distinguishes them from other non-contributory pensions like civil service pensions.⁵³ Also, social pensions do not require beneficiaries to withdraw from employment.⁵⁴ Social pensions allow policy-makers to extend social protection to the elderly poor who were previously informal workers.⁵⁵ It is clear that the Bangladeshi state adopts a type of social pension, in the form of OAAP, that explicitly targets older people.⁵⁶ The OAAP was later incorporated into Bangladesh's Fifth Five Year Plan from 1997 to 2002 to help the poor elderly population.⁵⁷ It is a selective social pension scheme because eligibility entails a categorical requirement, age or disability, and a means test, which assumes that some will be excluded.⁵⁸ The Ministry of Social Welfare (MoSW), through the Department of Social Services (DSS) introduced and implemented this scheme in all 6 highest administrative units of the country.⁵⁹ The OAAP initially targets the 10 poorest elderly living in rural wards that include at least 5 elderly women for monthly cash transfers. This initial provision of selecting a fixed number of beneficiaries per ward was replaced in 2002 by system that considered the number of beneficiaries based on the population size of the ward.⁶⁰

The OAAP's design has 3 salient features. One, men who are 65 years or older, and women who are 62 years and over are eligible for cash transfers.⁶¹ This programme is gender-sensitive. The minimum eligibility age for women was lowered from 65 years to 62 years in 2011 but remained unchanged at 65 years for men, indicating that the government implicitly recognises the economic vulnerability and the higher risk of impoverishment among older women.⁶² Two, beneficiaries are currently entitled to an unconditional flat rate monthly benefit of Tk500 (6 USD) that is paid over 3 months.⁶³ This reflected an increase from the initial Tk100 that beneficiaries used to obtain when the OAAP was piloted.⁶⁴ Nonetheless, direct transfers to the elderly poor do not lift them out of the poverty line threshold, since benefits are pegged below

⁵³ Barrientos, "Is There a Role for Social Pensions in Asia?" 8.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 9.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 10.

⁵⁷ Mahmood et al., "Bangladesh," 175.

⁵⁸ Barrientos, "Is There a Role for Social Pensions in Asia?" 10.

⁵⁹ S. Irudaya Rajan, "Social security for the unorganized sector in South Asia," *International Social Security Review*, Vol. 55, 4 (2002): <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-246X.00143>

⁶⁰ Luigi Ragno, "Linking Protection and Promotion in Poor Households: Social Pension Scheme and Poverty Reduction in Urban Bangladesh: Do Cash-Based Social Assistance Measures Promote More Investments Towards Poverty Exit?" (PhD diss., University of Manchester, 2014), 55.

⁶¹ Ibid., 58.

⁶² Khondker et al., *Old age social protection options*, 21.

⁶³ "Bangladesh," Pension Watch, accessed April 15, 2018, <http://www.pension-watch.net/country-fact-file/bangladesh/>

⁶⁴ Abdul Quayum, "Old age allowance a right, not charity," *The Daily Star*, October 31, 2017, <https://www.thedailystar.net/round-tables/old-age-allowance-right-not-charity-1441162>

Bangladesh's minimum wage at Tk1500 per month.⁶⁵ Rather, OAAP benefits serve to supplement individual consumption.⁶⁶ Three, OAAP beneficiaries are selected through a means-testing process based on certain characteristics that include age, average yearly income, health status, socio-economic condition, expenditure, and land ownership.⁶⁷ Presently, the eligibility criteria include an annual income of an elderly individual that is Tk3000 or less.⁶⁸ Those who receive other government grants or regular assistance from the community are excluded, and only one recipient per household is permitted.⁶⁹ While the OAAP's operations manual does not delineate specific targets, priority is typically given to freedom fighters, refugees, landless people and those without alternative sources of income.⁷⁰ Once selected and enrolled in the scheme, beneficiaries will receive OAAP benefits for life.⁷¹ Local communities and governmental institutions such as the *upazilas* play important roles in the OAAP's implementation, and identification and selection of eligible elderly individuals for the allowance money.⁷² The implementation of the OAAP is supervised and monitored by the municipal committee and *upazilas*.⁷³ The local ward committee makes the primary candidate selection from the applicants.⁷⁴ Subsequently, they submit the primary list to municipal committees and *upazilas* for urban and rural areas respectively, whereby the latter finalizes the list of beneficiaries.⁷⁵ Furthermore, the municipal committees arrange payment of the allowance to beneficiaries through government scheduled banks.⁷⁶ The records of OAAP beneficiaries, including their passbook and fingerprints are maintained by the district level office of DSS and the *upazila* Social Service Office for urban and rural areas respectively.⁷⁷ Evidently, an elaborate set of local committees and subcommittees are vested with the power to select beneficiaries.⁷⁸ Since local committees enhance the central government's legitimacy by delivering government benefits to

⁶⁵ "Bangladesh Minimum Wage Rate 2018," Minimum Wage Org, accessed April 19, 2018, <https://www.minimum-wage.org/international/bangladesh>

⁶⁶ Armando Barrientos, *Social Assistance in Developing Countries* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 105.

⁶⁷ Miyan, "Retirement and Pension System in Bangladesh," 24.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 25.

⁶⁹ "Bangladesh."

⁷⁰ Begum and Wesumperuma, "Overview of the Old Age Allowance Programme," 195.

⁷¹ Ragno, "Linking Protection and Promotion in Poor Households," 58.

⁷² Upazilas are local administrative districts and sub-districts. Upazila parishad – the local governing body consists of a chairman, two vice-chairpersons (one of them a woman), chairmen of all union parishads under the upazila concerned, mayors of all municipalities, if there are any, and women members of the reserved seat.

Wasim Bin Habib, "All about upazila parishad," *The Daily Star*, January 22, 2009, <https://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-72392>

⁷³ Begum and Wesumperuma, "Overview of the Old Age Allowance Programme," 195.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 196.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 194.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ Mahmood et al., "Bangladesh," 175.

the elderly poor, beneficiary selection and allowance delivery processes tend to be highly politicized.⁷⁹ Through the OAAP, the government incorporates fiscal tools in the form of social pensions to assist the elderly destitute. From a policy design perspective, the OAAP theoretically resolves the coverage of elderly destitute because an extensive means-testing system, coupled with institutions such as the *upazilas* and district administration bodies would ensure that the fiscal transfers reach the needy. Yet, the appropriate use of policy tools to address a specific social policy problem does not guarantee success in the context of expanding pension coverage for elderly destitute. In fact, the precondition for the alleviation of elderly poverty through social pensions lies in the political milieu and whether incumbents are engaged in zero-sum political battles.

In terms of financing, the government's budgetary sources serve as the main pillar of support for the OAAP.⁸⁰ The programme is financed through the annual budget as direct fiscal costs. It provides low benefits and constitutes 5.2 percent of GDP per capita.⁸¹ With the increase in the transfer values in recent years, nominal spending and transfers for the OAAP nearly doubled between the 2013-14 and 2016-17 budget.⁸² The OAAP constitutes almost one-third of the Ministry's total budget and ranged from 62-67 percent from 2013 to 2017.⁸³ According to the estimated budget breakdown of OAAP and HDDWW, the latter being another social assistance programme for widowed, deserted, and destitute women, the total administrative costs constitute 4 percent of the total costs of both schemes.⁸⁴ From this, it can be reasonably deduced that OAAP incurs low administrative expenditures.⁸⁵ Resources saved by efficient expenditure management have increased Bangladesh's fiscal space. Thus, the government has more available budgetary resources for expanding OAAP without jeopardizing the sustainability of its financial position.⁸⁶ Yet, the scheme currently covers only 38 percent of the elderly population despite periodic coverage expansion over the years. If the inclusion errors by age are considered, OAAP effectively covers only 26 percent of the actual elderly population.⁸⁷ The subsequent segment argues that the OAAP remains inept in expanding coverage for the elderly poor because it

⁷⁹ "Bangladesh: Political implications of 'upazila' elections," *Observer Research Foundation*, March 28, 2014, <https://www.orfonline.org/research/bangladesh-political-implications-of-upazila-elections/>

⁸⁰ "Bangladesh."

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁸² Ministry of Social Welfare, Government of Bangladesh, *A Diagnostic Study on Old Age Allowance Programme and Allowance to the Husband Deserted Destitute Women and Widows Programme* (Dhaka: Maxwell Stamp PLC, 2017), 22, <http://spfmisp.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/2017-04-05-Diagnostic-Study-on-OAA-and-HDDWWA-final.pdf>

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 24.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶ Mukul G. Asher and Azad Singh Bali, "Creating fiscal space to pay for pension expenditure in Asia," *Economic and Political Studies*, 5, no. 4 (2017): 508, DOI: 10.1080/20954816.2017.1384625

⁸⁷ Government of Bangladesh, *A Diagnostic Study on Old Age Allowance Programme*, 3.

remains motivated by partisan concerns. Furthermore, local elected committees use beneficiary selection processes to bolster political popularity. The problem is worsened when incumbents at the central government level use funding and agents to influence the OAAP's implementation.

Politics of the OAAP

The OAAP constitutes the incumbent's response to political pressures in a competitive two-party system, dominated by the Awami League (AL), with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) as the main opposition.⁸⁸ The restoration of parliamentary democracy since 1991 has been afflicted by confrontation, competition, monopolization of state institutions and resources by the ruling party.⁸⁹ Both parties have strong familial dynasties. Shiekh Hasina, the daughter of Bangladesh's founding father Mujib has been AL's leader since 1981. Khaleda Zia, the widow of the military ruler Ziaur Rahman, has headed the BNP since 1983 after her husband's assassination.⁹⁰ Inter-party confrontation ensues because leaders struggle to personalize state power amidst an environment characterized by "one kingdom and two dynasties."⁹¹ This generates a volatile political environment underpinned by intense partisan competition.⁹²

Thus, politics is a zero-sum game as parties attempt to establish hegemonic control over political agendas and the use of public resources.⁹³ The winning party subsequently monopolizes state resources and excludes the losing party from the wherewithal as if the latter has no right to exist.⁹⁴ Moreover, elections are party-centric battles fought with the influence of financial resources and patron-clientelism.⁹⁵ Politicians dispense material advantages to dependents in exchange for their votes. This relationship ceases once the expected rewards and stipends fail to materialize.⁹⁶ Consequently, leaders hold onto power by persistently giving cash transfers to secure the loyalty of key constituencies.⁹⁷ While the concept of the OAAP was floated in 1985, the actual implementation only occurred 2 years after the AL returned to power in 1996, thereby enabling the elderly poor to finally have access to necessities under the AL's regime.⁹⁸ The AL government's interpretation of welfare in terms of patronage is evident. When Bangladesh again

⁸⁸ Ferdous Arfina Osman, "Bangladesh Politics: Confrontation, Monopoly and Crisis in Governance," *Asian Journal of Political Science*, 18, no. 3 (2010): 311, DOI: 10.1080/02185377.2010.527224

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 310.

⁹⁰ Inge Amundsen, "Democratic dynasties? Internal party democracy in Bangladesh," *Party Politics*, 22, no.1 (2013): 53, DOI: 10.1177/1354068813511378

⁹¹ Mohammad Mozahidul Islam, "The Toxic Politics of Bangladesh: A Bipolar Competitive Neopatrimonial State?" *Asian Journal of Political Science*, 21, no. 2(2013): 149, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2013.823799>

⁹² *Ibid.*, 155.

⁹³ Amundsen, "Democratic dynasties?" 56.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁹⁵ Islam, "The Toxic Politics of Bangladesh," 155.

⁹⁶ Osman, "Bangladesh Politics," 312.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁹⁸ Ragno, "Linking Protection and Promotion in Poor Households," 55.

returned to parliamentary democracy in 2008 after a quasi-military rule, Hasina's administration promptly increased the monthly OAAP allowance from Tk250 to Tk300.⁹⁹ The OAAP's continuity reflects the incumbents' sharp political instincts for survival and dominance. Because the growth rate of the elderly is expected to grow faster than the general population from 2011 to 2051, expanding social pension coverage would have immense value to elderly poor by helping them meet their basic needs with a reliable source of income.¹⁰⁰ This heightens their confidence towards the incumbents because with the OAAP, no elderly will be deprived of necessities.¹⁰¹ This strengthens the social contract between the elderly poor and incumbent political elites because the latter are perceived as committed to ensure appropriate levels of well-being for the former.¹⁰² In turn, this strengthens the legitimation capacity and public trust in the government, especially among the elderly poor.¹⁰³ From 2006 to 2011, the number of approved beneficiaries sharply increased from 1.6 to 2.5 million older people. The OAAP allowance also increased under successive governments. From 1998 to 2010, the monthly allowance increased three-fold from Tk100 to Tk300.¹⁰⁴ Such trends imply that electoral considerations motivated the OAAP's expansion for the increasing proportion of the elderly poor who wield potential to become key electoral constituents that determine the incumbents' political popularity.¹⁰⁵ Hence, the very emergence and sustenance of OAAP is politically motivated, since the government's attempts to increase OAAP spending and coverage pre-empts challenges to their legitimacy amongst elderly constituents. Contemporarily, tensions between Hasina's Awami League and Zia's BNP were renewed when the former came to power for a second consecutive term after a bloody parliamentary election that was boycotted by Zia's party in 2014.¹⁰⁶ Khaleda Zia and the BNP is set to run in parliamentary polls in December and can still do so if an appeal is pending. At the same time, the incumbent administration will bring 400,000 more people under the old age allowance programme in the Social Safety Net scheme in next fiscal year (2018-19).¹⁰⁷ According to Julia Lynch, the politics of patronage tends to lead to more elderly-oriented

⁹⁹ Mehedi Hasan Khan, "Policy Responses to the Emerging Population Ageing in Bangladesh: A Developing Country's Experience," (paper presented at International Population Conference, Marrakech, Morocco, October, 2009), 11, <http://iussp2009.princeton.edu/papers/91324>

¹⁰⁰ Mahmood et al., "Bangladesh," 165.

¹⁰¹ Md. Shahidur Rahman Choudhary, "Impact of old age allowance among rural aged: An empirical investigation," *International Journal of Sociology and Anthropology*, 5, no. 7 (2013): 268, http://academicjournals.org/article/article1379759769_Choudhary.pdf

¹⁰² Barrientos, *Social Assistance in Developing Countries*, 218.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 219.

¹⁰⁴ Khan, "Policy Responses to the Emerging Population Ageing," 11.

¹⁰⁵ Ragno, "Linking Protection and Promotion in Poor Households," 55.

¹⁰⁶ FP Staff, "Khaleda Zia vs Sheikh Hasina: 'Battling Begums,'" *First Post*, February 9, 2018, <https://www.firstpost.com/world/khaleda-zia-vs-sheikh-hasina-battling-begums-of-bangladesh-still-shape-country-with-their-bitter-politics-4343177.html>

¹⁰⁷ BSS, "400,000 more to get old age allowance in next FY," *Dhaka Tribune*, April 22, 2018,

social policies.¹⁰⁸ In Bangladesh's context, it is evident that the increasingly competitive and cut-throat political competition between AL and BNP has prompted the former to unveil more initiatives to cater to the needs of the elderly, especially those who are regarded as indigent. Following this line of argument, it is observed that democracy in Bangladesh is defective. While Bangladesh started as a democracy, the post-independence circumstances defeated the goals of that democracy. Thereafter, the transition from parliamentary to presidential form took place in less than four years of independence. Subsequently, the military coup eliminated all traces of legitimate government. Between 1975 and 1990, Bangladesh had elections without democracy, beginning with the "yes/no" vote of General Zia in 1977.¹⁰⁹ Several elections were then held during this period, when Bangladesh was ruled by military strong men. When an elected non-military government came to power in 1991, it was path-dependent on authoritarian institutions of the past. While elections today are more competitive, with 2 major parties to choose from, the incumbents have typically employed and monopolized state power to induce and coerce the polity.¹¹⁰ Clearly, patron-clientelism is rife in the democratic state, at least in political nomenclature. Furthermore, the very existence of social policies such as the OAAP, which is a hallmark of citizenship, are manipulated to entrench the incumbent's political power and hegemonic position. In short, social policies like the OAAP are mechanisms harnessed to gradually undermine democracy in Bangladesh for the incumbents to strengthen their grip on political power. Because the incumbent AL government induces elderly citizens to vote for them through social policies like the OAAP, this excludes many deserving groups of the very same benefits promised by the administration. In the long haul, as Habibul Haque Khondker highlights, the hitherto defect of Bangladesh's democracy would worsen because social policies are administered not so much based on the needs of the citizenry.¹¹¹ Instead, social policies like the OAAP are administered, under the incumbent politician's command, with an intention to coax segments of the population into voting in their favour. Consequently, social policy benefits become a commodity to be exchanged for votes. Hence, rational bureaucracy and the rule of law are continuously assaulted by patron-clientelism, abetted by the abuse of power in social policy administration. Ultimately, the lack of trust in the political system by the citizens ensues.¹¹² Given the severe impacts that the manipulation and abuse of social policy can bring to

<https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/2018/04/22/400000-get-old-age-allowance-next-fy/>

¹⁰⁸ Julia Lynch, 2004, "The Age of Welfare: Patronage, Citizenship, and Generational Justice in Social Policy," Harvard University Center for European Studies Working Paper No. 111, <http://aei.pitt.edu/11795/1/Lynch.pdf>

¹⁰⁹ Habibul Haque Khondker, "Citizen-centered governance Lessons from high-performing Asian economies for Bangladesh," in *Politics and Governance in Bangladesh*, ed Ipshita Basu et al. (London: Routledge, 2018), 81.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 82.

¹¹² Ibid.

Bangladesh's entire political system, this essay sees value in analysing the political mechanisms of exclusion that accompany the OAAP, a scheme that addresses the needs of a sizeable population of senior citizens.

Undoubtedly, the OAAP is a crucial reform to Bangladesh's social security system. Yet, attempts at increasing OAAP coverage and allowance are unsuccessful given that only 34.9 percent of elderly poor are currently getting the benefit.¹¹³ The scheme is plagued with type 1 errors, whereby OAAP wrongly excludes the elderly poor from the benefit and type 2 errors, whereby selection wrongly includes the non-poor.¹¹⁴ S. Begum and D. Wesumperuma highlight that high proportion of beneficiaries are reportedly non-poor or below the age of eligibility.¹¹⁵ They also note that the government manual does not explicitly delineate the target population of OAAP.¹¹⁶ This leads to ambiguity on whether OAAP addresses all poor older people or the extreme elderly poor.¹¹⁷ There is also inadequate knowledge about the incidence of poverty among older people, coupled with controversy about the correct proportion of the total population who are elderly.¹¹⁸ The weak administrative capacity of public agencies further resulted in the poor targeting of beneficiaries. The DSS, the implementing agency of OAAP has no information about the actual number of older people receiving this benefit annually.¹¹⁹ Banks that distribute the allowance to the beneficiaries also cannot supply such information to the DSS due to systemic problems.¹²⁰ Finally, logistical difficulties prevented informal sector workers from participating and being incorporated in the scheme because government officials face difficulties in tracking their earnings. Informal sector activities and enterprises are not registered, and labour relations are based on causal employment, not contractual arrangement with formal guarantees. Hence, the government faces greater challenges in quantifying the magnitude and incidence of informal activities.¹²¹ Accordingly, the Statistics Bureau, which is tasked with collecting, collating and disseminating statistical data has not attempted to collect any on informal sector employment. Furthermore, it has not conducted any surveyor census on informal sector activities.¹²² Consequently, many who exit the informal labour market upon aging are not targeted for OAAP due to inadequate data obtained on their income or savings. Such information

¹¹³ Khan, "Policy Responses to the Emerging Population Ageing."

¹¹⁴ Barrientos, *Social Assistance in Developing Countries*, 113.

¹¹⁵ Begum and Wesumperuma, "Overview of the Old Age Allowance Programme," 203.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 197.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*

¹²¹ Tahmidul Islam, Informal Sector In South Asia: A Case Study of Bangladesh, *Global Journal of Human-Social Science*, 17, no. 3 (2017): 3, https://globaljournals.org/GJHSS_Volume17/1-Informal-Sector-In-South-Asia.pdf

¹²² *Ibid.*

gaps and ambiguity render the beneficiary selection process vulnerable to exploitation for political gains by officials, thereby depriving many elderly poor of access to social pension coverage.

Political exploitation of the beneficiary selection process is widespread because local union and *upazila Parishad* (UP) chairpersons exercise excessive authority in candidate selection. Theoretically, beneficiary selection is conducted by 2 committees, whereby a ward committee makes the primary selection of candidates. In practice, several sub-districts had no ward committees and the UP chairmen unilaterally choose the beneficiaries.¹²³ Clearly, the OAAP is prone to elite capture. Devolution of authority to lower levels of government to administer the OAAP disproportionately empowers local UP leaders to use their discretion to select beneficiaries. Hence, OAAP is often used as a resource by local elites to reward their clients within their patronage networks. UP leaders also siphon off resources intended for beneficiaries to enrich themselves and their supporters.¹²⁴ Moreover, they choose their own supporters and relatives as OAAP beneficiaries, even if they are not poor.¹²⁵ Lobbying by poor people is also an important consideration in beneficiary selection.¹²⁶ Local officials are skewed towards potential recipients who articulate their interests for OAAP benefits. A 2008 study conducted by BRAC revealed that elderly beneficiaries were more likely to have made active efforts to get a beneficiary card, with 92 percent of beneficiaries reported having done so. Nearly all of those who had tried to get cards had lobbied to *Parishads*, evincing a significant level of political agency among poor and marginalized elderly groups.¹²⁷ Arguably, local elites fear legitimacy deficits amidst the political pressures that constituents exert on them,¹²⁸ since the UP Council comprises of directly elected members, regular elections serve as mechanisms to ensure local government accountability and responsiveness to needy constituents.¹²⁹ Furthermore, direction action and protests are instruments which the poor use to demand responses from local elites and obtain material welfare.¹³⁰ Evidently, local power structures reflect a highly personalised set of informal relationships with elected or administrative officials serving as

¹²³ Begum and Wesumperuma, "Overview of the Old Age Allowance Programme," 203.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 204.

¹²⁵ Research and Evaluation Division, BRAC, *Small Scale Old Age and Widow Allowance for the Poor in Rural Bangladesh: An Evaluation* (Dhaka: BRAC, 2008), 4, http://research.brac.net/monographs/Monograph_36%20.pdf

¹²⁶ Begum and Wesumperuma, "Overview of the Old Age Allowance Programme," 203.

¹²⁷ BRAC, *Small Scale Old Age and Widow Allowance*, 15.

¹²⁸ Stephen Kidd and Bazlul Khondker, *Scoping Report on Poverty and Social Protection in Bangladesh* (n.p., 2013), 41, <http://www.developmentpathways.co.uk/downloads/projects/bangladesh-sp-review---2014feb20-final.pdf>

¹²⁹ M. Shamsul Haque, "Decentering the state for local accountability through representation: Social divides as a barrier in South Asia," *Public Administration Quarterly*, 32, no. 1 (2008): 34, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41288304>

¹³⁰ Naomi Hossain, "Who Trusts Government? Understanding Political Trust among the poor in Bangladesh" Asia Research Institute Working Paper Series No. 103 (Singapore: Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, 2008), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1316782

powerful patrons. Political connections to the UP leaders and a willingness to be pro-active remains central for the elderly poor to improve their well-being, since informal relationships and exchanges enable the destitute to strengthen existing formal claims on resources such as entitlements to OAAP benefits.¹³¹ A qualitative study by R. Ahmed and S. Islam further strengthens my argument that the OAAP is a resource that reinforces patron-client ties at local levels. Responses from the elderly Focus Group Dialogue (FGD) respondents revealed that bribes are taken by the UP leaders at the time of beneficiary selection, with political affiliation and nepotism being additional considerations in selecting beneficiaries.¹³² A resilient set of patronage relations remains at the local levels. Accordingly, local level functionaries dominate the selection process and use OAAP to establish and strengthen their political connections. Those factors contribute to the inappropriate selection of beneficiaries and denying of benefits to deserving people.¹³³

Apart from enduring local patron-client relationships and elite dominance of selection processes, political interference by the national incumbents worsen targeting errors and further marginalize the elderly poor from the OAAP.¹³⁴ The incumbent AL has hitherto controlled local institutions and eliminated the BNP's power base with several mechanisms that have spill-over effects on beneficiary selection for OAAP.¹³⁵ First, the AL government enacted a law that makes the members of parliament (MPs) advisers to the UP leaders at the sub-district and union levels. It is mandatory for *Parishads* to heed the local MP's advice.¹³⁶ Furthermore, MPs are empowered to make local development plans, although this is legally in the jurisdiction of the local bodies.¹³⁷ Under this legislation, the MPs' role in determining how local activities are implemented is further strengthened, as they often dictate the development activities to be undertaken without consulting local elected representatives or evaluating actual need.¹³⁸ Also, MPs are placed under all-pervasive party control and lose their membership in the House when they oppose party decisions.¹³⁹ MPs who aspire to retain their seats must stick to party decisions

¹³¹ David Lewis and Abdul Hossain, *Revisiting the Local Power Structure in Bangladesh: Economic Gain, Political Pain?* (Dhaka: Sida, 2017), 88, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/82224/1/17_0385%20Sida%20Report_v5_JustifiedCopy.pdf

¹³² Rafique Uddin Ahmed and Sheikh Shafiul Islam, *People's Perception on Safety Net Programmes: A Qualitative Analysis of Social Protection in Bangladesh* (Dhaka: HelpAge international Bangladesh, 2011), 6, <http://www.bibalex.org/Search4Dev/files/425863/451930.pdf>

¹³³ Begum and Wesumperuma, "Overview of the Old Age Allowance Programme," 204.

¹³⁴ Osman, "Bangladesh Politics," 325.

¹³⁵ Lewis and Hossain, *Revisiting the Local Power Structure*, 45.

¹³⁶ Osman, "Bangladesh Politics," 324.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Muhammad Sayadur Rahman, "Upazila Parishad in Bangladesh: Roles and Functions of Elected Representatives and Bureaucrats," *Commonwealth Journal of Local Governance*, 11(2012): 114. <http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/cjlg/article/view/3060>

¹³⁹ Muhammad Mustafizur Rahaman, "Parliament and Good Governance: A Bangladeshi Perspective," *Japanese Journal of Political Science*, 9, no.1 (2008): 44,

as candidate nominations in parliamentary elections are decided by party leaders.¹⁴⁰ Hence, the MP's undue influence over *upazilas* and unions facilitates central government control and instrumentalization of local governments and bureaucracies to consolidate clientelist support for the central ruling party.¹⁴¹ The instrumentalization of the local institutions intensifies the problem of beneficiary selection processes, which becomes biased according to the potential beneficiary's partisan affiliation, since loyalists of the incumbent party tend to be favourably selected into the OAAP.¹⁴²

Second, the ruling party has monopoly over the disbursement of funds for social protection and incumbents often disburse insufficient funds to sub-districts helmed by the opposition.¹⁴³ Conversely, ruling party-backed local bodies are awarded a major share of funding for initiatives like the OAAP. Resources are pumped through local development projects to reward *Parishads* who helped the ruling party win elections.¹⁴⁴ Thus, safety net measures such as the OAAP are political weapons that the incumbent party harness to extend control at the local levels as the programmes are often managed in favour of the incumbent's supporters.¹⁴⁵ Moreover, the central government is the main avenue of patronage for local officials seeking resources to finance the OAAP.¹⁴⁶ Resources are transferred to local areas through the MSoW or MPs who control public funds for purposes that are approved by them alone.¹⁴⁷ Central resource allocation is vulnerable to political capture because MSoW and local MPs can withhold funds for social protection schemes for sub-districts with a vibrant opposition. Local decision-making has clearly become "recentralised" at the national level amidst the MPs' stronger role and the increased power of incumbents over the allocation of funding for social protection programmes.¹⁴⁸ Due to the shift in conditions of political competition shifted from the previous dual-party system involving AL and BNP towards a monopolistic one dominated by AL,¹⁴⁹ the precondition for access to funds for social protection schemes is loyalty to the AL. Consequently, funds are increasingly allocated by local UP leaders who are AL activists, and pro-incumbent local *Parishads* now wield substantial power to shape the voting behaviour of the elderly constituents in favour of national political incumbents.¹⁵⁰ Ostensibly, resource distribution for

doi:10.1017/S1468109907002812

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 45.

¹⁴¹ Lewis and Hossain, *Revisiting the Local Power Structure in Bangladesh*, 41.

¹⁴² Ahmed and Islam, *People's Perception on Safety Net Programmes*, 28.

¹⁴³ Osman, "Bangladesh Politics," 324.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 325.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Lewis and Hossain, *Revisiting the Local Power Structure*, 97.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 89.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 98.

the OAAP remains driven by party politics rather than the needs of beneficiaries. Partisan politics has hindered the state's efforts to channel social pensions to the poorest of the elderly, since central bureaucracies like the MoSW and AL politicians dominate local levers of government and control funding for OAAP.¹⁵¹ Using the benchmark of "perfect targeting," whereby all OAAP benefits reach the intended targets, Bazlul Khondker highlights that only 46 percent of the benefits reached the poorest 3 deciles based on expenditure, indicating that most intended beneficiaries are excluded.¹⁵² Also, most of the benefits are incorrectly targeted based on the current eligibility criteria.¹⁵³ Targeting errors unsurprisingly persist amidst patron-clientelism at all levels of government and fierce partisan competition that affects resource distribution and beneficiary selection.¹⁵⁴

Conclusion

The OAAP's inception was politically motivated. The highly politicized implementation of the scheme led to its failure to overcome the problem of limited social pension coverage for the elderly poor. Efforts to expand coverage are encumbered by partisan politics and patron-clientelism that pervade all political institutions. Finally, insufficient social pension coverage remains a significant social policy problem for the increasing elderly population. Progress in terms of coverage expansion is continuously stymied for political reasons. Consequently, the OAAP's implementation could face further challenges from poor elderly stakeholders in the future if their trust in the government erodes.

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¹⁵¹ Rahman, "Upazila Parishad in Bangladesh," 100.

¹⁵² Khondker et al., *Old age social protection options*, 35

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Begum and Wesumperuma, "Overview of the Old Age Allowance Programme," 208.

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You Will Look Cute and Earn Lots of Money:

Examining Variable Authenticities of Lion Dance

Nathasha Lee, Yale-NUS College '21

This paper explores how performers of southern Chinese lion dance in Singapore construct lion dance as being an authentic, socially essential aspect of Singaporean Chinese culture to different audiences. The ability of lion dance performers to generate value in their performances which lets them be accepted by different groups of people is significant given social stigma against lion dance from its associations with gang violence which would otherwise delegitimize their performances. Referring to Peirce's definition of signs as signals referring to objects which interpreters assign to different concepts, I argue that performers communicate authenticity to viewers by manipulating the display of signs recognized as signifiers of authentic lion dance to varying degrees by different audiences. Such signs include gestures by performers in the lion costume, the sequence of accompanying percussion music, and the symbolic arrangement of props.

Fieldwork was conducted during three performances by the Kong Chow Wui Koon Martial Arts and Lion Dance Troupe held on 21 February 2018 to see how each sign was emphasized or downplayed to communicate authenticity to different viewers. The organization was chosen for the strong association with traditional Cantonese martial arts and heritage preservation, which gives troupe members a stronger vested interest in expressing the authenticity of their performances. Martial, ritual and performative characteristics are identified in not just aspects of the performance but also the embodied habitus cultivated by performers. How these characteristics are evoked in different signs is understood differently by different audiences, letting performers communicate the legitimacy of their performance in the convergence of different perspectives of authenticity. Simultaneously, the conscious performance of signs others recognized as authentic bolstered performers' self-concept of their authenticity as traditional Cantonese.

Introduction

The clamor of lion dances during Chinese New Year celebrations is considered an iconic element of Chinese culture in Singapore. However, representations of lion dance as an innocuous cultural icon in national discourse on cultural heritage contrast with public knowledge of its historical associations with gang violence.¹ Given this lingering stigma, this paper aims to investigate how performers construct lion dance as a socially acceptable, essential element of Chinese culture. In this paper, I argue that performers use different signs to appear authentic to audiences with different expectations of what an authentic lion dance should look like.

I will define ‘authenticity’ as the perception of essentialized cultural characteristics in an object. I will also use Charles Peirce’s definition of ‘signs’ as signals referring to objects which evoke in an interpreter a certain concept.² In lion dance, these signs consist of props, costumes, and dance movements which convey authenticity to performers and audiences through martial, ritual and performative characteristics. Performers also cultivate an embodied martial habitus which shapes their perception of their own authenticity. However, different audiences have varying expectations of an authentic lion dance and different extents of knowledge of the signs used in performances. The gap between audience’s and performers’ knowledge allows the latter to use different signs to achieve ritual efficacy and performative functions recognized by the audience while cementing their self-concept of authenticity. As different audiences recognize authenticity in different ways, constructions of authenticity within a given performance vary depending on its viewers.

To demonstrate this point, I will use fieldnotes and informal conversations with interlocutors gained from my experience as a performer for the Kong Chow Wui Koon (henceforth “KCWK”) Martial Arts and Lion Dance Troupe from March 2017 to May 2018. Three of the troupe’s performances during Chinese New Year on 21 February 2018 will be analyzed. First, I will provide some background on lion dance. Then I will elaborate on the troupe’s background and activities to give context to performers’ activities and goals. The martial, ritual and performative elements in the troupe’s practices will then be identified and analyzed to see how they signify authenticity. The interaction between audience’s and performers’ ideas of authentic lion dance let performers not only fulfil expectations of lion dance as something distinctively Chinese, but also validate the troupe’s identification as traditional Cantonese.

¹ Rachel Lau, “Two Brothers Fight to Save Lion Dance From Its Checkered Past.” *Rice Media*, 17 February 2018, <http://ricemedia.co/two-brothers-save-lion-dance-checkered-past/>.

² Charles Peirce, *The Essential Peirce, vol. 2: Selected Philosophical Writings (1883-1913)* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 478.

Background on Lion Dance

A lion dance consists of two people in a paper-mâché costume dancing in response to musical patterns played by a drum, gong and cymbals. Additional characters like a ‘big-head Buddha’ occasionally guide the lion during complex performances. For this paper I will focus on southern Chinese, also known as Cantonese, lion dance as that is the main form of lion dance practiced in Singapore.

Cantonese lion dance was promoted during the Qing dynasty as a way for anti-government revolutionaries to spread secret messages.³ It is distinctive for its *cai qing* performances, where lettuce is shredded and thrown out towards the audience. The act is said to symbolize vanquishing oppressors in the government from the homophone of the word for ‘lettuce’ with dynasty name ‘Qing’.⁴ There are two regional variants of Cantonese lion dance, *Futsan* and *Hoksan*, which differ in the designs of lion heads used and style of dance movements.⁵ *Futsan* lion dancing emphasises low stances and aggressive movement, having originated as a way for rebels to conceal their martial arts training.⁶ *Hoksan* style, which includes influences from northern Chinese lion dance, involves lighter and more acrobatic movements.⁷

Lion dances are also believed to have an exorcistic function. In each performance, an arrangement of food items collectively known as a *qing* is rearranged by the lion into auspicious characters. The re-arrangement of the food items is believed to usher positive energy to the performance venue. As such, lion dances are frequently requested by households and businesses to invoke blessings. The different parts of a lion head are also ascribed different functions for combating evil, such as the mirror on its forehead which reflects bad energy, and its horn with which the lion attacks malevolent spirits.

Nevertheless, lion dances are sometimes infamous for being associated with violence and illegal activity. Lion dances were used by martial arts schools, ranging from schools in southern China in the 1920s⁸ to New York in the 1980s⁹, to assert their power. Physical fights would break out between rival troupes in response to one party’s encroachment on another’s territory.¹⁰ Lion dance troupes were also notorious for having members linked to illegal

³ Anita Slovenz-Low, *Lions in the Streets: A Performance Ethnography of Lion Dancing in New York City’s Chinatown* (New York: New York University, 1994), 189-191.

⁴ Colin McGuire, “Music of the Martial Arts: Rhythm, Movement and Meaning in a Chinese Canadian Kung Fu Club” (PhD diss., York University, 2014), 85-86.

⁵ McGuire, “Music of the Martial Arts”, 87-89.

⁶ McGuire, 90.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 88-90.

⁸ Benjamin Judkins and Jon Nielson, *The Creation of Wing Chun: A Social History of Southern Chinese Martial Arts* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2015), 123.

⁹ Anita Slovenz, ““The Year is A Wild Animal: Lion Dancing in Chinatown”, *The Drama Review*, vol. 31, 3 (1987), 78.

¹⁰ Slovenz, ““The Year is A Wild Animal: Lion Dancing in Chinatown”, 78-79.

organizations like street gangs in Manhattan¹¹ and triads in Singapore.¹² In Malaysia, performances used to occasionally be banned by state governments during the Chinese New Year for fear that they would be used by secret societies as a cover for extortion.¹³ Though lion dance troupes in Singapore no longer have ties to secret societies, lion dance performers remain persistently stereotyped as gangsters or school dropouts.¹⁴

Kong Chow Wui Koon Martial Arts & Lion Dance Troupe

Kong Chow Wui Koon is a Cantonese clan association founded in 1840 by immigrants from Xinhui district in Guangdong province.¹⁵ Its lion dance and martial arts troupe was founded in 1939 and is considered one of Singapore's oldest lion dance troupes.¹⁶ Martial arts and lion dance practices are held on Friday and Saturday nights respectively at the association headquarters' fourth floor practice area. All the troupe's members are volunteers,¹⁷, consisting mostly of Cantonese-speaking Chinese men between their 40s to 70s whose ancestors were clan association members. Younger performers are largely young Chinese males aged between 13 to 19, with three female performers (including myself) aged between 20 to 30. Most of the young men perform for other lion dance troupes and seldom appear at Saturday practices except for the weeks preceding large-scale performances. Most of the younger male performers volunteer because they have older male family members already involved with troupe activities.

The KCWK troupe's website cites the "Cantonese Foshan [*Futsan*] Lion [as] the representative of all Southern Lions".¹⁸ Nevertheless, *Hoksan* lion heads are the most commonly-used for performances, followed by a hybrid known as *Fut-hok* which blends physical characteristics of both types. Emphasis is placed by lion dance instructors on low stances and powerful movements explicitly linked to martial arts. The troupe's website explicitly states that "Cantonese lion dancing attaches importance to horse stances and various martial arts techniques as its foundations",¹⁹ and that "performing a traditional lion dance for more than thirty-minutes is a true test of a practitioner's kungfu".²⁰ Older members described how in the

¹¹ Slovenz, 78.

¹² Lau, "Two Brothers Fight to Save Lion Dance From Its Checkered Past."

¹³ "LION DANCE: NO BAN IN CAPITAL", *The Straits Times*, 7 February 1959, <http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19590207-1.2.105?ST=1&AT=search&k=lion%20dance&P=2&Display=0&filterS=0&QT=lion,dance&oref=artic>.

¹⁴ Lau, "Two Brothers Fight to Save Lion Dance From Its Checkered Past."

¹⁵ Kong Chow Wui Koon, *Xin jia po jian guo 50 ji gang zhou hui guan 175 zhou nian* (n.p., 2015), 30.

¹⁶ Victor Loh, "The endangered lion in the Lion City," *AsiaOne*, January 23 2017. <http://www.asiaone.com/singapore/endangered-lion-lion-city>.

¹⁷ Loh, "The endangered lion in the Lion City."

¹⁸ Kungfu-Longshi, "Lion & Dragon Dance Curriculum". Accessed 5 May 2018. <https://www.kungfu-longshi.com/longshi-curriculum>

¹⁹ Kungfu-Longshi, "Lion & Dragon Dance Curriculum".

²⁰ Ibid.

past they were only allowed to begin practicing lion dance after several years of martial arts training. While this restriction has been relaxed in the 21st century the head lion dance coach, Mr. Leong, makes novices attend at least one Friday martial arts practice. Performers are taught Cantonese kung fu styles like Hung Gar, which also originated in Guangdong²¹ and had been taught in the clan association since the early 20th century.²² Currently only two performers attend both Friday and Saturday practices.

Some of the instructors and older troupe members referenced an essential connection between martial arts and lion dance. Mr. Leong even claims that lion dance “is a type of martial art”. While no other performer I spoke to characterized lion dance as a martial art, middle-aged and elderly performers refer to each other as “comrades in the *wulin*” (*wulin tongbei*), even when few of them continue to regularly practice the martial arts they learned at the clan association in their youth. The *wulin* is a term used in martial arts fiction to refer to an exclusive community of martial artists. A female performer who had trained with the troupe for 15 years stated “the [performers’] martial arts foundation” is what distinguishes the quality of “traditional” lion dance groups like the KCWK troupe from the more common for-profit “commercial” groups.



Figure 1: (from left to right) *Futsan*, *Fut-hok* and *Hoksan* lion heads used for the clan association’s 177th anniversary performance in June 2017. The year is incorrectly cited as ‘117’ in the picture’s original subtitle.

Source: Chit Wei Keith Tan, 2018. Digital image. Available from: Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/pg/KCWKSingapore/photos/?tab=album&album_id=1650572351728770 (accessed 3 May 2018).

Lion dance performances are commissioned by clan members for events like shop openings, clan anniversaries, and folk religion ceremonies. Mr. Leong will meet the host to decide on the cost, props involved and sequence of the performance. Before leaving the

²¹ Judkins and Nielson, *The Creation of Wing Chun: A Social History of Southern Chinese Martial Arts*, 80-81.

²² Singapore Kong Chow Wui Koon, “Our Lineage”. Accessed 5 May 2018. <http://www.kongchow.org/index.php/en/lineage>

headquarters on most performance days, the lion will perform ceremonial bows before the altar on the fourth floor and ancestral tablets on the floor below. Weapons typically used for martial arts demonstrations are loaded onto the back of the lorry which performers travel in and occasionally used to decorate the sides of the hand-pulled cart used to carry the percussions. When the troupe is approaching or leaving a performance venue, members will play the percussions loudly from the back of the lorry to signal their arrival or departure.



Figure 2: A hand-pulled cart for the percussions used in lion dance performances featuring weapons inserted into notches along its side outside the clan association headquarters. 2 April 2017.

The altar on the fourth floor houses several Chinese deities and was constructed on following the building's renovation in 2013 as some members desired a space for worship. The largest statue is that of Guandi, a general who lived during the Warring States who is widely revered as a martial deity by the Cantonese. Among the clan association members, Guandi is referred to affectionately as 'Grandpa Guandi' (*Guandi yeye*). Many members will offer incense to Guandi's image each time they arrive at the building. Guandi's birthday celebration, typically held between late July to early August, is one of the most important occasions commemorated by the clan association. Besides commissioning lion and dragon dance performances, a table of special offerings will be prepared for the deity and the clan association's board of directors will lead clan association members in collective worship before the altar.



Figure 3: Special offerings being prepared for Guandi's birthday celebration on the fourth floor of the Kong Chow Wui Koon headquarters. Guandi is the red-faced deity in the background. Source: Helen Tai. 5 August 2018. Digital image. Available from: Facebook, <https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=1892092534162502&set=pcb.1892095060828916&type=3&theater> (accessed 2 December 2018).

In April and October each year, the troupe will travel to the Peck San Theng columbarium to offer performances to deities and clan members' ancestors. The dates are said to coincide with the Qingming and Chongyang festivals when one is expected to pay respect to deceased forebears. These performances exclusively use newly-made lion heads. Only the lions are permitted to approach the altars directly. When approaching a deity's altar, the lions will perform a series of kneeling 'bows' in addition to the standing 'bows' typically done to bless building entrances and shopfronts.

The troupe's activities have been framed as a means of preserving traditional culture by officials in both the clan association and the government. In a foreword in Mandarin written for the association's 175th anniversary book, the President of the Singapore Federation of Chinese Clan Associations, Mr. Chua Thian Poh, raised the preservation of "folk practices" like lion dance as signs that the clan has "taken responsibility for promoting Chinese values and traditions".²³ The clan's practice of martial arts and lion dance are described as useful in "not only strengthening the body and defending oneself, [but also] promoting team spirit, protecting the country and understanding Chinese history and culture".²⁴ The clan association's third floor was converted into a lion dance gallery with the opening of the Kong Chow Wui Koon Cultural Center in 2013 to highlight the history of Cantonese migrants to Singapore and promote

²³ Kong Chow Wui Koon, *Xin jia po jian guo 50 ji gang zhou hui guan 175 zhou nian* (N.p., 2015), 4.

²⁴ Kong Chow Wui Koon, *Xin jia po jian guo 50 ji gang zhou hui guan 175 zhou nian*, 10.

traditional Chinese culture.²⁵ In addition, the troupe is frequently requested to perform for state-sponsored heritage preservation events like the Singapore Heritage Festival.

Lion Dance's Martial, Ritual and Performative Characters

Martial characteristics are emphasized in the KCWK troupe's activities through the physical skill demanded of performers, allowing lion dance to become an expression of strength and authenticity. Power is also represented in the way the troupe chooses to present itself, such as by lining the cart carrying the instruments with weapons. The power and aggression associated with martial arts is channeled into lion dance as expressiveness which legitimizes the skill of its performers. In his research with a Canadian lion dance troupe, Colin McGuire explores how practicing Chinese martial arts is used to inculcate a "kung fu habitus" that not only structures performers' movements, but also lets them physically reproduce Chinese culture.²⁶ Similarly, the martial foundation inculcated in KCWK's performers by Cantonese martial arts is seen to legitimize them in performing a traditional version of the dance that harkens to its martial roots. As performances perceive lion dance as having an essential connection to or even being synonymous with martial arts, versions of lion dance which are not based on martial arts will be seen as less authentic. To performers, their kung fu experience bolsters the dance's martial character and makes them and their performance authentic. This authentication also occurs even when the troupe appears to deviate from essential elements of southern Chinese lion dance, like by not using *Futsan* heads for most performances. The authenticity the troupe derives from their martial practice is perceived as not just present in their performances even when performers themselves might have limited martial arts experience, but also present in performers' bodies which leads them to perceive themselves and fellow performers as members of a martial community.

A ritual character is also seen in lion dance through the interaction of the lion with its props to engender spiritual efficacy. The physical change the lion produces in the props within the *qing* signals to the audience how the lion is materializing the blessings they desire and makes the dance an object of spiritual power. The lion's visible presence in religious events like ancestral worship rites also consolidates troupe members' cultural identity through their involvement in important social rituals. In her ethnography of New York lion dancers Slovenz highlighted how lion dance's ritual power "derives its force from the larger ceremonial life that uses the Lion²⁷" such as birthdays and weddings. Expanding on Slovenz's observation, I posit

²⁵ Ibid., 33.

²⁶ McGuire, "Music of the Martial Arts", 155-175.

²⁷ Anita Slovenz, "'The Year is a Wild Animal': Lion Dancing in Chinatown", 81.

that the ritual force evoked by the lion dance is cemented by the troupe's participation in larger social rituals. The troupe's respect, signified by gestures like bowing and using only new lion heads when performing for deities, let them be legitimized by audiences who recognize how they honor behavioral standards expected of members of the local Chinese community.

The martial, ritual and cultural associations tied to lion dance also let the lion dance gain a performative character when audiences see it as signifying various aspects of 'Chinese-ness'. For instance, the frequent performance of lion dance at events considered distinctively Chinese, like New Year celebrations, allow it to become a metonymy for Chinese culture. KCWK's involvement in activities related to cultural preservation enhances lion dancers' representation of not just performing Chinese culture in lion dance itself, but an exclusively traditional version of lion dance constructed by a martial habitus and the troupe's long history. Depending on their knowledge of the signs used in performances, audiences have different expectations of what an authentic performance is. In the subsequent section I will provide an account of three performances from my field notes to see how martial, ritual and performative elements of lion dance are variously evoked to audiences in different performance settings in ways that authenticate the KCWK performers.

Account of Performances

Around 25 members, led by Mr. Leong, were involved in the performances, a number considered 'small' by my interlocutors. The total included four male members of a Thai lion dance troupe aged between 13 to 16 who had come to Singapore by Mr. Leong's request to perform as the lion since the younger Singaporean performers were at school. Mr. Leong told me that he had taught them "lion dance and other martial arts." The Thai performers spoke exclusively Thai and only recognized the Chinese characters which were used in performances. Due to my relative inexperience, I was allowed only to play the cymbals that day. Around eight others also took turns playing drums, gongs and cymbals. A middle-aged Thai woman who accompanied the Thai youths performed as a Fortune God mascot. Though Mr. Leong had informed the members that we were to leave the headquarters at 12.30 p.m., the troupe left an hour later as some came late. The lorry was loaded with two regular-sized *Fut-hok* lion costumes, one smaller costume for child performers, weapons, and a full percussion set consisting of a drum, a gong and six pairs of cymbals. I asked one of my interlocutors, a man in his late 60s known as 'Uncle Robin', why the weapons were necessary. He replied that the weapons wouldn't be used. The usual bows to the association's Guandi altar and the ancestral tablets were not performed before the performers left the building.

The first performance was at the Mun San Fook Tuck Chee temple. The main building in the temple complex houses altars to the Taoist deity Tua Pek Kong and the bodhisattva Guanyin.²⁸ Its courtyard doubled as a practice area for the Sar Kong Mun San Fook Tuck Chee Lion Dance Troupe, which many of KCWK's older volunteers also travelled with. When we arrived, the Fortune God mascot was asked to stay on the lorry while the rest disembarked. A crowd of around twelve devotees and one of the temple caretakers stood aside to watch us perform. Two lions were used to signal the troupe's arrival to the deities. After bowing before the main building entrance, the lions entered the building to perform standing and kneeling bows to each of the altars. As the drummer could not see the lions inside, one of the older members stood beside the entrance signaling to the drummer which patterns to play to coordinate the lion's movements. A shorter dance was later staged at the temple courtyard with one lion where some oranges, a pomelo, and a leek were rearranged into the character *fu* (prosperity). Mr Leong replaced the performer of the lion tail during the performance to take over the re-arrangement of the props used in the *qing*. Extra oranges were provided, which the lion tossed out towards the temple caretaker.

Subsequently we visited a branch of the Mala Wang chain of Sichuanese hotpot restaurants at Geylang at around 3 p.m. Besides the store manager, her twin grand-daughters and the restaurant's staff, only one table had customers. Immediately Mr Leong asked for the weapons to be placed onto the hand-pulled cart carrying the drum. I asked Uncle Robin why the weapons were needed, and he replied that it was to make the drum "look prettier" (*geng piao liang*). The addition of weapons to the cart was ignored by the audience at the restaurant. A *qing* consisting of lettuce, a pomelo, oranges, leeks and a steamed cake had been left outside the storefront. Two lions were selected for the initial part of the performance involving bows to the storefront. Before the customary bows, the troupe walked to the building of a Buddhist study association next door to bow towards the entrance. Later, the lion paused for pictures with the proprietor's grand-daughters, and as the main performance ensued, the Fortune God mascot stood around to take pictures with the audience. The performance concluded with one lion shredding the lettuce and throwing it out towards the storefront before re-arranging the rest of the food items into the character *fu*. The workers emerged from the kitchen to watch the performance and rushed to pick up and keep scraps of lettuce during the performance.

²⁸ Mayo Martin, "Of coolies and fire dragons: Unearthing Kallang's hidden gem", *Channel NewsAsia*, 16 February 2018. <https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/lifestyle/of-coolies-and-fire-dragons-unearthing-kallang-s-hidden-gem-9939564>



Figure 4: The arrangement of items in the *qing* used for the performance at Mala Wang restaurant before and after the performance. 21 February 2018.

The troupe arrived at 7 p.m. for the day’s final performance at the Owen Seafood restaurant at Bukit Timah for a gala dinner by a social club. I was ordered by Mr. Leong to perform as the tail for the child-sized lion, with the youngest of the Thai performers performing as the head. He said to me, “You will look cute and would get a lot of money”. He instructed me to walk between tables and stop for the guests to give us red packets of money without needing to follow the music. Two other members were requested to perform in the ‘big-head Buddha’ role for the first time that day. All the lions performed the standing and kneeling bows before the restaurant’s Guandi altar before proceeding upstairs to the performance venue. All the lions, the Fortune God mascot and the ‘big-head Buddha’ figures walked around while guests gave them red packets.

As the performer of the lion tail, I was required to move in a crouch while leaning forward at the waist until my upper body was parallel to the ground. I also had to tuck my face in towards my chest so that the outline of my head could not be seen under the costume. In this position I could not see anything except my feet and those of the person in front of me. Resisting my physical discomfort, I tried to move in time with the performer at the head as we were led around the room. I felt light taps and strokes along the sides of my head, which I knew from experience came from people reaching out to touch the sides of the costume. From conversations with audience members of previous performances, I knew that audience members saw touching the lion costume as a means to gain good luck.

After some time, we were ushered to a platform at the front of the room. An emcee encouraged the diners to give generously as the troupe was “preserving traditional culture”. To my chagrin, he also told the audience that “the performers of the small lion are actually children” and praised us for working hard by participating in traditional cultural activities instead of staying indoors playing video games.

Discussion

Both ritual and performative signs appeared to have been evoked in the first all three performances. Ritual signs included bowing towards deities and storefronts and the indirect invocation of blessing through the re-arrangement of items in the *qing*. Performative signs include the physical act of donning the lion dance costumes, playing music, as well as crowd interaction by walking around tables or taking pictures with audience members. The only time an explicitly martial sign was seen to have been used was when the weapons were added next to the drum during the performance at Mala Wang.

The lack of a tangible performance of a martial sign would reflect how for the performers, an authentic martial character of lion dance is already expressed within the performance and reinforced by performers. To performers, a martial character was already present in each performance, given how the lion dance which the KCWK troupe practiced had accrued martial characteristics through its association with performers who had martial arts training. The lion dance's martial characteristics would not have been apparent or important to many audiences, depending on their knowledge of KCWK's history and their expectations of the performance. Nevertheless, performers already viewed the lion dance they practiced as authenticated through performers' martial habitus and the troupe's history of martial practice. As martial signs of authenticity were already viewed by performers as being encoded in and expressed in the act of performance, performers did not consider displaying explicitly martial traits to be necessary in authenticating their performance to an audience who would not recognize these traits' presence or importance. The subtlety of the performance's martial characteristics also downplays the visibility of martial signs to the audience which could emphasize a connection between lion dance and martial violence.

The intricacy of each performance also appears to have reflected different audience's expectations and the different signs through which they recognized authentic lion dance. The performance at Owen Seafood, which simply involved walking around in costume, was the least complex and could easily have been performed by untrained individuals. Nevertheless, the diners recognized the performance as a display of traditional culture, even when some of the performers were not Chinese and the performance lacked the technical finesse demanded of most other lion dances. This reflects how they recognized the presence of lion dance costume and music as already constituting a performance and the only signs needed to signify a lion dance. For the audience at Owen Seafood, it was sufficient that the performance resembled lion dance outwardly.

Audiences at Mala Wang and Mun San Fook Tuck Chee temple, however, appeared to demand not just outward signs of cultural performance but also performance skill. The staff at

Mala Wang expected the lion to bless the store. As such, the re-arrangement of the food items in the *qing* into an auspicious character was essential as it reflected the lion's expected role in providing blessings. To them, an authentic lion dance would involve the correct gestures, like bowing to the storefront, and generate the appropriate characters from the props to appear truly legitimate. Another set of gestures which convey skill is the sequence and movements expected of a lion in paying respect to deities. This would have been important to the devotees and caretaker of the Mun San Fook Tuck Chee temple, for whom honoring the deities would have been important. Thus, to the audience at the temple, an authentic lion dance consists of gestures which showed the appropriate respect to deities. The complexity of the later performance at the temple was also a concern for the caretaker insofar as it reflected the technical prowess he expected to see given his extensive experience with another lion dance troupe. This shows how the audiences at Mala Wang and the temple used legitimacy derived from skill as another way to authenticate a lion dance performance.

Consequently, both performing and non-performing troupe members' reactions in each setting reflected their understanding of the expectations which would be imposed on them by the audience. Demands of technical skill in responding to the musical patterns were virtually absent from the performance at Owen Seafood, allowing Mr. Leong to bring on more performers than was necessary and let inexperienced practitioners perform. The performance at Mala Wang required more experience in performers to know when and how to perform gestures like bowing and re-arrange the props correctly. The most attention to technical finesse was paid at the Mun San Fook Tuck Chee temple, with another member ensuring the drummer played the correct patterns and Mr. Leong interceding for one of the younger performers as he was more experienced and could create a more aesthetically-pleasing re-arrangement of the *qing*. In this way, the KCWK troupe consciously mediated the signs that would be presented to different audiences in a way that would preserve their desired appearance of authenticity before each audience while excluding superfluous actions that the audience wouldn't recognize.

Nevertheless, there were occasions where the performers consciously enacted signs which audiences would not have been able to see or recognize. Two examples of this were the inclusion of weapons next to the drum during the performance at Mala Wang and the bows made to the altar of Guandi below the dining hall at Owen Seafood. Given the sparse audience at the restaurant and performance's location along a remote side street, the troupe might have done this to bolster the force of their performance by looking 'pretty' while taking advantage of the lack of public scrutiny to flaunt signs of their martial identity cultivated through kung fu. The troupe's decision to show respect to the Guandi altar, conversely, appears to have been an extension of the bows typically made to the altars at the headquarters and reflects the respect the troupe

members themselves held for the deity. In both cases, the performance of these signs helped troupe members show outward signs among themselves of a shared identity as Cantonese traditional martial arts practitioners, bolstering the perception and performance of their own perceived authenticity.

Conclusion

What appears to have allowed the lion dance to be well-received at each performance was how different perceptions of authenticity could converge through the interaction caused by signs being performed by the dancers and recognized by the audience. The interaction between performers' and audience's ideas of authenticity can be analyzed through the three perspectives of objective, constructive and existential authenticity experienced by tourists outlined by Nicola MacLeod.²⁹ Objective authenticity, where one believes they are having a genuine experience of what they believe to be the real thing³⁰, is experienced by audiences when they view each performance as a true representation of lion dance. Performers experience existential authenticity, where one believes they can create authentic selves through experiencing an object.³¹ This view reflects how the KCWK performers see in themselves as representing a true Cantonese identity. Both views of authenticity can be brought together by constructive authenticity. Constructive authenticity is experienced when an audience projects onto an object its own expectations and beliefs which are shared within the community.³² The KCWK troupe can be said to form different communities with different audiences, each with its own unique mutual understanding on the meaning and importance of certain signs. This lets performers communicate authenticity to different audiences. The performance of these signs not only signaled to audiences what they were watching was 'real', but also cemented performers' essential identity as their actions are authenticated by audience perceptions. This reflects Sarah Weiss' observation on how different perspectives on authenticity can coexist in the same situation.³³ The coexistence of objective, existential and constructive authenticities that not only satisfies different audience expectations but allows performers to benefit from being a true representation of a culture.

²⁹ Nicola MacLeod, "Cultural tourism: aspects of authenticity and commodification" in Mike Robinson and Melanie Smith, ed. *Cultural Tourism in a Changing World: Politics, participation and (Re)presentation* (Clevedon: Channel View Publications, 2006), 181-188.

³⁰ Tazim Jamal and Steve Hill, "The Home and The World. (Post) Touristic Spaces of (In) Authenticity?," in G. Dann, ed. *The Tourist as Metaphor of the Social World* (Wallingford: CAB International), 77-108.

³¹ Ning Wang, "Rethinking Authenticity in Touristic Experience", *Annals of Tourism Research*, vol. 26, 2 (1999), 351-352.

³² MacLeod, "Cultural tourism: aspects of authenticity and commodification", 184.

³³ Sarah Weiss, "Perspectives on Balinese Authenticities: Sanggar Çudamani's Odalan Bali" in Kendra Sepputat, ed. *Performing Arts in Postmodern Bali—Changing Interpretations, Founding Traditions* (Germany: Shaker Verlag, 2013), 291.

The social recognition that lion dance receives today could then be ascribed to the different meanings it accumulates from the performances of different types of signs. McGuire points out how peoples' perspectives on lion dance build onto its para-liturgical function in providing blessings and let lion dance convey diverse meanings simultaneously.³⁴ Each different perspective of authenticity by a given audience reconstructs lion dance as different objects. The signs used in each performance allow lion dance to variously become a performance of tradition, a tool for blessings or a medium for veneration. Lion dance becomes recognized as holding different dominant functions to different audiences which supersede the associations they had as symbols of violence. These accumulated meanings allow lion dance to perform variable narratives to performers and audience alike which gloss over the stain of its notorious past.

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³⁴ McGuire, 131.

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The Determinants of Nationalism and the Effects of Conscription on National Pride

Dhivesh Vashdev Dadlani, Yale-NUS College '18

This paper aims to empirically explore the variation in nationalism between individuals and countries around the world. I used data from the World Value Survey to explore the determinants of nationalism and understand the effect of removing conscription on nationalist sentiments. On the individual level, I find that nationalism is positively correlated with age, confidence in one's government, religiosity, interest in politics, moral communalism, being a member of the armed forces and being married while it is negatively associated with education and generalized trust. On the country level, I find that it is positively related to conflict while it is negatively related to trade and taxes. Where conscription is concerned, I find that the causal effect of removing mandatory conscription on nationalistic sentiments is positive. This effect is confirmed on the country level where countries with mandatory conscription are less nationalistic. I argue that this is because forcing people to serve makes them feel like their freedom is taken away. I believe that the effect of this reduction in liberty on nationalistic sentiments is stronger than the positive effect of serving in the military.

Introduction

Nationalism refers to an individual's loyalty to their nation and feelings of patriotism. Much of the literature in economics tries to understand the relationship between the nation-building process and the economy. However, there is little empirical evidence documenting how the process of nation building works and the tools that governments can use to influence nationalism in a country. But why care at all about nationalism and nation-building?

Nation-building has been used to solve a variety of problems, especially in societies with ethnically fragmented populations (Ahlerup and Hanson, 2011). Ethnically fragmented countries tend to face poor economic and political performance. Studies have found multiple negative outcomes related to ethnic diversity such as, distorted provision of public goods, enablement of corruption and consequently, poor economic growth. In using nation-building as a policy tool, governments essentially create unity in a country and pride in one's nation, rather than unity within ethnic groups. If such a policy could work to reduce the risks of ethnic diversity and fractionalization, then it is worth understanding how nationalistic sentiments are influenced.

In this paper, I aim to provide empirical evidence about the determinants of nationalism and the effect of conscription on nationalism. In doing so, I will present my own views about why some factors affect nationalism in various ways. I aim to test the following hypotheses in this paper:

1. Conscription forces men to serve their nation and throughout their years of service, they become more nationalistic.
2. On an individual level, income and education would negatively correlate with nationalistic sentiments while trust, confidence in one's government, age and political interest would positively correlate with nationalism.
3. On the country level, international wars, average confidence in governments and average trust levels would positively correlate with nationalism while GDP per capita, openness of economies, civil wars and conflicts would negatively correlate with nationalism.

This paper will be structured as follows. First I will review the existing economic literature on nationalism. Next, I will describe the data I use for my analysis. Following this, I will bring the individual level determinants of nationalism to light before diving into data on Spain to understand the effects of conscription on nationalism. This will conclude the section on individual-level evidence. I will then present the evidence on the possible factors that influence nationalism on a country level before proceeding to explain why some interesting correlations exist. Lastly, I will conclude.

Literature Review

Few studies have explained nationalism in various contexts. Two of them study nationalism from a quantitative aspect. Ahlerup and Hanson (2011) empirically assessed the effects of nationalist sentiments on government effectiveness, using a cross-section of countries. They used the World Value Survey to measure the intensity of nationalistic sentiments using questions about national pride. I use the same survey question to measure nationalism as I will explain in Section 3. Their paper had two main findings. First, there was a “hump-shaped relationship between nationalism

and government effectiveness” (Ahlerup and Hanson, 2011, p. 432). They attributed this to their theory that there are different forces at play at different levels of nationalism. Concretely, they believed that nationalism had positive effects on government effectiveness at low levels of nationalism and negative effects at high levels of nationalism. Second, they found that nationalism could erode the “negative association between ethnic fractionalization and government effectiveness in former colonies” (Ahlerup and Hanson, 2011, p. 432).

The second study that empirically assessed effects used the same measure of nationalism as well as data from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP). Shulman (2003) was interested in testing the hypotheses that 1) richer countries and richer individuals were more nationalistic and 2) nations with less economic inequality amongst individuals and ethnic groups were more nationalistic. He found that relative and absolute wealth, as well as economic equality were in general, not positively related to nationalism. Specifically, in only 6 out of the 20 countries he studied were there significant relationships between nationalism and income. In these six countries, the relationship was negative, which means that poorer people were likely to be more nationalistic (Shulman, 2003). He adds in various controls – class, settlement size, education, ethnicity, religiosity, age and sex – and still finds only a few statistical relationships. Again, in each case, the relationship is negative.

There have been many studies about nationalism and nation building from a theoretical standpoint. Alesina and Reich (2015) studied nation-building across political regime and in transition periods, where they defined nation building “as a process which leads to the formation of countries in which the citizens feel a sufficient amount of commonality of interests, goals and preferences so that they do not wish to separate from each other” (Alesina and Reich, 2015, p. 3). They were interested to understand the reasons why European elites, the Soviet Union and other dictatorships wanted to homogenize their populations and why certain colonies engaged in nation-building after independence. They argued that in non-democracies, rulers are motivated to homogenize populations when they fear democratization as 1) it allows people in charge to implement their own preferred policies even if democracy prevails and 2) homogenization may reduce any ill-feelings towards their rule and reduce incentives to overthrow them. Essentially, they believed that leaders facing the threat of being overthrown may use homogenization and indoctrination through nation-building to make people less averse to their rule. They presented some historical evidence to illustrate their argument (Alesina and Reich, 2015). In my paper, I do not analyze these issues but it is worth understanding that countries used nation-building to homogenize populations in the past.

While the above paper explained why some countries undertook nation-building policies, Barry Posen (1993) wrote about the relationship between nationalism and war. He claimed that

nationalism is to be feared because of its close relationship with warfare. Nationalism could cause countries to undertake foreign policies that bring about war or even prolong and intensify war through many mechanisms. He argued that nationalism intensifies warfare through allowing the state to mass mobilize the “creative energies and the spirit of self-sacrifice of millions of soldiers” and wrote that nationalism is used as a tool by states to enhance their military capabilities (Posen, 1993, p. 81). He also used evidence from the history of France and Prussia/Germany to show how conscription rules changed and these rules affected the building of a mass army as well as its effect on nationalism. In some instances, conscription intensified solidarity among youth but in other cases, where exemptions to conscription were possible, conscription failed to intensify nationalistic sentiments (Posen, 1993). It is worthy to note that Posen focused on the role of education in building nationalistic sentiments and this was important in his analysis. For example, he wrote that, in France, children were taught patriotism. They were told that their main duty was to defend their nation and that people in the army were just like them (Posen, 1993). Bandiera et al. (2017) also study the effect of compulsory schooling laws on nation-building in the context of America.

Where the literature on conscription is concerned, Alesina, Reich and Riboni (2017) wrote about how states switched from mercenaries to mass armies via conscription in the late 18th century. Though people faced punishments if they did not comply and defected, the authors claimed that wars cannot be won with unmotivated soldiers. Thus, the elites had to reduce rents and provide public goods to make citizens voluntarily comply with conscription. This made citizens and soldiers believe that if they lost the war, they would lose public goods, “which they learned to appreciate because of nation-building” (Alesina, Reich and Riboni, 2017, p. 3). Essentially, nations used indoctrination and instilled patriotism to increase the value of public goods to motivate soldiers to fight for their country. It is important to note that their paper was concerned with making people voluntarily comply with conscription and did not consider the effects of conscription on nationalism and nation-building. The latter is the relationship I explore in my paper.

The above papers explored the various determinants and advantages of nation-building and nationalism. They also tied together the ideas of warfare, conscription and nationalism. However, as of now, much of the work is theoretical and relies on historical arguments. My paper will be similar to the first two described in this section, in that it will explore the observable variation in nationalistic sentiments within and across countries.

Data Description

The primary source of data for individual analyses comes from the World Value Survey (WVS) longitudinal dataset. This dataset contains responses to surveys conducted in 100 countries over the time-period of 1981 to 2014. The primary variable that I will use as a proxy or indicator of Nationalism is the answer question G006: “How proud are you to be [Nationality]?” In this paper, I refer to this variable as Nationalism or National Pride. In exploring the determinants of nationalism on an individual level, I ran regressions on the following variables: income, education, a dummy for active in the military, gender, age, confidence in government, general trust levels, religiosity, interest in politics, and marital status. These variables come from different questions in the WVS. A summary of the questions is given in Appendix 1. Though each question was taken directly from the survey, some variables were coded differently from the original WVS coding. For instance, responses from G006, nationalism, were reverse coded. While 1,2,3 4 represented “Very Proud”, “Quite Proud”, “Not Very Proud” and “Not At All Proud” respectively in the original documentation, I used reverse coding for easier interpretation of diagrams. Further, all missing values for these questions were dropped. Values could be missing for several reasons including: question not being asked, respondent not knowing the answer to the question or respondent choosing not to answer the question for a variety of reasons.

Data for country level analyses comes from a variety of sources. These sources are: WVS, World Development Indicator (WDI), UCDP Monadic Conflict Onset and Incidence Dataset, Major Episodes of Political Violence and Conflict Region (1946-2016), the Polity IV project, Conscription as Regulation (Mulligan and Shleifer, 2005), The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins (LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2008). A summary of the key variables used in each of the dataset is shown in Appendix 2.

For conscription data, a few sources were used. Mulligan and Shleifer (2005) was the primary source of data for country-year pairs before 2000. Conscription is coded “1” if there was more than 1 draft month in that year. Since Mulligan and Shleifer only provided data for years 1970-2000 in 5 year intervals, if an observation is not in any of the years in Mulligan and Shleifer's dataset, I cross-referenced this with Wikipedia, the CIA World Factbook and www.globalsecurity.org to check if there was any change to conscription laws in that country between that time-period. For example, Albania has 12 months of conscription according to Shleifer and Mulligan in 1995. Since the observation in my dataset was for year 1998 and Shleifer and Mulligan did not provide an estimate of year 2000, I referenced Wikipedia. Since Wikipedia reveals that conscription was removed in 2010 in Albania, conscription was coded as 1 for Albania-1998 in my dataset. Very importantly, due to data limitations, conscription is coded 1 if conscription is selective, lottery-based or just compulsory. Lastly, if there was no information

in any of the above four sources, conscription was left for that observation as a missing value. Consequently, that country-year pair did not play a role in my analysis.

Individual Level Determinants of Nationalism

To understand the determinants of nationalism, I used all the data from 100 countries and in all waves of the WVS. The repeated cross-section regression framework is shown below:

$$Y_{ict} = \lambda_t + \gamma_c + X'_{ict}\beta + \varepsilon_{ict}$$

where Y_{ict} is the nationalism level of individual i in country c at time t , γ_c and λ_t are the country and year fixed effects respectively, and X'_{ict} are the independent variables income, education, gender, age, confidence in the government, general trust levels, interest in politics and dummies for marital status as well as whether an individual is a member of the armed forces.

To understand the data and variation in nationalism, I refer to Figure 1. This figure shows a clear positive relationship between National Pride and age in 4 different countries. The strength of the relationship clearly varies across countries. For instance, in Turkey, every person surveyed between the age of 79 to 83 in Wave 4, responded “Very Proud” to the question about national pride. In the above regression framework, I controlled for the national differences and time trends through the country and year fixed effects, thus only comparing individuals within a country in a specific year, and repeating this for every country and every year in the dataset.

Figure 1: Graph of Nationalism Vs Age in 4 countries in Wave 4




Table 1 below shows the results of the above regression on various independent variables. Columns 1 – 6 offer simple bivariate regression estimates. Columns 7 – 13, allows us

to track the change in estimates as we add explanatory variables. I avoided adding education into the multivariate regressions due to multicollinearity issues. Further, military service is left out of these regressions as we analyse it from a different perspective in the next section.

Income seems to have a marginal effect on nationalism, both in a bivariate regression as well as regressions with controls. Education levels are negatively correlated with nationalism. Both sex and trust do not have a significant effect. Age, government confidence, religiosity and interest in politics have strong positive significant relationships with nationalism. Being married and serving in the military are also positively correlated. Most of these results are not shocking. Older people tend to be prouder of the country they have belonged to for many years. Military personnel are either serving because they are patriotic or have become patriotic due to military service. Having an interest in politics means that one would be interested in affairs on a national level, which can explain the relationship observed.

On the other hand, there are some results that are unexpected. I would fully expect that if people trusted others in their country, there would be a higher chance that they would be patriotic. A possible explanation is that when people are asked, “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?”, they recall people they spend time with rather than people in general. Though people could trust their close circle, they may not necessarily be proud of their nation at large, in which case we cannot say much about the correlation between these two variables. Another interesting finding is the relationship between education and nationalism. It seems that as people pursue further education, they lose a sense of pride for their nation. Perhaps, this is because students typically learn about their country before high school and as they proceed, they forget their education about their nation and focus more on specific topics that interest them. However, an in-depth analysis of this finding is out of the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, from a nation-building policy perspective, governments can consider revisiting their syllabus and introducing topics that are meant to build a sense of national unity in students.

Table 1: Individual Level Determinants of Nationalism

	<i>Table 1: Determinants of Nationalism</i>												
	Dependent variable is National Pride												
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)
Income	-0.00392*** (0.000682)						-0.00389*** (0.000683)	-0.00110 (0.000684)	-0.00105 (0.000675)	-0.00129* (0.000684)	-0.000684 (0.000673)	-0.00129* (0.000676)	-0.00177*** (0.000678)
Education		-0.0202*** (0.000695)											
Military			0.0554*** (0.0142)										
Sex				-0.00454 (0.00289)			-0.00392 (0.00289)	-0.00678** (0.00289)	-0.00477* (0.00285)	-0.00694** (0.00289)	0.00782*** (0.00285)	0.00372 (0.00288)	0.00336 (0.00288)
Age					0.00369*** (0.0000956)			0.00368*** (0.0000962)	0.00334*** (0.0000951)	0.00368*** (0.0000962)	0.00295*** (0.0000953)	0.00288*** (0.0000954)	0.00269*** (0.0000986)
Confidence in Government						0.116*** (0.00171)			0.113*** (0.00171)		0.110*** (0.00170)	0.109*** (0.00171)	0.108*** (0.00171)
Trust										0.0191*** (0.00349)	0.00272 (0.00345)	0.00105 (0.00345)	0.00113 (0.00345)
Religiosity										0.143*** (0.00371)	0.142*** (0.00371)	0.142*** (0.00371)	0.142*** (0.00371)
Interest in Politics												0.0170*** (0.00162)	0.0169*** (0.00162)
Marital Status													0.0235*** (0.00315)
Time Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Country Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
R ²	0.188	0.191	0.188	0.188	0.193	0.206	0.188	0.193	0.211	0.193	0.217	0.218	0.218
N	212539	212538	212539	212539	212539	212539	212539	212539	212539	212539	212539	212539	212539

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Ben Enke (2018) wrote about the role of morals in the US 2016 presidential elections. He described the fine line between individualizing values and communal values. Individualizing values are “prescriptive judgements of justice, rights and welfare pertaining to how people ought to relate to each other” (Enke, 2018, p. 1). Communal values on the other hand are concerned with loyalty and obedience to a hierarchy. It relies heavily on notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ and “applications of moral principles depend on context” (Enke, 2018 p. 1). Concretely, harm, care, fairness and reciprocity are individualizing values while respect, authority, loyalty and in-group membership/ belonging in social units such as family or nation are communal values. Table 2 presents the relationship between nationalism and certain cultural values. In some sense, nationalism can be seen as the ultimate form of moral communalism and we expect there to be a positive relationship between those who show moral communalism and those that are nationalistic. We can see that there is indeed a positive relationship between moral communalism and nationalism from columns 1, 2 and 3. People who believe in the importance of family as well as duties to parents and children are on average more nationalistic.

Table 2: Nationalism and Moral Values

Correlations of National Pride with Culture					
<i>Dependent Variable is National Pride</i>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Full Sample	Full Sample	Full Sample	Wave 4	Full Sample
Always Respect Parents	0.237*** (0.00599)				
Importance of Family		0.171*** (0.00409)			
Responsibility of Parents to children			0.137*** (0.00470)		
Is Violence Justifiable				-0.0234*** (0.00135)	
Aversion to Homosexuals as Neighbors					0.0597*** (0.00294)
Wave FE	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
R ²	0.170	0.179	0.166	0.189	0.173
N	150653	312130	149525	82992	288332

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Conscription and Nationalism – Evidence from Spain

Removal of conscription in Spain makes for a good natural experiment to understand how conscription affects nationalism. Though the ideal setting would be to study a country that decided to introduce conscription at some point, the data from the WVS did not contain any country that introduced conscription between the survey period. However, in 2001, Spain decided to abolish the law that mandated young men to serve for nine months in the military.


The Defense Minister gave a speech in 2001 telling the public that by December 31st 2001, men would no longer need to serve their nation. Military service would be completely voluntary and men can declare themselves objectors until one day before their official service period. As context, women were never required to serve in the military. Men who turn 18 before 2001 would have needed to serve in the military but men who turned 18 in 2001 or after, would never be mandated to, except for times of national emergency (CIA World Factbook). Given that I have data on Spain in 2007, I can compare the national pride of groups that were affected by this law and groups that were not. Specifically, men aged 24 and below in 2007 would never have been required to serve. Men aged 25 and above would have been required to serve. On the other hand, females of all ages were never required to serve.

Given this, using data from 2007, I used the following difference-in-difference framework to analyze the effect of not having to serve in the military, on nationalism:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Male}_i + \beta_2 \text{Below25}_i + \beta_3 (\text{Below25}_i * \text{Male}_i) + \varepsilon_i$$

where Y_i is the nationalism level of individual i , Male_i is a dummy variable indicating if an individual is male and Below25_i is a dummy variable indicating if an individual is below 25 years of age in 2007. Essentially, we are taking the difference between females aged 25 and above and females 24 and below, and comparing it to the difference between males aged 25 and above and males 24 and below. I restricted the sample to males between the age 21-29 so that the groups I compared are almost similar in age. An underlying assumption here is that this difference should not exist in the absence of the abolition of conscription.

Figure 2: Nationalism Levels for Males and Females Across Groups



As we can see from the Figure 2, males are on average, in 2007, more patriotic if they are part of the younger group than the older group while the evidence for females is consistent with the earlier finding that age tends to correlate positively with nationalism. To test the hypothesis that there should be no difference between the difference in males and the difference in females, in the absence of this law, I applied the same framework using data in 1995 and 2000. Figure 3 and Table 3 present the findings.


Table 3: Causal Effect of Removing Mandatory National Service of Nationalism

Causal Effect of Removing Mandatory Conscription on Nationalism				
<i>Dependent Variable is National Pride</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	2007 Sample: Ages > 20	2007 Sample: Ages 21-29	2000 Sample: Ages 21-29	1995 Sample: Ages 21-29
Male	-0.103** (0.0425)	-0.216 (0.142)	-0.191 (0.211)	-0.157 (0.195)
Age Below 25	-0.345** (0.159)	-0.270 (0.181)	0.311* (0.180)	0.134 (0.146)
Diff-in-Diff	0.444** (0.194)	0.557** (0.238)	0.0575 (0.260)	0.0624 (0.249)
N	931	146	119	151

Standard errors in parentheses
 * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

The results from Figure 3 and Table 3 illustrate two important points. First, from Figure 3, we can see that the difference across males and females have followed the same trend from 1995 to 2000. Second, there are no significant differences between differences in females and differences in males, in both 2000 and 1995. As such, under the assumption that there would be no difference in the absence of the law, there is a positive casual effect of not having to serve on nationalistic sentiments.

Figure 3: Difference-in-Differences over time




This does not provide evidence that conscription always negatively impacts nationalism. Rather, it provides evidence that if a country already requires people to serve, then getting rid of that law could increase nationalistic sentiments of people who were going to serve, but did not have to due to the law. This distinction is extremely important. I argue that the following factors caused this change in sentiments. Conscription takes away the right to choose if one wants to serve. Many conscripts never actually want to serve but do so because they must. Once potential conscripts expect that they must serve, they get conditioned to it and when they are told that they no longer will need to, they would feel more patriotic towards their nation. Further, for people just above the cutoff, there is a sense of resentment that they were not ‘spared’ and were made to serve. This could lead to them feeling less proud of their country. These two effects combined could cause the difference to become larger, thus explaining the significant positive effect of removing conscription on nationalistic attitudes.

Country Level Determinants of Nationalism

Data from the WVS allows us to understand the variation in nationalism from the country level. Given that there is data about different economic indicators and political events, we can analyze how nationalism correlates with other factors on a country level. Again, to understand the data from a country perspective, I refer to Figure 4. These figures show the relationship between various factors – Trade openness, General Trust Levels, General Confidence in the Government and Religiosity – and average national pride in a country.

Figure 4: Relationship Between Nationalism and Various Factors



Tables 4 – 7 show results of bivariate regressions on economic, political and cultural factors. As we are not interested in causal parameters in the following analyses, I offer correlation estimates without controlling for other factors. Table 4 shows the results of simple regressions of national pride on some economic factors. GDP per capita does not have any effect on nationalism. Trade has a small negative effect on nationalism. I argue that if countries are more globalized and economically integrated, citizens tend to have pride for the world at large rather than pride for their country. Further, much evidence points to the fact that when countries have more nationalistic sentiments, they tend to introduce protectionist policies to promote job growth within their country. Taxes have a slight positive effect on nationalism, though this effect is marginally significant and not very large.

Table 4: Nationalism and Trade, GDP and Tax Rates

Correlations Between Nationalism and Economic Factors						
<i>Dependent Variable is Avg. National Pride</i>						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GDP/Cap	-0.00000230 (0.00000206)	-0.00000217 (0.00000214)				
Trade as % of GDP			-0.00199*** (0.000748)	-0.00206** (0.000794)		
Taxes as % of Govt Revenue					0.00343* (0.00198)	0.00367* (0.00188)
Wave Fixed Effects	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
R^2	0.018	0.037	0.079	0.100	0.013	0.060
N	156	156	156	156	121	121
Standard errors in parentheses						
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01						

Table 5 shows us the relationship between nationalism and incidences of conflict, both civil and international. As we can see, national pride is correlated with all types of conflict. The relationship between international violence and nationalism can partially be explained by the fact that the nation rallies together against the enemy. Further, Alesina et al. (2017) write that in times of war, states typically engage in nation-building activities as well as negative propaganda against the enemy, thus creating a stronger sense of nationalism. On the other hand, the strong positive relationship between civil war and intrastate conflict with the government is surprising. I offer two explanations for this. First, governments may try to influence nationalism and create a national identity as a response to civil conflict. Second, individuals answering the questions may be proud of the side that they are for and consider that side their nation, instead of looking at the nation at large. An in-depth analysis of this is, unfortunately, out of the scope of this paper.

Table 5: Nationalism and Conflict

Correlations Between Nationalism and Conflict Indicators			
<i>Dependent Variable is Avg. National Pride</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Incidence of intrastate conflict	0.197*** (0.0454)		
Magnitude of International war and violence		0.0478*** (0.00697)	
Magnitude of Civil war and violence			0.0398*** (0.00979)
R^2	0.078	0.014	0.048
N	156	156	156

Standard errors in parentheses
 * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 6 presents evidence of relationships between nationalism and political factors. There is no significant relationship between the strength of a democracy or legal origins on nationalism. There seems to be a strong negative relationship between trust and nationalism, as well as conscription and nationalism. Where average confidence in the government and religiosity are concerned, coefficients are strong and positive.

Table 6: Correlations Between Nationalism and Political Factors

		Correlations Between Nationalism and Political Factors										
		<i>Dependent Variable is Avg. National Pride</i>										
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Democracy Index		-0.00525 (0.00430)	-0.00425 (0.00438)									
Avg. Trust				-0.493*** (0.128)	-0.486*** (0.130)							
Avg. Religiosity						0.641*** (0.0978)	0.632*** (0.102)					
Avg. Confidence in Government								0.198*** (0.0603)	0.192*** (0.0619)			
Conscription										-0.161*** (0.0449)	-0.157*** (0.0464)	
French Legal Origins												0.0692 (0.0472)
Wave Fixed Effects	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	NO
R ²	0.010	0.029	0.073	0.093	0.204	0.215	0.066	0.083	0.074	0.089	0.014	
N	156	156	156	156	156	156	156	156	156	156	156	156

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Figure 5: Relationship between Nationalism and Various Cultural Factors




Table 7 presents the evidence of the relationship between nationalism and cultural factors as discussed in the individual level analysis. Figure 5 depicts these relationships. We can see that the correlation between moral values and nationalism still holds when we exploit variation at the country level. It is worthy to note that all variables in tables 4 – 7 have extremely low explanatory power as we can see from the R^2 values.

Table 7: Nationalism and Moral Values (Country)

Correlations of National Pride with Culture						
<i>Dependent Variable is National Pride</i>						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	
	Full Sample	Full Sample	Full Sample	Wave 4	Wave 6	
Always Respect Parents	1.124*** (0.351)					
Importance of Family		1.645*** (0.3)				
Responsibility of Parents to children			1.440*** (0.176)			
Is Violence Justifiable				0.0239 (0.0414)		
Aversion to Homosexuals as Neighbors					0.362*** (0.119)	
Wave FE	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO	
R^2		0.163	0.232	0.391	0.002	0.098
N		114	225	114	60	57

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 8: Country Level Determinants of Nationalism

	Regression on Multiple Factors										
	<i>Dependent Variable is Avg. National Pride</i>										
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
GDP/Cap	-0.00000217 (0.00000214)	-0.00000131 (0.00000209)	0.00000106 (0.00000133)	0.00000132 (0.00000109)	0.00000202* (0.00000110)	0.00000202* (0.00000110)	0.00000155 (0.000009952)	0.00000213* (0.00000112)	0.00000188 (0.00000122)	0.00000218* (0.00000117)	0.00000211* (0.00000118)
Incidence of intrastate conflict	0.180*** (0.0494)	0.131** (0.0508)	0.112** (0.0480)	0.115** (0.0479)	0.115** (0.0479)	0.142*** (0.0498)	0.101* (0.0558)				
Religiosity		0.603*** (0.112)	0.635*** (0.106)	0.565*** (0.114)	0.565*** (0.114)	0.487*** (0.123)	0.515*** (0.128)	0.556*** (0.123)	0.548*** (0.128)	0.540*** (0.127)	
Avg. Confidence in Government			0.199*** (0.0481)	0.207*** (0.0474)	0.207*** (0.0474)	0.218*** (0.0478)	0.231*** (0.0476)	0.240*** (0.0470)	0.235*** (0.0482)	0.233*** (0.0484)	
Avg. Trust				-0.211* (0.124)	-0.211* (0.124)	-0.228* (0.128)	-0.235* (0.122)	-0.232* (0.126)	-0.218* (0.129)	-0.227* (0.128)	
Conscription						-0.155*** (0.0410)	-0.121*** (0.0385)	-0.103*** (0.0371)	-0.105*** (0.0374)	-0.105*** (0.0375)	
Trade							-0.00161*** (0.000579)	-0.00185*** (0.000584)	-0.00177*** (0.000581)	-0.00175*** (0.000586)	
Incidence of International war and violence								0.0788 (0.149)		0.0774 (0.154)	
Incidence of Civil war and violence									0.0632 (0.0584)		0.0628 (0.0589)
R ²	0.037	0.097	0.247	0.311	0.319	0.319	0.379	0.420	0.406	0.409	0.412
N	156	156	156	156	156	156	156	156	156	156	156

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Before explaining any of these findings, let us understand how these effects change when we control for certain factors. Table 8 presents the results of multivariate regressions controlling for wave fixed effects. We can see that the relationship for all conflict indicators, income or trust, are only either marginally significant or not significant at all, indicating that it was the correlation with other factors that was explaining the previous relationships. However, the coefficients on other factors such as trade, religiosity, confidence in government and conscription are extremely significant and are in the same direction as the correlation estimates. An interesting finding here that provides supports to the analysis on individuals, is that nationalism is negatively correlated with conscription. However, it is important to note that the interpretation here is very different. In this analysis, I find that countries that have mandatory conscription are, on average, less patriotic than countries that do not. This finding is interesting because it is not a natural experiment that gives light to it; we are essentially comparing average nationalism across countries while controlling for other factors and wave effects. The hypothesis about people's expectations of conscription cannot play a role here. I argue that nationalism is a function of the freedom one gets in their country and the exposure to nation-building activities. As individuals are given less freedom to decide how they can spend their life, when they can pursue further education and where they can go, they tend to love their nation less. However, when individuals are exposed to nation-building activities like conscription, propaganda, national day celebrations and compulsory singing of national anthems, they tend to feel prouder of their nation. Mandatory conscription is an event where these two effects are opposing each other. On one hand, individuals are being forced to train and fight for their country and on the other, they are being stripped of the liberty to decide how they would spend those years otherwise. Clearly, the effect of having less liberty dominates for the evidence above. In Spain, people were given back their liberty and they became more patriotic. Further, countries where men have this liberty and more patriotic than those that do not. Another possible explanation here is that the relationship might go in the other direction. Specifically, less nationalistic countries may use conscription as a tool for nation-building. This could explain the negative correlation between nationalism and conscription, with nationalism being an explanatory variable and conscription being the outcome. While the above analyses fail to substantiate any hypothesis of a relationship in that direction, this provides an opportunity for further research to dive deeply into. At this point, we know that this relationship exists and further research could understand the mechanisms that determine this relationship.

Conclusion

Relationships between nationalism and a variety of economic, cultural and political factors are strong and significant. There is a lot of variation in nationalism both on the individual as well as the country level. Nationalism can be beneficial for a country, especially in times of war, as much of the literature has discussed. It could also be harmful and lead to economically damaging policies such as protectionism. In this paper, I make no claim about whether nationalism is beneficial or harmful but I believe that if policy makers are looking to engage in any sort of nation-building policy, then it is worth understanding what high and low levels of nationalism are associated with. Further studies could explore the reason behind why nationalism is positively related with factors like religiosity, age and political interest, and negatively related with trust and trade openness. As of now, we only know that empirically, this is the way they correlate.

Where conscription is concerned, I find that the removal of conscription in fact increases national pride and I argue that the mechanism is through the liberty one gets when they do not need to serve. The evidence from Spain's natural experiment is consistent with evidence from the country level data. My first hypothesis that conscription increases nationalism has turned out, in some ways to be false. As for the other hypotheses, aside from income, trust and conflict, the rest of the correlations have been confirmed by the data. Further work on this could explore why trust and conflict had a surprising correlation with national pride.

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Appendix: Detailed Data Description

Appendix 1: WVS Questions Used in Individual-Level Analysis

Question No.	Question	Variable Description
G006	How proud of nationality	4: Very Proud 3: Quite Proud 2: Not Very Proud 1: Not At All Proud
X047	Scales of Income	Levels of Income that are specific to each country. For more information, I refer readers to the WVS Questionnaire
X025	Highest education level attained	1: Inadequately completed elementary education to 8: University with degree/Higher education - upper-level tertiary certificate For full list, please refer to the WVS Codebook
X036	Profession/Job	1: Member of the armed forces 0: Not a member of the armed forces
X001	Sex	1: Male 0: Female
X003	Age	13-100
E069_11	How confident in government	4: A Great Deal 3: Quite A Lot 2: Not Very Much 1: None at All
A165	Generalized trust	1: Most people can be trusted 0: Can't be too Careful
F034	Religious person	1: A religious person 0: Not a religious person/A convinced atheist
E023	Interest in Politics	4: Very Interested 3: Quite Interested 2: Not Very Interested 1: Not at All Interested
X007	Marital Status	1: Married 0: Not Married
S002	Wave	1:1981-1984 2:1989-1993 3:1994-1998 4:1999-2004 5:2005-2009 6:2010-2014
A001	Importance of Family	4: Very Important 3: Rather Important 2: Not Very Important 1: Not at all Important
A025	Respect: Always or Earned	1: Always 0: Earned/Neither
A026	Responsibility of parents to kids	1: Parents should do their best for kids 0: Parents have a life/Neither
A124_09	Do not want as Neighbors: Homosexuals	1: Mentioned 0: Not Mentioned
F114_03	Is Violence justifiable?	1: Never to 10: Always

Appendix 2: Summary of Data Sources Used in Country-Level Analysis

Variable	Source	Description
GDP/Capita	WDI	GDP per capita at constant 2010 USD
Taxes as % of Government Revenue	WDI	Value of Compulsory transfer to central government for public purpose as a % of GDP
Trade as a % of GDP	WDI	Value of Exports and Imports as % of GDP
Avg. Trust Levels	WVS	% of people that believe "Most people can be trusted"
Avg. Confidence in Government	WVS	Mean Level of Confidence in Government
Avg. Religiosity	WVS	% of people that are religious
Democracy Index	Polity IV	Polity 2: Combined Polity Score
Incidence of Armed Warfare	UCDP	Dummy variables indicating the incidence of intrastate conflict in each country-year pair
International Violence and War	MEPV	Magnitude score of episode(s) of international violence and War involving that state in that year
Civil Violence and War	MEPV	Magnitude score of episode(s) of Civil violence and War involving that state in that year
Legal Origins	LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, 2008	Dummy Variables indicating the legal origins of the country
Conscription	Mulligan and Shleifer, 2005 Wikipedia www.globalsecurity.org CIA world Factbook	Dummy Variable indicating that conscription exists in that country at that time

(un)Global Heritage Sites

Al Lim, Yale-NUS College '18

Global cities literature and UNESCO heritage sites often promote a hierarchical view of cities, which fuels city-to-city competition for status and prestige. Cities can attain prestige by promoting their cultural heritage in an instrumental way. This is undergirded by the theoretical and economic construct of the dominant global city model and its application to heritage preservation. My paper explores this phenomenon, illuminating practical problems for heritage sites because of the combination of global cities logic and UNESCO practices. Importantly, the hierarchical logic poses problems to global heritage sites even beyond the global city itself, suspended between the nexus of international institutions, state and city governments, and local actors. I argue that moving beyond this hierarchical conception will better preserve global cultural heritage, emphasizing cities' mutual interconnections and the local embeddedness of sites.

Introduction

“I have built a synagogue here, an institute for you to dwell in for eternity, in the year 1675” reads a stone plaque on the wall of the Tomb of Nahum.¹ Ironically, this ‘eternal’ structure stands at the risk of crumbling today due to time and terrorism, with no nation-state or party able to take ownership of its preservation. Contemporary institutions and provisions are not only inadequate to salvage sites like this but are exacerbating the issues surrounding marginalized heritage sites. I argue that the mutual constitution of the hierarchized and economic logic stemming from global city ideology, as well as UNESCO’s role in heritage, facilitate problematic practices in heritage sites. The rigid categorization, de-emphasis on the non-global cities and influence of the capitalist growth machine (i.e. influential coalition of elite actors) create a set of conditions that are exclusionary and produce problems on the ground for heritage

¹ Matthew Omolesky, “UNESCO in Ruins: Anti-Semitism and the Perversion of Cultural Heritage Preservation,” *The American Spectator* (2017).

conservation. There is thus a need for an ideological disruption to better address the plurality of heritage and its practices beyond the hierarchy of global cities.

The paper's focus is to expose two dominant theories that undergird heritage practices, and how their intersection damages heritage preservation efforts. The first section unpacks the contemporary definitions of the global city theory and its hierarchical models, derived from Sassen's construct. Second, common ideas of heritage espoused by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) are explained, outlining its scientific and technical rhetoric that seems objective. Third, I address how the global city model and UNESCO form an objective and hierarchical conceptualization of heritage that produces a problematic series of practices. Its effects go beyond global cities and crosses multiple scales, shaping international discourse. The last section proposes alternative reconceptualization of heritage ideology that avoids the pitfalls of contemporary practices.

The Global City

The global city theory is the dominant lens to understand the contemporary city, underpinned by agglomeration theory, which has reified the popularity of city hierarchies. Sassen's model proposes a new city typology through case studies of New York, Tokyo and London; these cities have gone through massive and parallel socio-economic changes since the 1960s in spite of different historic, political and cultural circumstances prior to this time period.² She argues that contemporary globalization is marked by unprecedented geographic dispersal of economic activity with an integrated financial market spanning the globe.³ Instead of the previous Fordist mode of centralized production, symbolized by Henry Ford's assembly line, these manufacturing processes have since been dispersed. As a result, firms are now linked together in increasingly complex manners, which requires particular forms of management and control.⁴ "Producer service firms" that comprise professionals like lawyers and accountants thus collectively coordinate and control tasks over dispersed networks.⁵ She then applies the agglomeration logic to producer services firms that choose to locate in global cities.⁶ A globally affiliated network with strong cross-border city-to-city interactions is created, which refer to interconnected hubs for producer services firms to manage critical tasks in the post-Fordist production system.⁷

² Saskia Sassen, *The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo*, 2nd ed. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001), 4.

³ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 90-91.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 126.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 8.

Building on this model of interconnected cities, Peter Hall explains how internationalization, concentration and intensity of producer services can lead to a ranking of cities.⁸ He highlights the work of the Loughborough group that considers an inventory of world cities, classifying them based on three indicators: global competence of service firms, the aggregate of each city's global service centers and different degrees of corporate service provision.⁹ These indicators are used to rank 122 cities: 10 cities are Alpha, 10 cities are Beta, 35 are Gamma, and the remaining 68 falling into the gray zone below Gamma.¹⁰ The Loughborough group's project defines these indicators as the central relationship defining the success of global cities, built upon the spatial concentration of producer service firms in global cities established by Sassen's model and its agglomeration underpinnings. Here, the order is clearly based on the economic power the city commands (or does not). At the same time, this excludes cities that do not match the selected criteria. The 122 cities are privileged based on their economic functions alone, which excludes the unquantifiable aspects of a country's or city's economy, and neglects its political, social and cultural dimensions (which are themselves entangled). By quantifying relationships between cities and ranking them based on numerical indicators in competitive hierarchies, the group is reproducing the competitive inter-city, inter-country, and inter-regional aspirations that necessarily devalues and excludes cities that do not apparently measure up.

Operationalizing the global cities' hierarchical logic, Shanghai invests an enormous amount of capital in pursuit of economic revenue and prestige. Kong's study on global cities describes how "Shanghai itself has clear and overt aspirations to be part of the race for global city status."¹¹ This is portrayed in the huge amounts of capital invested in urban infrastructure, where a city map had to be printed every three months on average in the late 1990s to keep up with the immense changes in the urban landscape.¹² Buildings like the old Shanghai Club, Cathay Hotel, and other historic structures are part of Shanghai's cultural strategy to assert its cosmopolitan reputation.¹³ It aspires to not just be the best in China, but the best in the world.

Additionally, the investment of capital into restructuring the city for a global city landscape is driven by nostalgia and rivalry; Shanghai wishes to regain its status as a leading center, which it possessed in the 1920s, and outshine Beijing.¹⁴ Shanghai's marketing strategy

⁸ Peter Hall, "Global City-Regions in the Twenty-First Century," in *Global City-Regions: Trends, Theory, Policy*, ed. Allen Scott (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 59–77.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 65.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 71.

¹¹ Lily Kong, "Cultural Icons and Urban Development in Asia: Economic Imperative, National Identity, and Global City Status," *Political Geography* 26, no. 4 (2007): 383–404, 387.

¹² *Ibid.*, 387–388.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 388.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 387, 394.

shows the internalization of the hierarchy's importance, attempting to rank up or get ahead in the race to be a "better" city occurs both domestically and internationally. The hierarchy is more than a diagnostic tool, producing a sense of competition among cities to want to outshine the other, which then affects their development and built environment. Further, Shanghai is not the classic case study of a global city, which demonstrates the influence of hierarchy and competition induced beyond global cities.

UNESCO's Role in International Heritage

Parallel to the global cities ideology is UNESCO's heritage practices, which are based on apparent objectivity and grounded in a scientific and rational mode of managing heritage. The term "Outstanding Universal Value" is commonplace in heritage preservation discourse, stemming from UNESCO's definition of "cultural heritage."¹⁵ According to UNESCO, it refers to "cultural and/or natural significance which is so exceptional as to transcend national boundaries and to be of common importance for present and future generations of all humanity."¹⁶ The transcendence of national boundaries in this case and the homogenization of *all* humanity display how UNESCO undertakes a universalist application of heritage. This forms the basis of an internationally-accepted definition of heritage, which is the foundational criteria for a site to be listed on UNESCO's World Heritage list.

Further, UNESCO's central importance in heritage preservation is strongly grounded in technoscientific and rational ideas. Logan notes that organizations like UNESCO:

"lay down international standards for professional practice—'world's best practice'—in the cultural heritage field, as well as influencing thinking in those fields in less direct ways. In these respects, UNESCO and its associated bodies may be said to impose a common stamp on cultures across the world, creating a logic of global cultural uniformity."¹⁷

Accordingly, the idea of cultural heritage is conceived from a highly technical order, which emphasizes standards, professionalism, and practice. This leads to a scientific mode of preserving heritage sites, adding to UNESCO's legitimacy as a neutral arbitrator to advise and grant countries world heritage status. Hence, ideas of heritage are cemented by a central regime, which dictates what heritage can or should be in a depoliticized and highly scientific manner.

¹⁵ UNESCO, "Operational Guidelines for Implementation of the World Heritage Convention (Paragraph 49)," 2005.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ William Logan, "Globalizing Heritage: World Heritage as a Manifestation of Modernism and the Challenge from the Periphery," *Twentieth Century Heritage: Our Recent Cultural Legacy: Proceedings of the Australia ICOMOS National Conference 2001, 2002*, 51–57, 52.

This mode of justifying heritage sites smooths over political contestation. Preah Vihear (supposedly) in Cambodia illustrates this phenomenon. It is a Shaivite temple dating back to the 9th century, which has come a hotly contested site between Thailand and Cambodia.¹⁸ It is well preserved due to its isolation and its exceptional carved stone ornamentation, appealing to “outstanding universal value.”¹⁹ The site became a flashpoint in the political tensions between rivaling factions—the Yellow and Red shirts—in Thailand. The Yellow Shirts were protesting UNESCO’s involvement in Preah Vihear, which seemed to privilege Cambodia.²⁰ The party is a domestic faction in a fractious nation-state, campaigning for the site as a symbol against its oppositional faction. Preah Vihear does not have universal appeal in this sense, appealing to only one side of a polarized country and being re-appropriated as a political symbol rather than for its heritage qualities. This contradicts the objective criteria and OUV that was designated by UNESCO. The site appropriates its label for apparently universal heritage value into political capital that the Yellow Shirts push against. Therefore, the UNESCO-shaped discourse is not as objective as its scientific and technical rhetoric suggests.

Problematic Implications from Dominant Global City and Heritage Practices

The legitimating exercise that UNESCO grants from its scientific perspective reinforces the global city ideology and its developmentalist hierarchy. My critique of this is three-fold: (1) UNESCO-based categories generate problems due to their rigidity, not allowing for space between tangible/intangible and global/local dichotomies, which create on-the-ground issues, (2) cities are then undervalued based on the scientific and developmentalist logic, and (3) key stakeholders’ growth mindset results in long-term problems for cities by privileging economic revenue at the expense of use value. Consolidating these points, there is an ideological overemphasis on UNESCO’s modes of categorization that de-emphasizes the “local,” which benefits the capitalist growth machine.

First, UNESCO’s categorization of sites is detrimental because it does not leave room for the middle ground between the tangible/intangible and global/local dichotomies, which then causes problems for heritage preservation itself. UNESCO’s categories of tangible (e.g. built sites and monuments) and intangible forms (e.g. group dance and traditional crafts) of heritage do not open up space for sites with both forms—where tangible and intangible heritage forms might be mutually constitutive. Governments and cities aspire to create and curate their sites to fit one of these categories. The focus on built heritage form ignores the social implications of

¹⁸ Brendan Borrell, “The Battle Over Preah Vihear,” *Archaeology* 66, no. 2 (2013), 55.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, 54.

²⁰ *Ibid*, 58.

their site and renders them secondary to secure their UNESCO heritage listing. The opposite focus on intangible heritage elides its relationship to the built environment or spatial cosmic forms, and leave a historically static slice of heritage. However, with the rapid urbanization of much of Asia and the world, these questions continue to be a pressing issue—what lies between these categories and how do we address heritage in this gray zone? The global cities ideology and hierarchy drives large cities to pursue the aesthetic function of heritage without consideration for their processual importance. Its ideological impetus is to get ahead of other cities and aspects of heritage that cannot be instrumentalized for this end would be left behind.

UNESCO's categories also do not allow for space between the global and local. In Singapore, the idea of "local" is reduced to a stable articulation of a group in opposition to some the foreign 'other' that complements that state narrative, resulting in its de-emphasis to promote global heritage. Chang et al. argue that the Singapore River is a complex integration of the globalization-urbanization dialectic, where local forces work together with global influence to produce the river's landscape.²¹ Nevertheless, their definition of local refers to the level of country or city, which is too general.²² One subsection of this 'local' population, the heartlanders, was evicted with the growth of exorbitant private condominiums and hotels which drove land prices up.²³ Singapore's attempt at curating an aesthetic image of the Singapore River as its icon of a global city alienates a huge part of its own 'local' population. Hence, heritage has been instituted from a top-down, non-organic perspective, which has prioritized the global city ideology at the expense of local users of space.

Extending UNESCO's rigid modes of classification that are incapable of capturing the fluidity and dynamism of heritage sites, especially in Asia, they have also entailed on-the-ground heritage malpractice. As explained above, UNESCO features as a technocratic, universalizing body that global cities aspire towards and use to project a more prestigious image of itself. However, when applying UNESCO's ideas to the site, there are clear issues on the ground. For instance, the materials and building technology of different places impact the types of preservation techniques required.²⁴ Traditional wooden houses in Korea and East Asia differ from wooden buildings, as they did not use iron nails but were put together like jigsaw puzzles.²⁵ Toxic chemicals like ethylene oxide used in the Ajanta Caves, a UNESCO heritage site, have

²¹ T.C. Chang, Shirlena Huang, and Victor Savage, "On the Waterfront: Globalization and Urbanization in Singapore," *Urban Geography* 25, no. 5 (2004): 413–36, 433.

²² *Ibid.*, 425.

²³ *Ibid.*, 426.

²⁴ Kecia Fong et al., "'Same Same but Different?': A Roundtable Discussion on the Philosophies, Methodologies, and Practicalities of Conserving Cultural Heritage in Asia," in *Routledge Handbook of Heritage in Asia*, ed. Patrick Daly and Tim Winter (Routledge, 2012), 43.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 43.

obliterated the existence of traditional, non-toxic methods and destroys the site.²⁶ By placing sites like the Ajanta Caves in UNESCO's classifications, its on-the-ground heritage management has damaged the site. The UNESCO-based approach that does not execute context-specific practices of its constituent member-states may not be the ideal mode of enabling equitable forms of heritage preservation. These problems from rigid categories like tangible/intangible, local/global and the import of western-based techniques of heritage are exacerbated by the global city hierarchical model.

My second critique addresses another form of rigid categorization based on national boundaries, which have consigned some cities off the grid, excluding and devaluing non-global cities and their heritage. Sassen's global city model created the theoretical starting point for the Loughborough group's classification. The metric only investigates the producer services sector in each city's economy, premised on a limited set of economic activities as defining features of each global city. An "Alpha" city is labelled as such because of the strategicness of advanced producer services in the city. Admittedly, this is an important economic aspect to unpack the industrial relationships in and across cities. Nevertheless, the assumption that this can ascribe a city to "Alpha" status on this virtue alone is problematic in terms of assuming an overly important role. As a result, it elides the importance of other factors in the city and assumes that the integrated global city system will continue to hold in a dynamically shifting world economy.

This mode of economic ranking also consigns other cities to irrelevance along a developmentalist spectrum that implies a continuum of value. Hall claims that the logic of stratifying cities is "simple," assigning arbitrary numbers according to the outcome of the advanced producer service firms metrics.²⁷ Its simplicity belies a more sinister devaluation of other cities. Although Sassen states that her approach cannot account for many cities that have not experienced these developments, she explains that Lusaka is not a player in major economic processes within the global market.²⁸ Robinson disagrees, citing how Lusaka's copper exports and its other economic activities display key functions in national and regional centrality.²⁹ These relate to how Lusaka remains a significant market for goods and services from across Zambia and the world.³⁰ However, when viewed through the lens of hierarchized global cities, it is irrelevant and invisible. Friedmann reinforces this concept in building his world city paradigm, stating that over 50% of the Brazilian population is "economically irrelevant" when

²⁶ Ibid, 48.

²⁷ Hall, "Global City-Regions in the Twenty-First Century," 70.

²⁸ Saskia Sassen, *Cities in a World Economy* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press, 1994), 198.

²⁹ Robinson, *Ordinary Cities*, 101.

³⁰ Ibid, 101.

looked through the lens of global capitalism.³¹ Therefore, the global city hierarchy has not just created a spectrum of value that increases according to economic power but also rendered a theoretical void that swallows much of the world's urban population and their claim to heritage(s).

UNESCO's operations defined by nation-state boundaries and the global cities' emphasis on the city itself also render regional hinterlands as backwards and invisible. For instance, Batam is in Singapore's hinterland but does not have its own heritage site. Instead Singapore is the focus of heritage for the city-state, even though its influence exceeds its borders. The urban morphology in places like Batamindo, built by Jurong Town Corporation, is distinctly of Singaporean origin. Nevertheless, places like Batam will not have its own heritage, as Singaporean capital for heritage will only be channeled towards cultivating its own global city ambitions. The ideological impetus to pursue heritage in the global city is what Kong calls "urban boosterism," which automatically assigns the non-urban and hinterland to a lower status.³² Places like Batam where Singaporean infrastructure is planted show the influence of a global city to grow its own investment portfolio by leveraging on regional markets and space, but unwillingness to cultivate cultural capital in these areas. Hence, the competitive drive behind inter-country and inter-city competition that privileges economic indicators renders places like Batam invisible, viewed as a hinterland without the need for its own heritage development.

The third critique focuses on the capitalist logic underlying the global city ideology, which privileges exchange value over the site's use value. To differentiate between the ideas of use and exchange values, one can think about the idea of a building. The building provides residents with a home (use value), whereas it simultaneously generates rent (exchange value) for its owners.³³ In cities, there is a coalition of actors from a wide range of elite groups who push for the city as a growth machine to increase aggregate rents and trap related wealth for themselves to benefit; they eliminate alternative visions for the local and meanings of the community.³⁴ This means that processes like gentrification would be prioritized under the mantra of urban growth and development. As a result, issues like heritage get sidelined.

Hoi An's heritage situation places it squarely at the center of this conflict between exchange and use values. Its inclusion on UNESCO's World Heritage list has caused severe issues, which do not seem immediately solvable. Its touristification caused by its inscription has

³¹ John Friedmann, "Where We Stand: A Decade of World City Research," in *World Cities in a World-System*, ed. Paul Knox and Peter Taylor (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 21–47, 41.

³² Kong, "Cultural Icons and Urban Development in Asia: Economic Imperative, National Identity, and Global City Status," 386.

³³ John R. Logan and Harvey L. Molotch, *Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2007), 1-2.

³⁴ *Ibid*, 50-51.

resulted in a wild pace of development and gradual destruction of Hoi An 's heritage features.³⁵ Local people have changed their mode of production to adapt to the growing number of international tourists, where they turn their fishing boats into tourist boats and *xích lô* tricycles now carrying tourists.³⁶ However, there are severe threats to the sustainable development of tourism in Hoi An on economic social and cultural grounds.³⁷ The issue here was that the UNESCO officials knew about it but had no power to implement changes, and the Vietnamese officials would not want to do so at the risk of impacting tourist revenue.³⁸ As a result, the exchange value of the world heritage site is privileged against its use value, where the coalition of actors including the Vietnamese state officials will not deviate from pursuing an increase in capital even when the site itself (and the very premise on which the capital is being generated) is at risk. The drive from ideological developmentalism of inter-city competition to generate higher tourist appeal with UNESCO's "objective" branding of Hoi An creates a situation where generating revenue from tourists is an unsustainable priority at the demise of its own heritage. These three critiques illustrate UNESCO's influence underlies and legitimates the global city ideology's hierarchy of inter-city competition and focus on exchange value, rendering some sites as invisible and deprioritizing the importance of site preservation.

Alternative Approaches to Heritage

While critical of the problems from the status quo of heritage practices, driven by the combined influence of global cities and UNESCO, this paper also provides two reconceptualizations for heritage: namely the need for a new lexicon for global cities/heritage and a movement away from the developmentalist *telos*. First, Brenner and Schmid's recent work on planetary urbanization offers a possible pathway to combat inherited assumption.³⁹ They argue that sociospatial arrangements and infrastructural networks beyond metropolitan cores are integral parts of the worldwide urban condition.⁴⁰ Thinking beyond the city to the concept of city-region and beyond provides a more accurate lens of understanding issues related to heritage. The example of Batamindo and Singapore's presence on non-Singaporean territory creates a set of heritage-related issues that do not fit neatly into any form of UNESCO categories. By adopting a broader scalar lens to understand the rapid rates of contemporary urbanization and heritage-related issues,

³⁵ Nir Avieli, "The Rise and Fall (?) Of Hôi An, a UNESCO World Heritage Site in Vietnam," *Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia* 30, no. 1 (2015): 35–71, 58.

³⁶ Ibid, 53.

³⁷ Ibid, 61.

³⁸ Ibid, 62.

³⁹ Neil Brenner and Christian Schmid, "The 'Urban Age' in Question," in *Implosions-Explosions*, ed. Neil Brenner (Berlin: Jovis, 2014), 310–37.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

UNESCO would then be able to adapt its fetishization of categorization based on nation-states boundaries to address the multiplicity of heritage spaces, publics and city icons.

This works in conjunction with a rejection of the developmentalist approach, removing inherited assumptions that stem from colonial and reductive perspectives. Massey's *For Space* re-imagines and presents an alternate approach to space.⁴¹ She specifically rejects the modernization theory, which refers to first world countries being ahead on a teleological path.⁴² She argues that countries occur and exist simultaneously, with power relations produced through the relational constructions of space.⁴³ Rethinking the hierarchy of global cities and the power relations heritage stakeholders, Massey's work provides a productive avenue to destabilize the hierarchized and simplistic thinking that global cities have created.

Massey's work echoes Robinson's *Ordinary Cities*, which presents an important post-colonial critique, asserting that all cities are best understood as ordinary.⁴⁴ She highlights their dynamism and diversity, produced by its people's inventiveness. Instead of Western notions of global or modern cities in opposition to their Third-World counterparts in a larger system of a priori analytical hierarchies or developmentalist frameworks, Robinson argues for a comparative and cosmopolitan approach to understanding cities. In other words, she advocates for cities to be analyzed as unique assemblages dynamically interacting within and between each other.⁴⁵ By grounding future policy outlooks in non-inherited forms of city hierarchies, there can be more productive modes of heritage preservation strategies.

Further, cities would not be rendered invisible nor feel the need to "catch up" to other "global cities." In doing so, issues of the local/localisms are addressed because the local and the global do not come up as an oppositional binary, where the global is privileged. As a result, the plurality of heritage's syncretic multiplicity and dynamic simultaneity can be explored through consultative processes of preservation.

Conclusion

Global cities' totalizing rhetoric is bolstered by UNESCO's scientific and technical discourse, producing and entrenching problems in heritage conservation. Many global cities instrumentalize their UNESCO heritage sites as part of the touristic appeal. London has four UNESCO world heritage sites that include the Palace of Westminster and Westminster Abbey, the Tower of London, the Maritime Greenwich, and the Royal Botanic Gardens in Kew.

⁴¹ Doreen Massey, *For Space* (London, UK: Sage, 2005).

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Robinson, *Ordinary Cities*, 1.

⁴⁵ Ibid, 109.

Moreover, in other commonly cited global cities: Tokyo has Ogaswara Islands and Le Corbusier's architectural work, Paris has its Seine River banks, and New York City has the Statue of Liberty. The value in driving tourist demand and international cultural appreciation embodied by these sites are crucial for the global city. Nevertheless, these modes of heritage conservation produce a set of exclusionary practices, relying on western modes of thinking or practice, that result in the devaluing of many other sites.

This applies to the global cities and beyond. The rhetoric and touristic claims, generated by global city competition, transcends the physical boundaries of the global city. The ideological impetus similarly affects local, national and regional scales beyond urban governance. The reproduction of the developmentalist trajectory is an outmoded form of exclusion, premised on narrow economic indicators. A new lexicon around these heritage or global city processes has yet to be formed, as the very contested ontologies of these two concepts make them increasingly difficult to define with existing vocabularies. However, the pitfalls of modernist and development practices can be avoided through alternative ideologies. Moving forward, critical consideration by policymakers, practitioners and important stakeholders of these conceptual naturalizations can enable the avoidance of pitfalls in heritage preservation.

Further study at a specific scale or through alternative hierarchies can extend or complicate my arguments. An in-depth analysis of one global city, its relationship to other global cities, and various policies on its heritage would provide productive ways to complicate my arguments. Here, Harvey's argument for urban governments' shift from managerialism to entrepreneurialism, which focuses on the scale of urban governance, can be a productive interlocutor.⁴⁶ Assertions on inter-city competition can be traced through these relationships and the political economy driving heritage in various contexts. One could also explore the correlation between hierarchized lists of global cities based on cultural sites, its economic counterpart, and the number/type of sites in each global city. This would generate a quantitative and empirical basis to nuance the proposed theoretical disruptions.

Today, the tomb of Nahum is still crumbling; it remains in the untouched gray zone between UNESCO, nation-states that are unwilling to claim it, and ISIS' terrorist antics. Global city thinking and UNESCO entrenches the inaction around this site, where UNESCO's supposed rational and scientific prowess cannot solve the political tensions surrounding the tomb. Meanwhile, global cities continue investing in its own heritage sites and other cities internalize those aspirations. Will the tomb of Nahum then continue to fall between the cracks of UNESCO's categories? Will the promise of the tomb standing for eternity be forever dashed?

⁴⁶ David Harvey, 'From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism: The Transformation in Urban Governance in Late Capitalism,' *Geografiska Annaler. Series B, Human Geography* 71, no. 1 (1989): 3-17.

Acknowledgements

This space of representation is an intellectual debt to the community and Urban Studies department at Yale-NUS College. Thank you to Dr. Aditya Ranganath and my classmates for walking through its crafting, as part of the Global Cities class, and Serena for being an excellent peer reviewer. Professor Jane Jacobs and Professor Nick Smith have been instrumental and inspirational, facilitating a program that acknowledges these very contestations both in theory and in practice.

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About the Authors



Francesca is a Politics, Philosophy and Economics (PPE) major at Yale-NUS College and a UWC Atlantic graduate. She plans to work in the public health sector, and she is particularly keen on exploring the intersection between health, citizenship and human rights. Other academic interests include migration and displacement, political authoritarianism, social movements, and Latin American studies. In her spare time, she bakes and studies Portuguese and Arabic.



Peter is a graduate from the Yale-NUS Class of 2018 who majored in Philosophy, Politics and Economics. The semester he spent studying abroad in Amman, Jordan, sparked his abiding interest in Middle East politics and Islam. He is currently preparing to spend a year in Indonesia to learn Bahasa Indonesia and broaden his understanding of Islam in Southeast Asia.



Ng Qi Siang is a senior at Yale-NUS College majoring in History and Minorng in Global Affairs. Interested in the intersection between History and International Relations, his main interests are in postcolonial Asian History and East Asian International History. He is currently pursuing a capstone project on the construction of Chinese nationalism in Cultural Revolution model operas. Outside of academics, he is also a prolific writer on current affairs in Singapore.



Kam Qiang Wei is a fourth-year Political Science student at NUS. His main research interest revolves around ethnic politics, identity and political violence in South Asia, more specifically in Bangladesh. At present, he is interested to examine the links between authoritarianism and praetorian politics and ethno-political violence in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) in Bangladesh. Other academic interests include public policy analysis in the South Asian context. Additionally, he has been placed on the FASS Dean's list in semester 2, AY 2016-17 and semester 1, AY 2017-18.



Nathasha is a second-year student at Yale-NUS College who intends to major in Anthropology and minor in Chinese Studies. Her main research interests are centered around Protestant Japanese ethnic churches and processes of identity formation among Japanese Christians in Singapore. Other academic interests include Chinese folk religion in Singapore and Chinese martial arts fiction.



Dhivesh is a final year economics major at Yale-NUS College. His main research interests are in econometric methods as well as development and cultural economics. Outside of academics, he is excited by transport technology and data analytics. In the future, he hopes to help countries adopt transport technology solutions that will benefit them.



Al Lim is an Urban Studies major and Arts & Humanities Minor at Yale-NUS College. Part-Thai and part-Singaporean, he grew up in Sydney and South Carolina before returning to his home continent. His academic works have been published in the peer-reviewed journal IAAPS' *Perspectives* and *Singapore Policy Journal*, and his creative works have appeared in *STAPLE Magazine*, Harvard's *Tuesday Magazine*, *pressure gauge press*, as well as anthologies like *SingPoWriMo* (Math Paper Press) and *Twin Cities* (Landmark Books). His research interests comprise peri-urbanization, spatial politics and urban theory in Southeast Asia.



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